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In its broadest sense, this Article examines the relationship between
science and the law in the context of postpartum illness.1  From classical
antiquity to the present day, physicians and scientists have investigated the
causes, correlates, and consequences of the depressions and psychoses that
develop in some women following their transition to motherhood.2  The sci-
entific investigation of postpartum illness has been characterized by an
open-ended search for knowledge with the recognition that scientific find-
ings published one day are subject to revision the next.3  Legislators and
judges also have sought to understand postpartum illness as necessary to
make laws that affect and adjudicate disputes involving new mothers,4 al-
though legal inquiries regarding postpartum illness have yielded factual find-
ings that are fixed in time.5  When the results of scientific research and legal
research are compared in the context of postpartum illness, several differ-
ences emerge,6 perhaps because science and law share neither a common
process nor common goals.7  This Article resolves these differences and de-
velops a new organizing principle for understanding illness; that is, a unified
health law framework that limits distinctions between physical and mental
illness.
This Article has three Parts.  Part I examines the scientific understand-
ing of postpartum illness from 400 B.C. to the present day.  From classical
antiquity to the late nineteenth century, scientific understandings of postpar-
tum illness were based primarily on observed temporal relationships be-
tween childbirth or lactation and the symptoms of mental illness.8  At the
turn of the twentieth century, psychoanalytic theories of postpartum illness,
including theories that explained causality in terms of female intra-psychic
1 As discussed in more detail at text accompanying note 27, infra, postpartum depres- R
sion is characterized by sadness, crying, self-blame, loss of control, irritability, anxiety,
tension, and sleep difficulties that may develop in new mothers between two weeks and
six months postpartum and that may last as long as six to twelve months.  Postpartum
psychosis is characterized by extreme emotional liability, mania, disorganization, and/or
the experience of hallucinations and delusions with an onset of three to fourteen days
postpartum. See infra text accompanying note 28. R
2 See infra Part I.
3 See infra Part I; see also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S.
579, 590 (1993) (“Science is not an encyclopedic body of knowledge about the universe.
Instead, it represents a process for proposing and refining theoretical explanations about
the world that are subject to further testing and refinement.”) (emphasis in original) (in-
ternal references and citations omitted); NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, A CONVERGENCE OF
SCIENCE AND LAW: A SUMMARY REPORT OF THE FIRST MEETING OF THE SCIENCE, TECHNOL-
OGY, AND LAW PANEL 1 (2001) [hereinafter NRC] (discussing the process of fact finding
in science).
4 See infra Part II.
5 See infra Part II; see also Vern R. Walker, Epistemic and Non-epistemic Aspects of
the Factfinding Process in Law, 5 J. PHIL., SCI. & L., 1–2 (2005), http://www.psljournal.
com/archives/all/walkerpaper.cfm (examining the process of fact finding in law).
6 See infra Part II.
7 See, e.g., David Goodstein, How Science Works, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIEN-
TIFIC EVIDENCE 67, 80–81 (2nd ed. 2000).
8 See infra Part I(A).
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conflict surrounding gender and interpersonal relationships and roles, gained
popularity.9  In the second half of the twentieth century, unicausal hormone-
based theories10 were followed by theories explaining causality in terms of a
reduction in neurotransmitters11 and the influence of psychosocial and soci-
ocultural factors.12  In the first decade of the twenty-first century, a number
of neuroanatomical and neurofunctional findings13 as well as genetic find-
ings14 and evolutionary theories15 contributed to the scientific understanding
of postpartum illness.  Part I concludes by summarizing postpartum illness’s
current (and still incomplete) scientific understanding and outlining a con-
temporary multifactorial model for postpartum illness that gives weight to
hormonal, neurochemical, neuroanatomical, genetic, evolutionary,
psychosocial, sociocultural, and other biological and environmental factors.16
Because Part I provides scientific support for the legal arguments presented
in Parts II and III, Part I is necessarily technical.
Part II examines the legal understanding, incorporation, and utilization
of postpartum illness.  Part II finds that a range of past, current, and pro-
posed legal authorities, including criminal infanticide laws, judicial opinions
interpreting health insurance policy provisions, and postpartum awareness
laws expressly reference postpartum illness, its probable causes, and its ob-
served effects.17  Part II discovers that the science lawmakers use to support
and interpret postpartum law and policy is not always accurate,18 and sug-
gests that lawmakers who rely on outdated scientific findings risk develop-
ing inappropriate postpartum laws and policies, encouraging the introduction
of expert testimony that will not meet evidentiary standards for use in litiga-
tion, establishing conflicts between different health laws and policies, and
supporting the public misunderstanding of postpartum illness.19  Part II con-
cludes by arguing that lawmakers, judges, and other stakeholders need to
recognize the complexity of illness etiology, including the etiology of post-
partum illness.20  To assist with these efforts, Part II proposes a contempo-
rary legal explanation of postpartum illness that emphasizes the illness’s
incomplete understanding and likely multifactorial etiology.21  Part II also
proposes the repeal or reformulation of outdated common law tests designed
to distinguish physical and mental illness.
9 See infra Part I(B).
10 See infra Part I(C).
11 See infra Part I(D).
12 See infra Part I(H).
13 See infra Part I(E).
14 See infra Part I(F).
15 See infra Part I(G).
16 See infra Part I(I).
17 See infra Parts II(A), II(B), and II(C).
18 See infra Parts II(A), II(B), and II(C).
19 See infra Part II(D).
20 See infra Part II(D).
21 See infra Part II(D).
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Part III demonstrates that advances in the scientific understanding of
postpartum illness combined with recent developments in mental health par-
ity and disability discrimination law may impact future litigation in favor of
some women with postpartum illness.22  Using mental health parity and disa-
bility discrimination law as a platform, Part III also questions the appropri-
ateness of health law frameworks that are built on binary understandings of
illness as well as the legal consequences that attach to judicial findings of
mental versus physical illness.23  Part III concludes by proposing a limited,
legal merger of physical and mental illness.24
A note regarding the diagnostic terms used in this Article: health pro-
fessionals currently recognize three types of postpartum conditions including
the postpartum blues, postpartum depression, and postpartum psychosis.
The postpartum blues affect a reported 30% to 80% of new mothers and may
be described as a transitory, natural reaction to the sequelae of childbirth that
is characterized by increased emotionality, irritability, anxiety, and tearful-
ness.25  The postpartum blues typically last one to two weeks following
childbirth and may peak at postpartum days three, four, and five.26  The sci-
entific and legal understanding of the postpartum blues is not at issue in this
Article.
Postpartum depression, the second most common postpartum illness,
affects a reported 3% to 30% of new mothers and is characterized by sad-
ness, crying, self-blame, loss of control, irritability, anxiety, tension, and
sleep difficulties that develop between two weeks and six months postpar-
tum and may last as long as six to twelve months after childbirth.27  Postpar-
22 See infra Parts III(A) and III(B).
23 See infra Part III(C).
24 See infra Part III(C).
25 The characteristics, time of onset, length of illness, and percentage of women af-
fected by the postpartum blues vary depending on the source of information. See AM.
PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 423
(4th ed., text rev. 2000) [hereinafter DSM-IV-TR] (citing a 70% prevalence); IRIS F.
LITT, TAKING OUR PULSE: THE HEALTH OF AMERICA’S WOMEN 182 (1997) (citing a
50–80% prevalence); Joan C. Chrisler & Ingrid Johnston-Robledo, Raging Hormones?
Feminist Perspectives on Premenstrual Syndrome and Postpartum Depression, in RE-
THINKING MENTAL HEALTH AND DISORDER: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES 174, 180 (Mary Ballou
& Laura S. Brown eds., 2002) (citing a 50–80% prevalence); Maureen J. Giovannini, The
Relevance of Gender in Postpartum Emotional Disorders, in GENDER CONSTRUCTS AND
SOCIAL ISSUES 209, 211 (Tony L. Whitehead & Barbara V. Reid eds., 1992) (citing a
60–80% prevalence); Lucy Martinez-Schallmoser, Postpartum Depression in Hispanic
Women, in ANNUAL REVIEW OF WOMEN’S HEALTH VOLUME II 243, 245 (Beverly J.
McElmurry & Randy Spreen Parker eds., 1995) (citing a 50–80% prevalence); Jo Ann
Rosenfeld, Depression and Premenstrual Syndrome, in HANDBOOK OF WOMEN’S HEALTH:
AN EVIDENCE-BASED APPROACH 437, 452 (Jo Ann Rosenfeld ed., 2001) (citing a 30–75%
prevalence).
26 See DSM-IV-TR, supra note 25, at 423; LITT, supra note 25, at 182; Chrisler, R
supra note 25, at 180; Giovannini, supra note 25, at 211; Martinez-Schallmoser, supra R
note 25, at 245; Rosenfeld, supra note 25, at 452. R
27 Chrisler, supra note 25, at 180. Although current diagnostic classification manuals R
classify depression as “postpartum” only when its onset occurs within the first four
weeks following childbirth, many researchers and clinicians believe that the postpartum
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tum psychosis, the third—and most serious and least common—postpartum
illness, affects a reported 0.1% to 2.0% of new mothers and is characterized
by extreme emotional lability, mania, disorganization, and/or the experience
of hallucinations and delusions with an onset of three to fourteen days post-
partum.28  The scientific and legal understandings of postpartum depression
and postpartum psychosis are at issue in this Article.  Hereinafter this Article
will refer to either postpartum depression or postpartum psychosis, as appro-
priate and as defined herein, unless the reference is to both postpartum de-
pression and postpartum psychosis, in which case the generic phrase
“postpartum illness” is used.
I. SCIENTIFIC UNDERSTANDINGS OF POSTPARTUM ILLNESS
A. Early Medical Observations
For centuries, physicians have observed a temporal relation between the
occurrence of female-specific reproductive events and the symptoms of ill-
ness that traditionally have been classified as “mental.”29  One of the earliest
recorded medical observations of postpartum illness occurred in 400 B.C.,
when Greek physician Hippocrates described a severe case of insomnia and
restlessness that began on the sixth day in a woman who bore twins.30  In the
eleventh century, Italian physician Trotula di Ruggiero documented a link
between uterine functions and melancholia: “[I]f the womb is too moist, the
brain is filled with water & the moisture running over to the eyes compels
them involuntarily to shed tears.”31  In the eighteenth century, German phy-
period can last up to six months or even a year following childbirth. See DSM-IV-TR,
supra note 25, at 422; see, e.g., SHAILA KULKARNI MISRI, PREGNANCY BLUES: WHAT R
EVERY WOMAN NEEDS TO KNOW ABOUT DEPRESSION DURING PREGNANCY 191 (2005).  For
wide-ranging descriptions of the characteristics, time of onset, length of illness, and per-
centage of women affected by postpartum depression, see, for example, LITT, supra note
25, at 183; Giovannini, supra note 25, at 211; Martinez-Schallmoser, supra note 25, at R
245; Rosenfeld, supra note 25, at 452–53. R
28 For various descriptions of the characteristics, time of onset, length of illness, and
percentage of women affected by postpartum psychosis see, for example, LITT, supra
note 25, at 183; Chrisler, supra note 25, at 179–80; Giovannini, supra note 25, at 211; R
Martinez-Schallmoser, supra note 25, at 245; Rosenfeld, supra note 25, at 453. R
29 See, e.g., ILZA VEITH, HYSTERIA: THE HISTORY OF A DISEASE 1 (1965) (examining
the historical development of hysteria, including its nature, origins, symptoms, and man-
agement); see also Martinez-Schallmoser, supra note 25, at 247 (discussing early obser- R
vations and documentation of mental illness in women experiencing reproductive events).
30 See, e.g., Michael W. O’Hara & Scott Stuart, Pregnancy and Postpartum, in PSY-
CHIATRIC TREATMENT OF THE MEDICALLY ILL 253, 253 (Robert G. Robertson & William R.
Yates eds., 1999) (referencing the story); George Stein, Perinatal Psychiatric Disorders,
in SEMINARS IN GENERAL ADULT PSYCHIATRY 635, 635 (George Stein & Greg Wilkinson
eds., 2d ed. 2007) (referencing the story); Margaret G. Spinelli, Psychiatric Disorders
During Pregnancy and Postpartum, 53 J. AM. MED. WOMEN’S ASS’N. 165, 165 (1998)
(referencing Hippocrates’s documentation of postpartum illness).
31 Meir Steiner, Kimberly A. Yonkers, & Elias Eriksson, Preface to MOOD DISORDERS
IN WOMEN, at xv (Meir Steiner, Kimberly A. Yonkers, & Elias Eriksson eds., 2000); Rudy
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sician Berger published a thesis referring to a “lacteal irritation [that] some-
times falls upon the brain, either immediately after confinement, or at the
period of the lacteal revolution.”32  According to Berger, “Some who have
been confined . . . have a fixed pain in the head; others are in a stupor, have
a dull expression, and reason falsely.”33
The first comprehensive studies of postpartum illness were conducted
in the nineteenth century and tended to categorize postpartum illness as
pregnancy-related (if occurring during gestation), puerperal (if occurring
within six weeks of childbirth), or lactational (if occurring after six weeks of
childbirth).34  In 1838, French psychiatrist Jean-Etienne-Dominique Esquirol
published his famous volume Des Maladies Mentales, which included an
essay examining the Mental Alienation of Those Recently Confined and of
Nursing Women.35  Based on his years of experience in private psychiatric
practice and in treating women at Salpeˆtrie`re, the famous Parisian teaching
hospital,36 Esquirol believed that postpartum illness was caused by a wo-
man’s failure to nurse, or suppression of her milk: “[I]nsanity manifests
itself most frequently, among women who do not nurse.”37  Esquirol con-
cluded by recommending treatment, not punishment, for women with post-
partum illness.38
Nydegger, Postpartum Depression: More than the “Baby Blues”?, in 3 MENTAL DISOR-
DERS OF THE NEW MILLENNIUM 1, 2 (Thomas G. Plante ed., 2006).
32 See E. ESQUIROL, DES MALADIES MENTALES 127 (E. K. Hunt trans., Philadelphia,
Lea, and Blanchard 1845) (1838) (referencing Berger’s thesis and findings).
33 Id.
34 See, e.g., JOHN MACPHERSON, MENTAL AFFECTIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
STUDY OF INSANITY 47 (1899) (categorizing postpartum illness by “pregnancy,” “parturi-
tion,” or “lactation”); Hugh F. Butts, Post-Partum Psychiatric Problems: A Review of
the Literature Dealing with Biological Theories, 61 J. NAT’L MED. ASS’N 136, 136 (1969)
(noting the nineteenth-century classification of postpartum illnesses as “puerperal” or
“lactational”).
35 ESQUIROL, supra note 32, at 125–43. R
36 Id. at 125.
37 Id. at 129–30.
Here are very naturally presented, two interesting questions, which for a long time
furnished matter for debate.  1. Is the suppression or diminution of the milk, the
cause or effect of mental alienation?  We may reply, that insanity manifests itself
most frequently, among women who do not nurse.  Of our ninety-two insane wo-
men, twenty-nine were single, and sixty-three married.  Now single women rarely
nurse.  The greatest number of facts, prove, that the milk diminishes, is sup-
pressed, or loses its distinctive qualities, before the explosion of delirium; but
there are observations also, which furnish undeniable proof, that the suppression
or diminution of milk, takes place only after the explosion of insanity.
Id.
38 Id. at 132.
It is unnecessary to remark, that women who have become insane in consequence
of confinement and lactation, ought to be submitted to the same general principles
of treatment, with other insane persons; that isolation, the aids of hygiene, and
moral means, ought not to be neglected, and that these alone have sufficed to
effect a cure, although more rarely, than in other forms of mental alienation.
Id.
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George Fielding Blandford, a British physician and Fellow of the Royal
College of Physicians in London, also spoke of connections between child-
birth, lactation, and mental illness in a series of lectures given at St. George’s
Hospital during the second half of the nineteenth century.39  In a lecture enti-
tled “The Pathology of Insanity,” Blandford formally recognized a “puer-
peral insanity,” the symptoms of which “may first be noticed during labor or
immediately after, within a week, within a month, two months, six months—
in fact, at almost any period within a twelvemonth.”40  Blandford also recog-
nized an “insanity of lactation” that appeared within a few months of child-
birth, but disagreed with Esquirol’s failure-to-nurse and suppression-of-milk
theories, focusing instead on the negative effects of excessive nursing.  Ac-
cording to Blandford, “insanity of lactation” was due to “anaemia brought
about by prolonged suckling, or by the mother making undue efforts to
nurse, and so overtaxing her strength.”41
Perhaps confused by Esquirol’s and Blandford’s competing theories,
physicians writing at the turn of the century attributed postpartum illness to
both lactation as well as the cessation of lactation.  John MacPherson, a Brit-
ish physician who gave several lectures on “Mental Diseases” at the Royal
Colleges School of Medicine in Edinburgh, described his understanding of
postpartum illness in 1899.42  According to MacPherson, postpartum illness
can be caused both by lactation, which produces a “physical exhaustion,
accompanied by malnutrition and anemia,” as well as the “sudden cessation,
of any cause, from the milk secretion.”43
Notwithstanding these early observations, today’s physicians and scien-
tists generally agree that neither lactation nor the cessation thereof causes
postpartum illness,44 although no consensus has emerged regarding the exact
role or roles played by genetic, biological, and environmental factors.45
39 GEORGE FIELDING BLANDFORD, INSANITY AND ITS TREATMENT: LECTURES ON THE
TREATMENT, MEDICAL AND LEGAL, OF INSANE PATIENTS v (3rd ed., New York, William
Wood & Co. 1886).
40 Id. at 39; see also id. at vii (noting listings of “insanity of pregnancy” and “puer-
peral insanity” within Lecture III).
41 Id. at 39.  In 1893, George H. Rohe´, an American physician and insane asylum
superintendent, agreed that prolonged or excessive lactation was probably the chief cause
of insanity occurring during the extended nursing period (and that sepsis was probably
the cause of insanity in the immediate postpartum). See George H. Rohe´, Lactational
Insanity, 21 JAMA 325, 325 (1893).
42 See MACPHERSON, supra note 34, at v. R
43 Id. at 48.
44 See Ann Dunnewold & Jeannette Crenshaw, Breastfeeding and Postpartum De-
pression: Is There a Connection?, 15 BREASTFEEDING ABSTRACTS 25, 25 (May 1996) (ex-
ploring the connection between breastfeeding and postpartum illness and concluding that
breastfeeding does not increase a woman’s risk of postpartum depression or anxiety); J.
C. Ingram, R. J. Greenwood & M. W. Woolridge, Hormonal Predictors of Postnatal
Depression at 6 Months in Breastfeeding Women, 21 J. REPROD. & INFANT PSYCHOL. 61,
62 (2003) (referencing Dunnewold and Crenshaw’s findings); text accompanying notes
182–183, infra. R
45 See infra Parts I(C)–(I).
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B. Psychoanalytic Theories
During the first half of the twentieth century, psychoanalytic theories of
postpartum illness, including those that explained causality in terms of fe-
male intra-psychic conflict surrounding gender and interpersonal relation-
ships and roles, gained popularity.46  Gregory Zilboorg, a Russian-born
psychoanalyst and historian of psychiatry who eventually established a psy-
choanalytic practice in New York City, stated his belief in 1928 that postpar-
tum psychosis was the result of an “unresolved positive Oedipus situation,
or with its anal regressive resultant—father identification.”47  American psy-
chiatrist Martin Orens described in 1955 a case of postpartum depression
highlighting female castration conflicts.48  American psychoanalyst Gilbert
Rose described in 1962 a case of postpartum depression in which “depres-
sion was largely based on need for punishment for the unconscious oedipal
gratification of the transference pregnancy and birth.”49  Robert Daniels and
Herbert Lessow, two mid-twentieth century American psychiatrists, ex-
plained their understanding in 1964 that women with postpartum illness “an-
ticipate being treated as dependent children rather than adults.  They can
accept only limited responsibility at home and find it difficult or impossible
to function outside the home.”50  Dutch psychoanalyst Hendrika Halberstadt-
Freud argued in 1993 that a “woman’s unresolved symbiotic illusion with her
mother plays a central role in postpartum depression.”51 These and other
psychoanalytic theories tend to place fault on the mother for her unconscious
failure to achieve a mature femininity.52
46 See, e.g., Giovannini, supra note 25, at 213 (discussing psychoanalytic theories of R
postpartum illness).
47 Gregory Zilboorg, Post-Partum Schizophrenias, 68 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DIS-
EASE 370, 383 (1928); see also Butts, supra note 34, at 137 (referencing Zilboorg’s R
findings).
48 Lawrence D. Blum, Psychodynamics of Postpartum Depression, 24 PSYCHOANA-
LYTIC PSYCHOLOGY 45, 51 (2007) (citing Martin H. Orens, Setting a Termination Date—
An Impetus to Analysis, 3 JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN PSYCHOANALYTIC ASSOCIATION 651-
665 (1955)).
49 Blum, supra note 48, at 51 (quoting Gilbert J. Rose, Unconscious Birth Fantasies R
in the Ninth Month of Treatment, 10 JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN PSYCHOANALYTIC ASSOCI-
ATION 677–88 (1962)).
50 Robert Daniels & Herbert Lessow, Severe Postpartum Reactions, 5 PSYCHOSOMAT-
ICS 21, 24 (1964). See generally Clifford K. Dorne, Psychodynamics Versus Endocrinol-
ogy in Postpartum Psychosis: A Critique of the Diminished Capacity Test in Infanticide
Cases, 16 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 16, 23 (1991) (placing Daniels and Lessow’s understanding
of postpartum illness in historical context).
51 Blum, supra note 48, at 51 (citing Hendrika C. Halberstadt-Freud, Postpartum De- R
pression and Symbiotic Illusion, 10 PSYCHOANALYTIC PSYCHOLOGY 407–23 (1993)).
52 Giovannini, supra note 25, at 213. R
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C. Hormone-Based Theories
Although psychoanalytic theories of postpartum illness gained popular-
ity in the first half of the twentieth century, biological theories, especially
unicausal hormone-based theories, began to emerge in the second half of the
twentieth century.53  Hormones are chemical messengers produced by the
endocrine glands that are released into the bloodstream and transported to
distant parts of the body, where they exert a specific effect for the benefit of
the body as a whole.54  The three main sex hormones (estrogen, progester-
one, and testosterone) are derived from cholesterol through a series of chem-
ical reactions.55  Changes in the levels of sex hormones in the human body
allow for conception, pregnancy, and childbirth.56  During pregnancy, for ex-
ample, a woman’s estrogen and progesterone levels drastically increase to
allow for the maintenance of pregnancy.57  Within three days of childbirth, a
woman’s estrogen and progesterone levels return to pre-pregnancy levels.58
Historically, clinicians and scientists observed a temporal relation be-
tween the onset and recurrence of depression in women and the times at
which hormone levels were known to fluctuate significantly, including dur-
ing the reproductive events of puberty, pregnancy, childbirth, and meno-
pause.59  It is not surprising, then, that many clinicians, scientists, medical
journalists, and scholars emphasize the centrality of hormones when describ-
53 See, e.g., Gwen Stern & Laurence Kruckman, Multi-Disciplinary Perspectives on
Postpartum Depression: An Anthropological Critique, 17 SOC. SCI. AND MED. 1027, 1030
(1983) (discussing the rise of hormone-based theories of postpartum illness in the middle
of the twentieth century).
54 See, e.g., LAURALEE SHERWOOD, FUNDAMENTALS OF PHYSIOLOGY 94 (3rd ed. 2006).
55 See, e.g., MISRI, supra note 27, at 35; Idit Oren, Sarel J. Fleishman, Amit Kessel & R
Nir Ben-Tal, Free Diffusion of Steroid Hormones Across Biomembranes: A Simplex
Search with Implicit Solvent Model Calculations, 87 BIOPHYSICAL J. 768, 768 (2004).
56 See, e.g., MISRI, supra note 27, at 35–37. R
57 See, e.g., id.
58 See, e.g., Elka Serrano & Julia K. Warnock, Depressive Disorders Related to Fe-
male Reproductive Transitions, 20 J. PHARMACY PRACTICE 385, 388 (2007) (“Women in
the postpartum period experience drastic changes in both progesterone and estrogen
levels.  Estradiol may increase 50-fold before it drops to follicular phase levels on the
third day postpartum.”); Claudio N. Soares & Brook Zitek, Reproductive hormone sensi-
tivity and risk for depression across the female life cycle: A continuum of vulnerability?,
33 J. PSYCH. NEUROSCIENCE 331, 333 (2008) (“The postpartum period is a time of abrupt
decreases in the amounts of circulating estrogen and progesterone.”); Spinelli, supra note
30, at 165 (“Estrogen and progesterone levels rise gradually during gestation, and with R
the loss of placenta at delivery, plummet within 24 to 48 hours.”).
59 See, e.g., Lorah D. Dorn & George P. Chrousos, The Neurobiology of Stress: Un-
derstanding Regulation of Affect During Female Biological Transitions, 15 SEMINARS IN
REPROD. ENDOCRINOLOGY 19, 29 (1997) (“Certainly, studying hormone-behavior rela-
tions during the biological transition of pregnancy is congruent with the knowledge of the
multiple endocrine changes of pregnancy and the incidence of postpartum mood disorders
and depression.”); Soares, supra note 58, at 331 (“It has been hypothesized that women R
presenting with episodes of depression associated with reproductive events (i.e., premen-
strual, postpartum, menopausal transition) may be particularly prone to experiencing de-
pression, in part because of a heightened sensitivity to intense hormonal fluctuations.”).
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ing the etiology of postpartum illness.60  Perhaps the most popular theory is
that the sharp drop of estrogen and progesterone to pre-pregnancy levels
within three days of childbirth causes postpartum illness.61  In one well-
known study published in 2000, a group of American scientists affiliated
with the National Institutes of Health investigated the effects of withdrawing
estrogen and progesterone in women with and without a history of postpar-
tum depression following an artificial eight-week treatment of the two hor-
mones.62  The scientists found that 62.5% of the women with a history of
postpartum depression and none of the control subjects developed significant
mood symptoms during the withdrawal period.63  The scientists concluded
that they had “provided direct evidence in support of the involvement of the
reproductive hormones in the development of postpartum depression,” and
that women with a history of postpartum depression are “differentially sen-
sitive to mood-destabilizing effects of gonadal steroids.”64
Scientists continue to investigate the relationship between
neuroendocrine changes and postpartum illness.65  In 2009, for example, a
60 See, e.g., Chrisler, supra note 25, at 181–82 (discussing the centrality of hormones R
in early biomedical models of postpartum illness); Giovannini, supra note 25, at 212. R
61 See, e.g., CAROL DIX, THE NEW MOTHER SYNDROME: COPING WITH POSTPARTUM
STRESS AND DEPRESSION 22 (1985).
We cannot have a hormonal change without a change in biochemistry and without
some mental change.  In searching for the root cause of the bodily and psychic
upheaval [of postpartum psychosis], we must turn to the relatively new science of
endocrinology and ongoing studies attempting to associate hormonal changes and
depression.
Id. See also, e.g., Elizabeth J. Corwin & Kathleen Pajer, The Psychoneuroimmunology of
Postpartum Depression, 17 J. WOMEN’S HEALTH 1529, 1530 (2008) (noting that acute
changes in reproductive hormone levels have been proposed as a risk factor for postpar-
tum depression); Giovannini, supra note 25, at 212 (noting that the postpartum drop in R
progesterone has been linked to postpartum illness); Serrano, supra note 58, at 388 R
(“Women in the postpartum period experience drastic changes in both progesterone and
estrogen levels.  Estradiol may increase 50-fold before it drops to follicular phase levels
on the third day postpartum.  This neurobiologic stress likely plays a role in the vulnera-
bility to postpartum psychosis, along with other psychosocial factors . . . .”); Spinelli,
supra note 30, at 165 (“Estrogen and progesterone levels rise gradually during gestation, R
and with the loss of placenta at delivery, plummet within 24 to 48 hours.  This precipitous
drop is the first step in the sequence of biological events that may trigger psychiatric
symptoms in vulnerable women.”); VALLEY WOMEN’S HEALTH ACCESS PROGRAM, WO-
MEN’S HEALTH COORDINATION CENTER AT GRIFFIN HOSPITAL, POSTPARTUM DEPRESSION
(PPD) 1 (2004), http://vwhcc.org/whcc_html/docs/postpartum.pdf (“One study con-
cluded that women with the greatest drop in progesterone levels after delivery were more
likely to rate themselves depressed within 10 days of delivery.”).
62 See Miki Bloch, Peter J. Schmidt, Merry Danaceau, Jean Murphy, Lynette Nieman
& David R. Rubinow, Effects of Gonadal Steroids in Women with a History of Postpar-
tum Depression, 157 AM. J. PSYCH. 924, 924 (2000).
63 Id. at 926.
64 Id. at 924; see also id. at 928.
65 See, e.g., Corwin, supra note 61, at 1530–31 (reviewing how pregnancy-related R
changes in the innate immune system and the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis
may contribute to the development of postpartum depression); Pietro Grussu, Maria T.
Nasta  & Rosa M. Quatraro, Serum Cholesterol Concentrations and Distress in the Initial
Days After Childbirth, 151 PSYCH. RESEARCH 159, 159 (2007) (casting doubt on the hy-
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group of American scientists published their study of a hypothesized link
between placental corticotropin-releasing hormone (“pCRH”) and postpar-
tum depression.66  The scientists assessed pCRH in blood samples taken at
15, 19, 25, 31, and 37 weeks gestational age in 100 adult women with a
single pregnancy and then measured depressive symptoms using a standard-
ized questionnaire at the last four pregnancy visits and postpartum.67  The
scientists found that pCRH was a strong predictor at 25 weeks gestational
age of postpartum depression in the 16 women who developed symptoms of
postpartum depression68 and concluded that pCRH is a “sensitive and spe-
cific early diagnostic test for [postpartum depression] symptoms.”69  Given
these findings, it is not surprising that several medical news articles have
reported that a hormone screening test for postpartum depression, perhaps to
be called the “pCRH PPD Screen,” could be incorporated into standard pre-
natal care at 24 to 28 weeks gestation.70
Although hormone-based theories of postpartum illness continue to en-
joy widespread acceptance in many medical circles,71 contrary findings and
models also have been reported and published,72 including findings that the
pothesis of a possible association between cholesterol and depression in the general popu-
lation and in mothers who have just given birth); M. Kammerer, A. Taylor & V. Glover,
The HPA Axis and Perinatal Depression: A Hypothesis, 9 ARCHIVES WOMEN’S MENTAL
HEALTH 187, 187 (2006) (suggesting that the physiologic changes of the HPA axis in
pregnancy may contribute to depression); Alfonso Troisi, Anna Moles, Lea Panepuccia,
Domenica Lo Russo, Giampaolo Palla & Stefano Scucchi, Serum Cholesterol Levels and
Mood Symptoms in the Postpartum Period, 109 PSYCH. RESEARCH 213, 213 (2002) (study
concluding that the physiological fall in blood lipids in the postpartum period can be a
useful  model to test the relationship between serum cholesterol levels and mood).
66 Ilona S. Yim, Laura M. Glynn, Christine Dunkel Schetter, Calvin J. Hobel, Alek-
sandra Chicz-DeMet & Curt A. Sandman, Risk of Postpartum Depressive Symptoms with
Elevated Corticotropin-Releasing Hormone in Human Pregnancy, 66 ARCHIVES OF GEN.
PSYCH. 162, 162 (2009).
67 Id. at 163–64.
68 Id. at 162, 165–66.
69 Id. at 167.
These data are, to our knowledge, the first to suggest a sensitive period in mid-
pregnancy during which pCRH, as measured in maternal plasma, is a moderate
and independent predictor of PPD symptoms.  We propose that pCRH during this
period may serve as a sensitive and specific early diagnostic test to identify wo-
men at high risk for developing PPD symptoms.
Id.
70 See, e.g., Rick Nauert, Hormone Test to Predict Postpartum Depression,
PSYCHCENTRAL, Feb. 26, 2009, http://psychcentral.com/news/2009/02/04/hormone-test-
to-predict-postpartum-depression/3909.html (reporting that women who have a higher
level of a placenta-produced hormone midway through their pregnancies are more likely
to develop postpartum depression and suggesting that a postpartum depression screening
test could be performed mid-pregnancy).
71 See, e.g., Giovannini, supra note 25, at 212 (noting the widespread acceptance of R
hormone-based theories of postpartum illness and stating that, “[u]nfortunately, despite
significant challenges from feminist scholars and researchers, the medical establishment
still operates under the assumption that female biology is a woman’s destiny.”).
72 See, e.g., Chrisler, supra note 25, at 182 (referencing contrary scientific findings); R
Giovannini, supra note 25, at 212; Jessica Zonana & Jack M. Gorman, The Neurobiology R
of Postpartum Depression, 10 CNS SPECTRUMS 792, 792 (2005) (“Most studies of gona-
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experimental manipulation of hormones triggers depression only in women
with a history of postpartum illness, as well as models suggesting that it is
behavior that influences hormones and not hormones that influence behav-
ior.73  As a result, some physicians and scientists believe that the current data
regarding the hormone-based theory of postpartum illness are negative or
equivocal at best.74
D. The Role of Neurotransmitters
Because all women experience an increase in estrogen and progesterone
during pregnancy and a corresponding decrease following childbirth, but not
all women experience postpartum illness, many scientists have turned their
attention to the ways in which some women may be genetically predisposed
to postpartum illness due to differences in neurochemistry and
neuroanatomy, as well as the ways in which social, cultural, and environ-
mental factors may interact with genetics to exacerbate the risk of postpar-
tum illness.75  To that end, recent scientific investigations of postpartum
illness have focused on the specific relationship between changes in hor-
mone levels and the disruption of chemicals in the brain called neurotrans-
mitters, which are endogenous chemicals that relay, amplify, and modulate
signals between a neuron and another cell.76
The human brain has more than one hundred neurotransmitters, includ-
ing serotonin, norepinephrine, dopamine, acetylcholine, and gamma-ami-
nobutyric acid (“GABA”),77 and a number of recent studies have been
designed to investigate neurotransmitter levels in women with postpartum
illness.  In 2006, for example, scientists at The University of British Colum-
bia and Canadian Blood Services published a study of platelet serotonin
levels in women with postpartum depression at two points in time and com-
pared them with questionnaire outcomes in an attempt to determine whether
a measurement of platelet serotonin could aid in the diagnosis of postpartum
dal and pituitary hormones have shown conflicting evidence for consistent roles in the
development of postpartum depression.”).
73 See, e.g., Dorn, supra note 59, at 23–24 (identifying four models of hormone- R
behavior relations, including a model that acknowledges that behavior may influence
hormones and a model that acknowledges the possible bi-directionality of hormones and
behavior).
74 See, e.g., Chrisler, supra note 25, at 182; Giovannini, supra note 25, at 212; R
Zonana, supra note 72, at 798. R
75 See, e.g., MISRI, supra note 27, at 41–44; Press Release, Nat’l Insts. of Health, R
Mechanism for Postpartum Depression Found in Mice: Discovery May Lead to Better
Treatments (July 31, 2008), http://nih.gov/news/health/jul2008/nimh-31.htm.
76 See, e.g., MISRI, supra note 27, at 41 (noting that scientists have turned their atten- R
tion from unicausal hormonal theories to theories that rely on the interplay of hormones
and neurotransmitters).
77 See, e.g., id. at 32.
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depression.78  The scientists found that platelet serotonin levels in patients
with depression were reduced 50% compared to normal levels and suggested
that platelet serotonin levels obtained with a new immunocytochemical test
might be useful as evidence-based support for postpartum illness
questionnaires.79
In a second study published in 2008, scientists at The University of
Pittsburgh, Emory University, and the National Institute of Mental Health
used positron emission tomography (“PET”) to investigate brain serotonin-
1A (“5HT1A”) receptor binding potential in seven healthy postpartum con-
trols and nine postpartum depressed subjects.80  The scientists found that age,
time since delivery, and reproductive hormones did not differ between
groups, but that postsynaptic 5HT1A receptor binding in the depressed sub-
jects was reduced 20% to 28% relative to controls.81  The scientists opined
that their recognition of this “neurobiological deficit” in women with post-
partum depression may be useful in developing treatment and prevention
strategies.82
E. Neuroimaging Findings
Since 1895, when German physicist Wilhelm Conrad Ro¨ntgen discov-
ered x-rays,83 clinicians have used a range of imaging technologies, includ-
ing x-ray, computed tomography (“CT”), positron emission tomography
(“PET”), single-photon emission computed tomography (“SPECT”), and
magnetic resonance imaging (“MRI”), in an attempt to provide neuroradio-
logical proof of physical conditions such as broken bones, torn ligaments,
78 See Elisabeth Maurer-Spurej, Cheryl Pittendreigh & Shaila Misri, Platelet Seroto-
nin Levels Support Depression Scores for Women with Postpartum Depression, 32 J.
PSYCHIATRY NEUROSCIENCE 23, 23–24 (2007).
79 Id. at 27–28 (“Our results support the usefulness of platelet serotonin as a periph-
eral marker for postpartum depression and treatment response.  In this preliminary study,
we showed that platelet serotonin levels are significantly lower in women with postpar-
tum depression, compared with healthy control subjects.”).
80 See Eydie L. Moses-Kolko, Katherine L. Wisner, Julie C. Price, Sarah L. Berga,
Wayne C. Drevets, Barbara H. Hanusa, Tammy L. Loucks & Carolyn C. Meltzer, Seroto-
nin 1A Receptor Reductions in Postpartum Depression: A Positron Emission Tomography
Study, 89 FERTILITY & STERILITY 685, 685 (2008).
81 Id. at 685.
82 Id. at 691.  Other studies have focused on the role of the neurotransmitter GABA in
postpartum illness. See, e.g., C. Neill Epperson, Ralitza Gueorguieva, Kathryn A.
Czarkowski, Stephanie Stiklus, Edward Sellers, John H. Krystal, Douglas L. Rothman &
Graeme F. Mason, Preliminary Evidence of Reduced Occipital GABA Concentrations in
Puerperal Women: A 1H-MRS Study, 186 PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 425, 425 (2006); Jamie
Maguire & Istvan Mody, GABAAR Plasticity During Pregnancy: Relevance to Postpar-
tum Depression, 59 NEURON 207, 207 (2008); Yale Sch. of Med., Women’s Health Re-
search at Yale, Clinical Trials: Finding Predictors of Depression and Response to
Treatment, http://www.med.yale.edu/womenshealth/trials/index.html (last visited Nov.
15, 2009).
83 See, e.g., Stacey A. Tovino, Imaging Body Structure and Mapping Brain Function:
A Historical Approach, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 193, 207 (2007) (discussing the discovery
and forensic use of Ro¨ntgen’s x-rays).
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and cancerous tumors for diagnostic, treatment, and forensic purposes.84
Historically, health professionals have diagnosed mental illness through
clinical observation of symptoms and behaviors (that is, through the princi-
ples of descriptive psychiatry) rather than through radiological identification
of neurobiological processes or pathology.85
Over the last fifteen years, however, several groups of scientists have
investigated the ability of neuroimaging technology to provide radiological
evidence of a number of illnesses traditionally classified as “mental,” in-
cluding postpartum illness.86  Specific areas of inquiry include whether the
brain structure and function of women with postpartum illness differ from
those of controls (including new mothers without postpartum illness as well
as non-postpartum women with depression and psychosis), in addition to
whether any observed differences are causes, correlates, or consequences of
postpartum illness.  Broader areas of inquiry relate to the extent to which
new findings add to existing research investigating the neural processes as-
sociated with maternal responsiveness and parental attachments.87
In one illustrative study published in 1998, a group of German scien-
tists used computed tomography (“CT”) to quantify the ventricular and cis-
ternal cerebrospinal fluid (“CSF”) spaces in 14 women, 12 of whom had
cycloid psychoses with postpartum onset.88  The scientists found that certain
CSF spaces were significantly larger in patients with postpartum psychosis
when compared to age-matched female patients with non-postpartum cy-
84 Id. at 207–21 (examining the development of these imaging technologies and their
ethical, legal, and social implications).
85 See generally GERMAN E. BERRIOS, THE HISTORY OF MENTAL SYMPTOMS: DESCRIP-
TIVE PSYCHOPATHOLOGY SINCE THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 15–26 (1996) (exploring the
roots of descriptive psychopathology in nineteenth-century medicine and philosophy);
Paul Raeburn, The Therapeutic Mind Scan, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2005, at 20 (“Psychia-
trists are among the few doctors who don’t look at the organs they treat. . . . Instead of
looking at the brain, they rely on interviews, experiences, hunches, and trial and error.
But that soon could change.”).
86 See infra text accompanying notes 88–98. R
87 See, e.g., Anna J. Abramson, The Postpartum Brain, GREATER GOOD MAG., Spring
2008, at 36, available at http://greatergood.berkeley.edu/greatergood/2008spring/Abram
son.pdf (describing new imaging research uncovering specific biological mechanisms as-
sociated with parental attachment); Sarah Squire & Alan Stein, Functional MRI and Pa-
rental Responsiveness: A New Avenue into Parental Psychopathology and Early Parent-
Child Interactions?, 183 BRIT. J. PSYCH. 481, 481 (2003) (“[R]elatively straightforward
functional neuroimaging studies could be conducted that would help to illuminate the
neural processes underlying parental emotional responses to children.”).  While research-
ing the neuroimaging studies discussed in the next four paragraphs, I was asked to give a
brief talk about my preliminary findings at the University of Akron School of Law’s
Neuroscience, Law and Government Symposium, held on September 25 and 26, 2008, in
Akron, Ohio. See Stacey A. Tovino, Remarks: Neuroscience, Gender, and the Law, 42
AKRON L. REV. 941 (2009).  I reserved permission to reprint and expand upon those
remarks within the context of this complete Article.  The next four paragraphs are taken
(with updates and technical changes) with copyright permission granted October 29,
2008, 20:19:00 CST, by Jason M. Fuller, Symposium Editor, Akron Law Review.
88 See M. Lanczik, E. Hofmann, C. Schulz, M. Knoche, & T. Becker, Ventricular
Abnormality in Patients with Postpartum Psychoses, 1 ARCHIVES WOMEN’S MENTAL
HEALTH 45, 45–47 (1998).
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cloid psychoses or bipolar affective disorders outside the puerperium.89  The
scientists concluded that their findings could reflect an unspecific neuros-
tructural vulnerability marker in some patients with postpartum psychosis.90
In a second study, published in 2007, a group of New York scientists
used fMRI to compare the brain function of women with postpartum depres-
sion compared to asymptomatic postpartum female control subjects.91  The
study, believed to be the first neuroimaging study specifically designed to
identify neural activity changes in unmedicated postpartum depressed wo-
men,92 suggested that the neural mechanisms related to postpartum depres-
sion appear somewhat different than those of non-postpartum depression.93
Although the scientists stated that it would be premature to conclude that
postpartum depression is a unique depression phenotype, they stated that
functional neuroimaging may have the potential to identify an empirically-
based neural characterization of postpartum depression.94
These are just two of the neuroimaging studies that have investigated
the brain structure and function of women with postpartum illness.  In other
studies, scientists have concluded that future research may provide a method
for diagnosing postpartum illness,95 and may be used to predict maternal
style, such as child neglect, as well as offspring temperament, including de-
pression and anxiety.96  Today’s scientists continue to use neuroimaging tech-
nologies in an attempt to better understand the neuroanatomy and processes
89 Id. at 45.
90 Id. at 47 (“The results underline evidence of subtle, unspecific brain structural
abnormalities in patients with postpartum cycloid, and possibly other types of postpartum
psychosis.  Such abnormalities might constitute an unspecific vulnerability factor.”).
91 Michael E. Silverman, Holly Loudon, Michal Safier, Xenia Protopopescu, Gila
Leiter, Xun Liu & Martin Goldstein, Neural Dysfunction in Postpartum Depression: An
fMRI Pilot Study, 12 CNS SPECTRUMS 853, 853–54 (2007).
92 Id. at 859–60.
93 Id. at 861.
94 Id.
95 Nat’l Alliance for Research on Schizophrenia and Depression, Pregnancy & Post-
partum Depression: New Research Directions, http://www.narsad.org/?q=node/799 (last
visited Nov. 15, 2009) (summarizing recent advances in postpartum depression research,
including a neuroimaging study involving postpartum subjects conducted at the Medical
University of South Carolina (“MUSC”); stating that the findings from the MUSC re-
search “may provide a method for diagnosing postpartum depression”).
96 Jeffrey P. Lorberbaum, John D. Newman, Judy R. Dubno, Amy R. Horwitz, Ziad
Nahas, Charlotte C. Teneback, Courtnay W. Bloomer, Daryl E. Bohning, Diana Vincent,
Michael R. Johnson, Naresh Emmanuel, Olga Brawman-Mintzer, Sarah W. Book, Bruce
Lydiard, James C. Ballenger & Mark S. George, Feasibility of Using fMRI to Study
Mothers Responding to Infant Cries, 10 DEPRESSION & ANXIETY 99, 99 (1999).
While parenting is a universal human behavior, its neuroanatomic basis is cur-
rently unknown. . . . Future work in this area may help: (1) unravel the functional
neuroanatomy of the parent-infant bond; and (2) examine whether markers of this
bond, such as maternal brain response to infant crying, can predict maternal style
(i.e., child neglect), offspring temperament, or offspring depression or anxiety.
Id.
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that underlie postpartum illness,97 and their findings lend support to the char-
acterization of postpartum illness as a neurodegenerative disorder that dis-
rupts the structure and function of brain cells and precipitates cognitive
decline.98
F. Genetic Bases
Over the past forty years, scientists also have been considering the ge-
netic bases of postpartum illness.99  Initial genetic studies attempted to iden-
tify a link between mental illness, including major depression and bipolar
disorder, and the X chromosome, although these studies have proved incon-
97 See, e.g., Marcelo Febo, Michael Numan & Craig F. Ferris, Functional Magnetic
Resonance Imaging Shows Oxytocin Activates Brain Regions Associated with Mother-
Pup Bonding During Suckling, 25 J. NEUROSCIENCE 11637, 11637 (2005) (fMRI study
investigating whether oxytocin released in the maternal brain during breastfeeding may
help strengthen the mother-infant relationship); Jack B. Nitschke, Eric E. Nelson, Brett D.
Rusch, Andrew S. Fox, Terrence R. Oakes & Richard J. Davidson, Orbitofrontal Cortex
Tracks Positive Mood in Mothers Viewing Pictures of Their Newborn Infants, 21
NEUROIMAGE 583, 583 (2004) (fMRI study implicating the orbitofrontal cortex in a
mother’s affective responses to her infant and suggesting that individual variations in
orbitofrontal activation to infant stimuli may reflect an important dimension of maternal
attachment); Squire, supra note 87, at 481 (recommending that research investigating the R
neural processes underlying parental emotional responses to children be pursued); Yale
Program for Women’s Reprod. Behavioral Health, Research in the Service of Patient
Care, http://www.med.yale.edu/psych/clinics/YBG.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2009) (pro-
viding information about the current research projects of the Yale Program for Women’s
Reproductive Behavioral Health, including a research study involving the diagnosis and
treatment of postpartum depression using neuroimaging).
98 See, e.g., Hara Estroff Marano, Depression: Beyond Serotonin, PSYCHOL. TODAY,
Mar. 1, 1999, at 30, 32.
The newest evidence indicates that recurrent depression is in fact a neurodegener-
ative disorder, disrupting the structure and function of brain cells, destroying
nerve cell connections, even killing certain brain cells, and precipitating cognitive
decline.  At the very least, depression sets up neural roadblocks to the processing
of information and keeps us from responding to life’s challenges.
Id. at 32.
99 See, e.g., John J. Medina, Is There a Gene for Postpartum Depression?, 25 PSYCH.
TIMES, Dec. 1, 2008 at 44, 44–45 (exploring whether there is a molecular basis for post-
partum depression); Post-Natal Psychosis Genes Found, BBC NEWS (July 5, 2007), http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/wales/6273182.stm.
Researchers at Cardiff University have helped locate the genes which can make
women more vulnerable to severe mental illness just after childbirth. . . . Finding
these genes will allow us to better identify bipolar women at very high risk and
will help them and their doctors make the difficult decisions about taking medica-
tions through pregnancy.
Id. See also, e.g., Graham Tibbetts, Mothers’ Acute Post-Natal Depression Could be
Genetic, TELEGRAPH.CO.UK, Nov. 2, 2008, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/health/3366667/
Mothers-acute-post-natal-depression-could-be-genetic.html (“Work has begun to isolate
the gene to enable doctors to identify and treat women at risk from postpartum psychosis
before they are affected.”).
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clusive.100  Although women continue to be statistically more likely to de-
velop depression than men,101 scientists have turned their attention in the last
five years to specific genes that may influence susceptibility to postpartum
illness.102
In 2007, scientists affiliated with Cardiff University, Birmingham Uni-
versity, and Trinity College conducted one of the first systematic genome
scans designed to localize genes that influence susceptibility to bipolar af-
fective puerperal psychosis.103  The scientists selected families with bipolar
disorder from a previous bipolar disorder genome scan in which there was at
least one family member with a manic or psychotic episode with an onset
within six weeks of delivery, and then the scientists coded the individuals as
affected if they had been diagnosed with bipolar I disorder, bipolar II disor-
der, or schizoaffective disorder of bipolar type, according to the DSM-IV-
TR classification system.104  The cohort included 36 pedigrees contributing
54 affected sibling pairs, and the scientists’ genome scan consisted of an
analysis of 494 microsatellite markers using Genehunter and Mapmaker/Sibs
statistical genetic analysis software.105  The scientists observed a genome-
wide significant linkage signal on chromosome 16p13 and a genome-wide
suggestive linkage on chromosome 8q24, even though no significant or sug-
gestive linkage was observed in these regions in the scientists’ original bipo-
100 See, e.g., Robert M.A. Hirschfeld & Myrna M. Weissman, Risk Factors for Major
Depression and Bipolar Disorder, in NEUROPSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY: THE FIFTH GENERA-
TION OF PROGRESS 1023 (Kenneth L. Davis, Dennis Charney, Joseph T. Coyle & Charles
Nemeroff, eds., 5th ed. 2002), available at http://www.acnp.org/Docs/G5/CH70_1017-
1026.pdf (“There have been a number of investigations aimed at determining the actual
genes involved in bipolar illness.  Attempts to demonstrate linkage to the X-chromosome
. . . have not been conclusive.”).
101 See, e.g., Harvard Med. Sch., Women and Depression: How Biology and Society
Make Women More Vulnerable to Mood Disorders, 20 HARV. MENTAL HEALTH LETTER,
May 2004, at 1, 1 (“All over the world, depression is much more common in women than
in men.  In the United States, the ratio is two to one, and depression is the main cause of
disability in women.”); Serrano, supra note 58, at 385 (“[E]pidemiologic studies note R
that the risk of depression in women is twice that of men, regardless of racial and socio-
economic variables.”).
102 See, e.g., Tibbetts, supra note 99 (quoting Dr. Ian Jones, who stated that he had R
“identified chromosomal regions that are likely to harbour genes that predispose individ-
uals to [postpartum psychosis]”); Amelia Hill, Postnatal Depression ‘in the Genes:’
Fresh Medical Research Suggests the Serious Mental Illness Which Bedevils New
Mothers May be Due to Nature, not Nurture, THE OBSERVER, Nov. 2, 2008, at 18 (“The
most severe form of postnatal depression, which affects one in 500 new mothers and has
been linked to suicide and infanticide, could be genetic, according to new research.”).
103 See Ian Jones, Marian Hamshere, Jeanne-Marrie Nangle, Philip Bennett, Elaine
Green, Jess Heron, Ricardo Segurado, David Lambert, Peter Holmans, Aiden Corvin,
Mike Owen, Lisa Jones, Michael Gill & Nick Craddock, Bipolar Affective Puerperal
Psychosis: Genome-Wide Significant Evidence for Linkage to Chromosome 16, 164 AM.
J. PSYCH. 1099, 1103 (2007).
104 See id. at 1099.  The DSM-IV-TR classification system is introduced later in this
article; see infra text accompanying notes 287–289 and 294–297. R
105 Jones, supra note 103, at 1099–1100. R
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lar scan.106  The scientists concluded that they had identified the
“chromosomal regions that are likely to harbor genes that predispose indi-
viduals to bipolar affective puerperal psychosis,”107 and that their findings
supported the hypothesis that bipolar affective puerperal psychosis is a “ge-
netically meaningful subtype of bipolar disorder.”108
In 2008, two scientists at the University of California, Los Angeles fur-
ther investigated the genetic basis of postpartum depression, this time in
mice.109  In their research, the scientists studied mice that developed symp-
toms that in postpartum humans we would call postpartum depression, in-
cluding anhedonia, despair, increased anxiety, and decreased maternal
care.110  The scientists found that the gene disrupted in these mice, delta
subunit of gamma-aminobutyric acid A receptor (“GABAAR”), encodes a
subunit of a receptor that is located on the surface of neural cell,111 and be-
lieve that their findings point to a genetic source for predisposition to post-
partum depression.112
G. Evolutionary Theories
In addition to genetics-based research, several anthropologists and other
evolutionary theorists are investigating whether postpartum illness serves an
evolutionary function.  The theory underlying many of these studies is that
postpartum illness may be an adaptation that informs mothers that they are
suffering a fitness cost, such as lack of paternal or social support, and that
motivates them to reduce or eliminate investment in their offspring.113  An-
106 Id. at 1101 (“We found one chromosome region (16p13) with a LOD [logarithm
of the odds ratio] score (4.07) meeting the Lander and Kruglyak criteria (26) for genome-
wide significance (p=0.02). . . . We also report an additional chromosomal region (8q24)
that meets the Lander and Kruglyak (26) criteria for genome-wide suggestive linkage.”).
107 Id. at 1099.
108 Id. at 1103 (“In summary, we report the first systematic genome scan aimed at
localizing genes that influence susceptibility to bipolar affective puerperal psychosis and
provide further support for the hypothesis that this is a genetically meaningful subtype of
bipolar disorder.”).
109 See Maguire, supra note 82, at 207. R
110 Id. at 208–10.
111 Id. at 211–12.
112 Id.
113 See, e.g., Edward H. Hagen, Depression as Bargaining: The Case Postpartum, 23
EVOLUTION AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR 323, 324 (2002); Edward H. Hagen, The Functions of
Postpartum Depression, 20 EVOLUTION AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR 325, 325–26 (1999) [here-
inafter Functions]; Edward H. Hagen & H. Clark Barrett, Perinatal Sadness among
Shuar Women: Support for an Evolutionary Theory of Psychic Pain, 21 MED. ANTHRO-
POLOGY Q. 22, 25–27 (2007); Randy Thornhill & F. Bryant Furlow, Stress and Human
Reproductive Behavior: Attractiveness, Women’s Sexual Development, Postpartum De-
pression, and Baby’s Cry, in 27 STRESS AND BEHAVIOR 319, 341–52 (Anders Pape Møller,
Manfred Milinski & Peter J.B. Slater eds., 1998); Stefanie L. Turner & Francis T. McAn-
drew, A Laboratory Simulation of Parental Investment Decisions: The Role of Future
Reproductive Opportunities and Quality of Offspring in Determining Levels of Parental
Investment, 4 EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOL. 197, 198 (2004); Margo Wilson & Martin Daly,
The Psychology of Parenting in Evolutionary Perspective and the Case of Human Fili-
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thropologist Edward Hagen proposed in 1999, for example, three related
adaptive functions for postpartum depression.114  Hagen first proposed that
sad or depressed mood should be associated with social circumstances that
are reproductively costly in ancestral environments, including situations in
which mothers lack social support and in which the infant’s health is poor.115
Second, Hagen proposed that mothers will take actions to reduce their level
of psychological pain in order to reduce their reproductive costs.116  Third,
Hagen proposed that major postpartum depression, characterized by marked
loss of interest in virtually all activities, psychomotor retardation, significant
weight loss, diminished ability to think or concentrate, and recurrent
thoughts of death, may enable the mother to negotiate greater levels of social
support.117
A second evolutionary theory relates to the development of obsessive-
compulsive symptoms (including recurrent, intrusive thoughts of harm com-
ing to the baby)118 as a means of ensuring infant survival.  For example, a
group of American scientists who used fMRI in 2002 to investigate the
brains of healthy, new parents as they heard their babies cry found that the
parents’ neural networks were similar to the networks known to be associ-
ated with obsessive-compulsive disorder (“OCD”).119  The scientists believe
that listening to babies cry triggers a deeply anxious neural response even in
healthy parents, and suggest that even the healthy parental brain may be
“hardwired” for a period of transient, mild OCD that may have been adap-
tive in our ancestral environment, when new parents needed to be hyper-
vigilant about protecting their young from dangerous predators.120  Accord-
ing to the scientists, however, the persistence of these behaviors in the mod-
cide, in INFANTICIDE AND PARENTAL CARE 73, 74–75 (Stefano Parmigiani & Frederick S.
vom Saal eds., 1994); Australian Broadcasting Corporation National Radio Broadcast, All
in the Mind: The Evolution of Depression—Does It Have a Role? (Apr. 3, 2004), http://
www.abc.net.au/rn/science/mind/stories/s1077027.htm (discussing whether depression
can serve an evolutionary function). But see Daniel Nettle, Evolutionary Origins of De-
pression: A Review and Reformulation, 81 J. AFFECTIVE DISORDERS 91, 91 (2004) (pro-
posing an alternative formulation in which depression is seen not as an adaptation but
nonetheless as the outcome of evolutionary processes).
114 Hagen, Functions, supra note 113, at 326–27. R
115 Id. at 335–37.
116 Id. at 342–45.
117 Id. at 345–49.
118 See, e.g., Faruk Uguz, Cemal Akman, Nazmiye Kaya & Ali Savas Cilli, Postpar-
tum-Onset Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder: Incidence, Clinical Features, and Related
Factors, 68 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 132, 132 (2007) (investigating the incidence, rate,
and symptomatology of postpartum-onset obsessive-compulsive disorder (“PPOCD”),
the factors associated with PPOCD, and comparing clinical characteristics of obsessive-
compulsive disorder with and without postpartum onset).
119 James Swain, James Leckman, Linda Mayes, Ruth Feldman & Robert Schultz,
Functional Neuroimaging and Psychology of Parent-Infant Attachment in the Early Post-
partum, 5 ANNALS GEN. PSYCHIATRY S85 (2006); Abramson, supra note 87 at 37 (refer- R
encing Swain’s study).  The full publication of Swain’s findings is forthcoming. See Dr.
Edward James Swain, Profile, http://myprofile.cos.com/jameseswain (last visited Nov.
15, 2009) (listing Swain’s submitted but as yet unpublished manuscripts).
120 Abramson, supra note 87, at 37. R
\\server05\productn\H\HLG\33-1\HLG108.txt unknown Seq: 20 27-JAN-10 12:46
118 Harvard Journal of Law & Gender [Vol. 33
ern environment may not be useful, and an excess (or lack) of this mild
vigilance may play a role in the obsessive (or neglectful) symptoms exper-
ienced by some mothers diagnosed with postpartum illness.121
H. Psychosocial and Sociocultural Models
In the last three decades, many socially-trained scientists have given
less credence to straight biological theories of postpartum illness, labeling
them reductionist and sexist, and have focused instead on socioenviron-
mental stressors and cultural factors as important etiological factors in post-
partum illness.122  Within psychosocial models, childbirth is viewed as a
significant life event that requires the assumption of new social roles, skills,
and behaviors, which can lead to uncertainty and stress in new mothers.123
In order to minimize these stressors and assist women in successfully transi-
tioning to their new maternal role, pregnant and postpartum women are be-
lieved to require emotional support, advice, information, and assistance.124  If
these forms of support are either not available or not accessible, new
mothers may be more vulnerable to postpartum illness.125
A number of recent studies have investigated the psychosocial factors
that may contribute to postpartum illness.126  In a 2005 study of the narra-
The researchers offer an evolutionary hypothesis for the neural signs of anxiety
they saw in these parents.  They believe that, after the birth of a child, a period of
high alert may have helped parents protect their babies from environmental harm
in times when this was a treacherous and all-consuming task. . . . The Yale re-
searchers hypothesize that the healthy maternal brain is hardwired for a period of
transient OCD. . . .  But, . . . once mothers are endowed with this kind of neural
machinery, there’s a danger they could connect up OCD behaviors with irrational
things not for survival.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). See also Swain, supra note 119, at S85. R
121 See Abramson, supra note 87, at 37. R
122 Giovannini, supra note 25, at 213–14. R
123 See, e.g., Maigun Edhborg, Malin Friberg, Wendela Lundh & Ann-Marie Wid-
stro¨m, “Struggling with Life:” Narratives from Women with Signs of Postpartum Depres-
sion, 33 SCANDINAVIAN J. PUB. HEALTH 261, 261 (2005) (“Social scientist studies are
predominantly within a qualitative tradition and highlight women’s perceptions of the
depression.  Feminist researchers link depression to women’s inferior status in society and
to structural conditions and constraints, e.g., current labour market structures and family
policy in division of household labour.”); Giovannini, supra note 25, at 213–14. R
124 Giovannini, supra note 25, at 214. R
125 Id.
126 See, e.g., Laura S. Abrams & Laura Curran, Not Just a Middle-Class Affliction:
Crafting a Social Work Research Agenda on Postpartum Depression, 32 HEALTH & SOC.
WORK 289, 290–94 (2007) (reviewing the current postpartum depression literature with
specific attention to the sociocultural dimensions of the disease and barriers to treatment);
Cecilia Benoit, Rachel Westfall, Adrienne E. B. Treloar, Rachel Phillips & S. Mikael
Jansson, Social Factors Linked to Postpartum Depression: A Mixed-Methods Longitudi-
nal Study, 16 J. MENTAL HEALTH 719, 719 (2007) (investigating the association between
social factors, the organization of maternity care services, and the prevalence of depres-
sion among a sample of new mothers at three to four weeks and four to six months
postpartum; finding links between income and postpartum depression and satisfaction
with the birth experience and postpartum depression); Wendy A. Mason, Michael J. Rice
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tives of women with postpartum depression, a group of Swedish scientists
found that the women expressed feelings of loss of who they are, felt over-
whelmed by the responsibility for the child, struggled with feelings of aban-
donment, worries, and breastfeeding problems, and struggled to keep their
equality with their husbands and to get them involved in childcare.127  The
scientists concluded that the depressed feelings of these postpartum women
may be explained in terms of losses and changes in the dimensions of self,
child, and partner.128
In a 2007 review article, two American social scientists reported known
risk factors for postpartum depression, including prior experiences with
mental illness, complications or dissatisfaction with labor and delivery, and
other concurrent life stressors such as divorce, loss, illness, or major transi-
tions.129  The scientists also reported that prevalence rates for postpartum
depression are higher among single mothers, mothers who have lower edu-
cational attainment, women who have low levels of social support, and wo-
men who have low-income status or financial hardship.130  Finally, the
scientists reported feminist theories of postpartum depression, including
those that focus on the physical trauma of and recovery from childbirth,
sleep deprivation, new responsibilities, the need to quickly master new skill
sets, postpartum losses of autonomy and time, and transformations in per-
sonal and occupational identity, physical appearance, sexuality, and
relationships.131
Within sociocultural models, the symptoms associated with postpartum
illness are viewed as culture-bound, meaning they may be categorized as a
disorder or disease in some societies but not others, or that family and com-
munity support (including education, social support, shared child care, and
social recognition of the importance and value of the motherhood role) may
be more available in some cultures compared to others, making women
outside those cultures more vulnerable to postpartum illness.132  A number of
recent studies have focused on sociocultural models of postpartum illness.
& Kathie Records, The Lived Experience of Postpartum Depression in a Psychiatric Pop-
ulation, 41 PERSP. IN PSYCHIATRIC CARE, Apr.–June 2005, at 52, 52 (using a psychophe-
nomenological design to examine reports from women with postpartum depression
regarding the role life experiences played in their labor, delivery, and postpartum peri-
ods); Verinder Sharma & Dwight Mazmanian, Sleep Loss and Postpartum Psychosis, 5
BIPOLAR DISORDERS 98, 98–103 (2003) (reviewing the literature on the relationship of
sleep disruption and postpartum psychosis and noting that sleep loss resulting from the
interaction of various putative causal factors may be the final common pathway in the
development of psychosis in susceptible women).
127 See Edhborg, supra note 123, at 261. R
128 Id.
129 See Abrams, supra note 126, at 290. R
130 Id.
131 Id. at 292.
132 See, e.g., Chrisler, supra note 25, at 184–87; Sophie Grigoriadis & Sarah Romans, R
Postpartum Psychiatric Disorders: What Do We Know and Where Do We Go?, 2 CUR-
RENT PSYCHIATRIC REV. 151, 155–56 (2006) (noting that postpartum depression may re-
present a culture-bound syndrome).
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In one study published in 2007, for example, a group of Chinese scientists
investigated the relationship between fetal gender and postpartum depression
in a small cohort of female Chinese subjects.133  The scientists found that the
rate of postpartum depression in women who gave birth to a female infant
was 24.6% compared to 12.2% for women who gave birth to a male in-
fant.134  The relative risk for postpartum depression in women who gave birth
to a female infant as compared with those who gave birth to a male was
2.89, after adjusting for potential confounding by maternal age, education
level, family income, living conditions, gravidity, number of prenatal care
visits, and mode of delivery.135  The scientists concluded that Chinese wo-
men who give birth to female infants have an increased risk of postpartum
depression, perhaps due to the negative reactions of family members towards
the birth of female babies.136
Not all scientists who are interested in sociocultural models of postpar-
tum illness completely discount the role of biology, however.  In one study
jointly authored by a scientist from Taiwan and a scientist from the UK in-
vestigating and comparing the etiology of postpartum illness in Taiwan and
the UK, the scientists found that sociocultural factors were not the only fac-
tors associated with postpartum depression.137  More specifically, the scien-
tists found that the prevalence of postpartum depression was similar in both
cultures despite large differences, at least historically, in cultural and postna-
tal care systems, suggesting that postpartum depression may have biological
determinants as well as sociocultural ones.138
133 See Ri-hua Xie, Guoping He, Aizhong Liu, Jacques Bradwejn, Mark Walker &
Shi Wu Wen, Fetal Gender and Postpartum Depression in a Cohort of Chinese Women,
65 SOC. SCI. & MED. 680, 680 (2007); see also Sandhya Ramashwar, In China, Women
Who Give Birth to Girls Face an Increased Risk of Postpartum Depression, 33 INT’L
FAMILY PLANNING PERSP. 191, 191–92 (2007) (summarizing the Chinese study investigat-
ing the relationship of fetal gender and postpartum depression).
134 Xie, supra note 133, at 680, 682. R
135 Id. at 680.
136 Id. at 683 (“We speculate that the negative reaction of family members towards
the birth of a female baby may be influential in creating or exacerbating depression here.
The preference for male children may be communicated to the mother and those who
deliver females may receive less support and less positive feedback.”).
137 See Yu-Chu Huang & Nigel Mathers, Postnataldepression—Biological or Cul-
tural? A Comparative Study of Postnatal Women in the UK and Taiwan, 33 J. ADVANCED
NURSING 279, 279 (2001).
138 Id. at 286.
In conclusion, we have observed big differences in both postnatal rituals and the
postnatal care systems between the UK and Taiwan.  The findings of our study
suggest that despite these differences, the prevalence of postnatal depression is
similar in both cultures.  This gives some support to a hypothesis that postnatal
depression may have at least some important biological determinants as well as
cultural and social ones.
Id.
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I. Current Understandings
The most current understandings of postpartum illness are based on
multifactorial models that give weight to hormonal, neurochemical,
neuroanatomical, genetic, evolutionary, psychosocial, sociocultural, and en-
vironmental factors, and that recognize a subtle interplay between and
among these factors depending on the patient.139  Unicausal theories, espe-
cially unicausal hormone-based theories, receive little support in the current
scientific literature.140  In one current multifactorial model, socioenviron-
mental stressors experienced early in life are believed to alter nerve circuits
that control emotion, and such alterations are believed to exaggerate later
responses to stress, which may lead to the neurochemical and behavioral
changes associated with postpartum illness.141  Very recent studies also are
showing that all forms of depression, including postpartum depression, can
lead to heart disease and exacerbate existing cardiac problems, and that the
hormone deficiencies that sometimes accompany depression, including in-
creased levels of cortisol, can lead to reductions in calcium and eventually
139 See, e.g., JAMES ALEXANDER HAMILTON, POSTPARTUM PSYCHIATRIC ILLNESS: A PIC-
TURE PUZZLE xix (James A. Hamilton & Patricia N. Harberger, eds., 1992) (“[E]vidence
from a variety of sources suggest[s] that postpartum psychiatric syndromes implicate a
range of pathophysiology which is fairly extensive and extended in time.  Looking at
individual variables, a very complex phenomenon is suggested.”); Butts, supra note 34, R
at 139 (“In all likelihood there are many factors responsible for decompensation in any
post-partum patient.  These factors are organic, biochemical, physiological and psycho-
logical.  One should bear in mind the subtle interplay between these and other parameters
in the production of post-partum illness.”); Martinez-Schallmoser, supra note 25, at R
246–47 (“It appears that the etiology of postpartum depression may be complex and
multifactorial.”).  A multifactorial model was recognized as early as 1838 by French
Psychiatrist Jean-Etienne-Dominique Esquirol, who stated in Des Maladies Mentales
that, “[t]he causes which especially predispose the recently confined and nurses to this
malady are, hereditary predisposition, an extreme susceptibility, attacks of insanity ante-
rior to pregnancy, and attacks consequent upon preceding confinements, or during lacta-
tion.” ESQUIROL, supra note 32, at 128. R
140 See, e.g., Marano, supra note 98, at 30, 32. R
Much more than a chemical imbalance, depression is a disorder of mind, brain,
and body . . . . New research is challenging the assumption that the world’s most
common mental ailment is just a chemical imbalance in the brain . . . . It is not
possible to explain either the disease or its treatment based solely on levels of
neurotransmitters.
Id.
141 See, e.g., id. at 32.
Stress-related events may kick off 50 percent of all depression and early life stress
can prime people for later depression.  Ongoing research in animals and in people
demonstrates that early strain can alter nerve circuits that control emotion, exag-
gerating later responses to stress and creating the neurochemical and behavioral
changes of depression.  In other words, the deeper researchers probe the brain, the
more they validate the psychoanalytic view that early adverse life events can cre-
ate adult psychopathology.
Id.
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osteoporosis.142  As a result, many physicians and scientists now classify de-
pression in all its forms as a physical illness due to its probable physical
causes and documented physical effects, and recognize depressive and
psychotic episodes as secondary responses to primarily biologically-based
illnesses.143
II. LEGAL UNDERSTANDINGS OF POSTPARTUM ILLNESS
Given these advances in the scientific understanding of postpartum ill-
ness, I now turn to its legal understanding, incorporation, and utilization.  A
range of past, current, and proposed legal authorities, including criminal in-
fanticide laws, judicial opinions interpreting health insurance policy provi-
sions, and postpartum awareness laws, expressly reference postpartum
illness, its probable causes and its understood effects.  In this Part II, I
demonstrate that the science lawmakers use to support and interpret postpar-
tum law and policy is not always accurate.  A criminal infanticide bill intro-
duced in one state’s most recent legislative session continues to refer to
lactation as a cause of postpartum impaired judgment, for example.144  Judi-
cial opinions interpreting health insurance policy provisions continue to clas-
sify postpartum illness as a non-physical, nervous disorder notwithstanding
readily available scientific evidence to the contrary.145  Many states’ recent
142 See, e.g., id.; Lana J. Williams, Julie A. Pasco, Felice N. Jacka, Margaret J. Henry,
Seetal Dodd & Michael Berk, Depression and Bone Metabolism, 78 PSYCHOTHERAPY &
PSYCHOSOMATICS 16–25 (2009) (reviewing the current evidence on the relationship be-
tween depression and bone mineral density and identifying potential mechanisms); De-
pression Increases Risk for Heart Disease More Than Genetics or Environment,
ScienceDaily, Mar. 5, 2009, http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2009/03/0903041821
13.htm (referencing a study conducted by researchers at the Washington University
School of Medicine and the St. Louis Veterans Affairs Medical Center reporting that a
history of major depression increases the risk of heart disease over and above any genetic
risks common to depression and heart disease); Marilyn Elias, Depression Can Break the
Heart, USA TODAY, Mar. 4, 2009, http://www.usatoday.com/news/health/2009-03-04-de
pression-heart_N.htm (referencing the same study); Kerri Watchter, 19 Postmenopausal
Women Studied: Cortisol May Mediate Effect of Depression on Osteoporosis, OB/GYN
News, June 15, 2004, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0CYD/is_12_39/ai_n6101
590/ (referencing data presented at the 2004 American Association for Geriatric Psychia-
try suggesting that women with a history of depression history appear to have increased
stress-related cortisol levels, a finding that may help explain the link between depression
and osteoporosis).
143 See, e.g., Marano, supra note 98, at 74 (suggesting that psychiatry is moving to- R
wards the view that the brain is a biological organ).
The new corporeality of “mental” illness is perhaps most daringly embodied in
the work of Bruce Charlton, a research psychiatrist in the department of psychol-
ogy at the University of Newcastle in England.  Depression, Charlton provoca-
tively contends, doesn’t just have physical concomitants; it is wholly a physical
disorder, one that is misinterpreted by the brain.  Sickness is read as sadness.
Id.
144 See infra Part II(A).
145 See infra Part II(B).
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postpartum awareness laws are premised on outdated unicausal hormone-
based theories of postpartum illness.146  The reasons for these inaccuracies
likely include the difficulties faced by non-scientifically trained lawmakers
in understanding complex disease etiology, the reliance on common law
tests and contractual provisions that contain outdated formulas for distin-
guishing physical and mental illness, the lack of time and resources neces-
sary to update outdated law, the frequency with which lawmakers borrow
language from old law to create new law without updating the science
therein and, perhaps, the desire of lawmakers to rely on the perceived objec-
tivity and allure of science to support socially desirable health laws and
policies.147
Unfortunately, inaccurate understandings of illness and behavior are not
only difficult to remove from the law once established, but they also tend to
reappear within new statutes and judicial opinions notwithstanding readily
accessible scientific findings to the contrary.148  In this Part, I also demon-
strate that lawmakers who rely on outdated science risk developing inappro-
priate health laws and policies, encouraging the introduction of expert
testimony that will not meet evidentiary standards for use in litigation, estab-
lishing conflicts between different health laws and policies, and supporting
the public misunderstanding of postpartum illness.  Going forward,
lawmakers, judges, and other stakeholders need to recognize the complexity
of disease etiology, including the etiology of postpartum illness.  To assist
with these efforts, I propose a contemporary legal explanation of postpartum
illness that emphasizes the illness’s incomplete understanding and likely
multifactorial etiology, as well as the elimination or reformulation of com-
mon law tests designed to distinguish physical and mental illness.
A. Criminal Infanticide Legislation
International criminal infanticide legislation provides one of the oldest
express legal recognitions of a relationship between childbirth and mental
illness.149  The English Infanticide Act of 1922 reduced the maximum charge
146 See infra Part II(C).
147 See infra Part II.
148 See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 182–200. R
149 See, e.g., GEOFFREY R. MCKEE, WHY MOTHERS KILL: A FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGIST’S
CASEBOOK 42 (2006) (“Legislative confirmation of the influence of pregnancy and deliv-
ery on a woman’s emotional status, for example, was provided in the English Infanticide
Act of 1922.”).  Older infanticide laws, such as the English Infanticide Act of 1623,
reduced the maximum charge a mother could face for concealing the death of a bastard
child, were thought to result not from legal recognition of postpartum illness but from
recognition of socio-economic difficulties, such as the inability of a mother to secure
support for a child born out of wedlock from the child’s biological father; see An Act to
Prevent the Destroying and Murdering of Bastard Children, 1623, 20 Jac., c. 27 (Eng.).
See generally Katherine O’Donovan, The Medicalisation of Infanticide, reprinted in
SOURCEBOOK ON FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE 518 (Hilaire Barnett, ed., 1997) (examining
criminal law’s treatment of infanticide from the seventeenth century to the present).
\\server05\productn\H\HLG\33-1\HLG108.txt unknown Seq: 26 27-JAN-10 12:46
124 Harvard Journal of Law & Gender [Vol. 33
a mother could face for killing her child from the crime of murder to man-
slaughter if (i) the child was “newly-born”; and (ii) “at the time of the act or
omission [the mother] had not fully recovered from the effect of giving
birth to such child, but by reason thereof the balance of her mind was then
disturbed.”150  Although the Infanticide Act of 1922 did not contain any
within-statute legislative findings or preamble referencing particular scien-
tific findings addressing the relationship between childbirth and mental ill-
ness, a literal reading of the Act suggests to the public and the legal
community that a woman’s mind can be “disturbed” during the period in
which her child is “newly-born.”151
The problem with the Infanticide Act of 1922 was that it did not define
the phrase “newly-born.”152  Five years later, a case involving a woman
named Mary O’Donoghue, who had killed her 35-day-old child, was brought
to trial.153  The trial court held that the child was not “newly-born” and,
therefore, that Ms. O’Donoghue must be sentenced to death under the gen-
eral murder statute, a sentence the Crown later commuted to life imprison-
ment.154  On appeal, defense counsel argued that the Infanticide Act of 1922
was designed to protect women who suffered from “puerperal mental der-
angement,” a condition that could last from two to up to six weeks after
childbirth, and that Ms. O’Donoghue’s criminal behavior occurred during
this extended period.155  The Court of Criminal Appeal disagreed, finding no
error in the trial court’s holding that the defendant’s 35-day-old child was not
“newly-born.”156
Parliament responded eleven years later by amending the Infanticide
Act of 1922 to apply to a broader range of killings, including those involving
children up to 12 months of age, and to killings of such children due to a
second reason; that is, due to lactation.  The Infanticide Act of 1938 thus
150 Infanticide Act, 1922, 12 & 13 Geo. 5, c. 18, § 1(1) (Eng.).
Where a woman by any wilful act or omission causes the death of her newly-born
child, but at the time of the act or omission she had not fully recovered from the
effect of giving birth to such child, and by reason thereof the balance of her mind
was then disturbed, she shall, notwithstanding that the circumstances were such
that but for this Act the offence would have amounted to murder, be guilty of
felony, to wit of infanticide, and may for such offence be dealt with and punished
as if she had been guilty of the offence of manslaughter of such child.
Id. See also MCKEE, supra note 149, at 42 (discussing the Infanticide Act of 1922). R
151 Infanticide Act of 1922, § 1(1).
152 Id.
153 R. v. Mary O’Donoghue, (1927) 20 Cr. App. R. 132 (Eng.).
154 Id. at 132–33.
155 Id. at 133 (“[T]here was between insanity and sanity a degree of mental derange-
ment which the medical authorities called ‘puerperal’ which might appear physically for
any period from two to six weeks after childbirth, to meet which condition the statute was
designed.”).
156 Id. at 136 (“Mr. Justice Talbot made no error in law in holding, with reference to a
child of more than a calendar month of age, that there was no evidence upon which he
could invite or permit a jury to find that that child was newly-born within the meaning of
the statute.”).
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reduced the maximum charge a mother could face from murder to infanti-
cide if (i) the child was “under the age of twelve months”; and, (ii) “at the
time of the act or omission the balance of her mind was disturbed by reason
of her not having fully recovered from the effect of giving birth to the child
or by reason of the effect of lactation consequent upon the birth of the
child.”157   Like the Infanticide Act of 1922, the Infanticide Act of 1938 did
not contain any within-statute legislative findings or preamble referencing
particular scientific studies finding a relationship between or among child-
birth, lactation, and mental illness, although a literal reading of the Act sug-
gests to the public and the legal community that a woman’s mind can be
“disturbed” during the twelve-month period following birth due to a failure
to recover from birth or the effects of lactation.
The bulk of the law review scholarship referencing the Infanticide Acts
of 1922 and 1938 focuses on the question of whether postpartum women
who kill their children should benefit from separate, gender-specific criminal
infanticide provisions.158  My inquiry as a law-medicine scholar, however, is
157 Infanticide Act, 1938, 1 & 2 Geo. 6, c. 36, § 1(1) (Eng.).
Where a woman by any willful act or omission causes the death of her child being
a child under the age of twelve months, but at the time of the act or omission the
balance of her mind was disturbed by reason of her not having fully recovered
from the effect of giving birth to the child or by reason of the effect of lactation
consequent upon the birth of the child, then, notwithstanding that the circum-
stances were such that but for this Act the offence would have amounted to mur-
der, she shall be guilty of felony, to wit of infanticide, and may for such offence
be dealt with and punished as if she had been guilty of the offence of manslaugh-
ter of the child.
Id.  See generally Kimberly Fisher, Note, To Save Her Children’s Souls: Theoretical Per-
spectives on Andrea Yates and Postpartum-Related Infanticide, 25 T. JEFFERSON L. REV.
599, 615–18 (2003) (discussing the Infanticide Act of 1938).
158 See, e.g., Sheri L. Bienstock, Mothers Who Kill Their Children and Postpartum
Psychosis, 32 SW. U. L. REV. 451, 453 (2003) (recommending recognition of a statutory
“heat of passion” or “guilty except for insanity” scheme for women with postpartum
psychosis); Fisher, supra note 157, at 600 (examining “whether postpartum psychosis R
should be recognized as a general defense to infanticide, or as a separate statutory de-
fense.”); Christine Ann Gardner, Note, Postpartum Depression Defense: Are Mothers
Getting Away with Murder?, 24 NEW ENG. L. REV. 953, 955 (1990) (arguing that postpar-
tum depression should not be viewed as an illness in need of special recognition in U.S.
courts as postpartum depression is in other countries); Connie Huang, It’s a Hormonal
Thing: Premenstrual Syndrome and Postpartum Psychosis as Criminal Defense, 11 S.
CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 345, 345 (2002) (“[P]ostpartum psychosis should be
allowed as a type of insanity defense, but not as a separate defense.”); Jessie Manchester,
Beyond Accommodation: Reconstructing the Insanity Defense to Provide an Adequate
Remedy for Postpartum Psychotic Women, 93 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 713, 717
(2003) (“[T]he best solution for ensuring that postpartum psychotic women can ade-
quately present evidence of their mental illness is for states to return to a broader insanity
test.”); Cristie L. March, The Conflicted Treatment of Postpartum Psychosis under Crimi-
nal Law, 32 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 243, 245–46 (2005) (exploring a variety of options
regarding the criminal treatment of women with postpartum psychosis who commit in-
fanticide); Laura E. Reece, Comment, Mothers Who Kill: Postpartum Disorders and
Criminal Infanticide, 38 UCLA L. REV. 699, 717–54 (1991) (arguing that criminal law
should accept postpartum disorder evidence in infanticide cases and proposing several
methods therefore); Heather Leigh Stangle, Murderous Madonna: Femininity, Violence,
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the Acts’ allegedly scientific basis.159  Were the 1922 and 1938 Acts recog-
nizing known scientific links between and among childbirth, lactation, and
mental illness?  Or, were the Acts legislatively creating links where none
existed, perhaps to bolster support for the more lenient treatment of postpar-
tum women,160 or out of a judicial desire not to prosecute postpartum women
for murder unless the black-cap capital punishment would actually be car-
ried out, which it rarely was?161  Although other law-medicine scholars have
concluded that the answers to these questions remain, to this day, unclear,162
a careful review of the early medical observations presented in Part I(A) of
this Article combined with a review of then-current newspaper reports and
the legislative history of the Infanticide Act of 1938, presented below,
reveals an early twentieth-century public and legal recognition of medical
observations of the temporal relation between and among childbirth, lacta-
tion, and mental illness.  Studies confirming a causal relationship between
childbirth or lactation and mental illness that would meet today’s standards
for the scientific method163 did not exist at the time of the Acts’ enactment,
however.
and the Myth of Postpartum Mental Disorder in Cases of Maternal Infanticide and Fili-
cide, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 699, 704 (2008) (“[T]he states have no need to enact an
Infanticide Act or other gender-specific laws.”); April J. Walker, Application of the In-
sanity Defense to Postpartum Disorder-Driven Infanticide in the United States: A Look
Toward the Enactment of an Infanticide Act, 6 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER &
CLASS 197, 201–07 (2006) (examining the legal treatment of women with postpartum
psychosis who commit infanticide under state and international law).
159 See, e.g., Michelle Oberman, Mothers Who Kill: Coming to Terms with Modern
American Infanticide, 8 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 3, 19–20 (2004) (also examining the
quasi-scientific basis of early twentieth-century European infanticide acts).
160 See, e.g., id. at 20 (asking the question).
161 See, e.g., 108 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (1938) 303 (remarks of Lord Arnold)
(“In the last ten years, or rather, in the ten years down to 1936, there have been fifteen
cases which come under the category of what the Press call the ‘black cap farce,’ that is,
the sentencing of a woman to death for the murder of her child when it is perfectly well
known that the sentence will not be carried out.”); O’Donovan, supra note 149, at 520 R
(“Even when there was a conviction capital punishment was rarely carried out.  Despite
39 convictions for child murder between 1849 and 1864, no woman was executed, from
1905 to 1921, 60 women were sentenced to death but in 59 of these cases the sentence
was commuted.”).
162 Oberman, supra note 159, at 19. R
Interestingly, the most fundamental criticism of the Infanticide Act is not the law’s
lenience, but rather its quasi-scientific basis.  Professor Osborne echoed the senti-
ments of many when she concluded that the Act did not recognize the existence of
a link between childbirth and infanticide, but created it.  Even at the time of the
Act’s passage, it was unclear whether the Act was based on an actual belief that
women who killed their children were mentally ill, or whether “a medical model
was adopted to justify moderation in the imposition of punishments.”  In recent
decades, as various English law reform groups have reconsidered the Infanticide
Act, both supporters and critics of the Act agree that “there is little or no evidence
for an association between lactation and mental disorder,” and that mental disor-
der is “probably no longer a significant cause of infanticide.”
Id.
163 See generally A. F. CHALMERS, WHAT IS THIS THING CALLED SCIENCE? (1976)
(discussing theories of the scientific method); James Woodward & David Goodstein,
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At the time of the Acts’ enactment, medical reports of a temporal rela-
tion between and among childbirth, lactation, and mental illness did exist.
Recall the medical observations, dating back to 400 B.C., of the temporal
relation between the occurrence of female-specific reproductive events and
the symptoms of mental illness.164  Further recall eighteenth century German
physician reports of mental illness concurrent with lactation,165 French psy-
chiatrist Esquirol’s observation in 1838 that mental illness in the postpartum
period was caused by a woman’s failure to nurse,166 British physician Bland-
ford’s late nineteenth century lectures recognizing both a “puerperal in-
sanity” as well as an “insanity of lactation,” the latter of which was believed
to be caused by excessive nursing,167 and British physician MacPherson’s
turn-of-the-century lectures attributing mental illness in the postpartum to
both lactation and the sudden cessation of lactation.168
Given these published medical observations and formal medical school
lectures, Parliament’s decision to include a medical justification for infanti-
cide (that is, the failure of a woman who committed infanticide to “fully
recover[ ] from the effect of giving birth to such child, and by reason
thereof the balance of her mind was then disturbed”)169 in the Infanticide Act
of 1922 may be characterized as grounded in the medical literature that was
available at that time.  If asked to re-write the 1922 provision today, I might
add a clinical definition of postpartum psychosis and delete the old-fash-
ioned “disturbance” and “balance of mind” language.  Given the early med-
ical observations of mental illness concurrent with or following childbirth,
however, I would not characterize the association between childbirth and
mental illness made by the Infanticide Act of 1922 as not based in then-
current medical literature.  Stated another way, I would not say that the In-
fanticide Act of 1922 legislatively created a link between childbirth and
mental illness where none existed.170
Conduct, Misconduct and the Structure of Science, 84 AM. SCIENTIST 479, 479–90 (1996)
(discussing the ethical implications of the various theories of the scientific method).
164 See supra text accompanying note 30. R
165 See supra text accompanying notes 32–33. R
166 See supra text accompanying notes 35–38. R
167 See supra text accompanying notes 39–41. R
168 See supra text accompanying notes 42–43. R
169 Infanticide Act of 1922, § 1(1)
Where a woman by any wilful act or omission causes the death of her newly-born
child, but at the time of the act or omission she had not fully recovered from the
effect of giving birth to such child, and by reason thereof the balance of her mind
was then disturbed, she shall, notwithstanding that the circumstances were such
that but for this act the offence would have amounted to murder, be guilty of . . .
the offence of manslaughter of such child.
Id. (emphasis added); see also MCKEE, supra note 149, at 42 (discussing the Infanticide R
Act of 1922).
170 See, e.g., Oberman, supra note 159, at 19 (asking whether infanticide acts were R
recognizing known links between childbirth and mental illness or were legislatively cre-
ating them).
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The next question is whether Parliament legislatively created additional
links between and among childbirth, lactation, and mental illness where
none existed when it reconsidered the provisions of the Infanticide Act of
1922 in 1938 and decided not only to maintain the first medical justification
for infanticide (that is, the “effects of childbirth”), but to add a second medi-
cal justification relating to lactation (that is, “the balance of her mind was
disturbed . . . by reason of the effect of lactation consequent upon the birth
of the child”).171  The medical literature available in 1938 continued to sup-
port the concept of mental illness associated with childbirth as well as the
concept of mental illness associated with lactation (although today’s scien-
tific literature would not support and actually refutes a causal relationship
between lactation and mental illness).  Consider, for example, a 1936
London Times report of a case involving a 24-year-old mother who was tried
that year in England for murdering her second child three weeks after the
child’s birth.172  According to the Times, Lord Dawson of Penn, President of
the Royal College of Physicians, testified on behalf of the defendant mother
that she was suffering from “puerperal insanity and did not know what she
was doing.”173  Lord Dawson’s testimony suggests that he, and perhaps other
physicians associated with the prestigious Royal College of Physicians, be-
lieved in the existence of a form of insanity occurring during or following
childbirth, and that the symptoms of individual women could lead to this or
another form of insanity classification.
Medical reports such as these, as well as public beliefs based on these
medical reports, did not go unnoticed by British lawmakers, including
lawmakers involved in the passage of the Infanticide Act of 1938.  While
urging a second reading of the bill that would become the Act, Viscount
Dawson of Penn testified that the purpose of the bill was to protect ill new
mothers: “[T]he intention of this Bill is to secure recognition by Parliament
that under certain circumstances the killing of infants is provoked by illness
and not always by criminal intent, and to procure for such cases appropriate
handling.”174  Viscount Dawson did not reference particular scientific studies
or medical authorities, although he did refer to what might be called a public
belief that some women who kill their children seem to do so as a result of
the effects of childbirth: “The horse sense of the public detected that
amongst these cases of child murder there were two groups.  There was what
we know as the child-birth group, and there was the group which constituted
the murdering of unwanted children . . . .”175  Viscount Dawson concluded
his testimony by re-emphasizing that certain offenses, including some infan-
171 Infanticide Act of 1938, § 1(1).
172 Infanticide, LONDON TIMES, July 22, 1936, at 13.
173 Id.
174 108 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (1938) 292.  Viscount Dawson also stated that
until the Infanticide Act of 1922, “there was no comprehension that there is a group of
cases in which the cause is illness rather than criminal intent.” Id. at 293.
175 Id. at 292.
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ticides, can be due to illness and that both humanity and present-day think-
ing require leniency to certain postpartum women:
[C]ertain offences can be due to illness, and if and when that
mental illness amounts to irresponsibility for the offence charged,
I suggest that the patient should neither be punished nor dubbed a
lunatic but bound over for appropriate treatment.  I suggest that
that would be a practice more in harmony with present-day think-
ing and with sound humanity, and I beg to move the Second Read-
ing of this Bill.176
Other Lords present at the second reading of the bill that would become
the Infanticide Act of 1938 also referenced an association between childbirth
and mental illness.  The Lord Archbishop of Canterbury testified:
My Lords, I think there can be no question that the women with
whom this Bill deals are entitled to our compassion; women, that
is to say, who, owing to the effects of child-birth and the instabil-
ity of mind which it sometimes occasions, have committed an act
for which they either cannot be regarded as responsible or of
which they could not, at the time, be supposed to be able to discern
the wrong.177
Lord Snell agreed: “[I]t is frequently a cause of ill-health rather than of
criminality.”178  Perhaps in response to the unstated concern that mentally
healthy mothers who had given birth to unwanted children would take ad-
vantage of the leniency afforded by the 1938 Act, Lord Archbishop of Can-
terbury also testified that physicians were capable of distinguishing mentally
disturbed women situated in the postpartum period from other women: “I
am told that the evidences of this unhappy form of insanity are well known
and can easily be recognised.”179
The bill, the second reading of which was being urged by Lord Arch-
bishop of Canterbury and his colleagues, ultimately became the Infanticide
176 Id. at 298.
177 Id. at 301.
178 Id. at 298.
179 Id. at 302.  This statement was preceded by:
I wondered whether there would not be a risk under this Bill that the mother of
such a very unwanted child might be tempted to avail herself, after the child was
actually horn, of the merciful provisions of this Bill in order to get rid of it; but I
am assured by my noble friend that by no possibility could the mere act of infanti-
cide alone be regarded as evidence of disturbance of mind, but that in every case
it would have to be clearly proved that there was, quite apart from the act itself,
evidence of that natural illness.
Id.
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Act of 1938.  That Act represents the modern international trend.180  Canada,
Zimbabwe, New South Wales, and other jurisdictions have also enacted laws
that permit women who kill their children within certain time periods fol-
lowing birth to be charged with a lesser crime if, at the time of the killing,
the woman’s mind is disturbed due to a failure to recover from birth and, in
some jurisdictions, the effects of lactation.181
International infanticide laws remained on the books for a few decades
with little medical controversy.  In the last third of the twentieth century,
however, scientists began investigating the purported scientific relationship
between lactation and mental illness and reporting negative findings.  In
1996, two Texas scientists published a lengthy article reviewing the available
scientific literature and concluding that lactation does not increase a wo-
man’s risk of developing postpartum illness.182  Throughout the first decade
of the twenty-first century, scientists also published studies suggesting that
oxytocin, a hormone produced during breastfeeding, may actually promote
and reinforce maternal behavior, and that breastfed babies are less likely to
be neglected.183
Shortly following the release of these new studies and review articles, a
number of international law reform commissions began recommending the
180 See, e.g., Gardner, supra note 158, at 958 (explaining that England, Canada, and R
other countries have female-specific infanticide laws); Fisher, supra note 157, at 615–16 R
(same).
181 See, e.g., Canada Infanticide Act (codified at R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 233 (1985)) (“A
female person commits infanticide when by a willful act or omission she causes the death
of her newly-born child, if at the time of the act or omission she is not fully recovered
from the effects of giving birth to the child and by reason thereof or of the effect of
lactation consequent on the birth of the child her mind is then disturbed.”); Infanticide
Act, 1990 ZWE-1990-L-57018, No. 27 of 1990 (codified at Criminal Law Act, Chapter
5, Part I, § 48 (Zimb.)) (“Any woman who, within six months of the birth of her child,
causes its death . . . intentionally; or . . . by conduct which she realises involves a real risk
to the child’s life; at a time when the balance of her mind is disturbed as a result of giving
birth to the child, shall be guilty of infanticide if the evidence establishes that she com-
mitted that crime.”); New South Wales Crimes Act 1900, § 22A(1) (Austl.) (“Where a
woman by any wilful act or omission causes the death of her child, being a child under
the age of twelve months, but at the time of the act or omission the balance of her mind
was disturbed by reason of her not having fully recovered from the effect of giving birth
to the child or by reason of the effect of lactation consequent upon the birth of the child,
. . .  she shall be guilty of infanticide . . . .”).
182 Dunnewold, supra note 44, at 25 (exploring the connection between breastfeeding R
and postpartum illness and concluding that breastfeeding does not increase the risk of
developing postpartum depression or anxiety); see also Ingram, supra note 44, at 62 R
(referencing Dunnewold and Crenshaw’s findings).  Interestingly, several studies suggest
that depressive symptoms early in the postpartum period may actually lower the preva-
lence of breastfeeding. See, e.g., Daniel C. Hatton, Jennifer Harrison-Hohner, Sarah
Coste, Veronica Dorato, Luis B. Curet & David A. McCarron, Symptoms of Postpartum
Depression and Breastfeeding, 21 J. HUM. LACTATION 444, 444 (2005).
183 See, e.g., Lane Strathearn, Abdullah A. Mamun, Jake M. Najman & Michael J.
O’Callaghan, Does Breastfeeding Protect Against Substantiated Child Abuse and Neg-
lect? A 15-Year Cohort Study, 123 PEDIATRICS 483, 483 (2009) (“Among other factors,
breastfeeding may help to protect against maternally perpetrated child maltreatment, par-
ticularly child neglect.”).
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repeal of all or part of their infanticide acts, based in part on their lack of
continuing medical and scientific support.184  In 1997, for example, the New
South Wales Law Reform Commission recommended the repeal of New
South Wales’ infanticide provision,185 due to the lack of evidence supporting
a causal relationship between lactation and mental illness.186  According to
the Commission, “it seems now to be generally doubted that there is any
medical basis for the notion of ‘lactational insanity.’” 187  Other international
law reform commissions, including those of England, Wales, and Victoria
also recommended omitting from their jurisdictions’ infanticide provisions
any reference to lactation as a ground for mental illness due to the relation-
ship’s dubious validity.188
Notwithstanding these efforts, the provisions of the English Infanticide
Act of 1938, including the concept of lactational insanity, remain intact and
represent the modern international trend, although not the law of the United
States.189  Assuming that an infanticide bill currently pending before the
Texas Legislature does not become law,190 American neonaticide (the killing
of a baby during the first day of life), infanticide (the killing of a child less
than one year of age), and filicide (the killing of a child older than one year
of age)191 generally are prosecuted under the law of murder.192  The states
generally do not have stand-alone acts creating manslaughter-like infanticide
offenses or recognizing either postpartum depression or postpartum psycho-
sis as independent defenses to homicide (complete or partial), although evi-
dence of postpartum psychosis has been used to support the defenses of
insanity and diminished capacity as well as the verdict of “guilty but men-
tally ill,” where available.193  The United States’ state-by-state and case-by-
184 See text accompanying notes 186–188, infra. R
185 See New South Wales Crimes Act 1900, § 22A (Austl.) (infanticide provision); id.
§ 23A (providing a defense of diminished responsibility).
186 Law Reform Commission, New South Wales, Report 83—Partial Defenses to
Murder—Provocation and Infanticide, § 3.27 (1997) [hereinafter LRC] (“The offence/
defence of infanticide requires the existence of mental disturbance resulting from the
effects of lactation or the effects of giving birth.  The validity of these medical principles
has been widely questioned.”).
187 Id. at § 3.28.
188 See id.; CRIMINAL LAW REVISION COMMITTEE, OFFENCES AGAINST THE PERSON,
1980, Cmnd. 7844, at 47 (Eng.); Law Commission of England and Wales, 1 CRIMINAL
CODE FOR ENGLAND AND WALES (Law Com 177, 1989) c. 64(1); Law Reform Commis-
sion of Victoria, MENTAL MALFUNCTION AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY (Report No. 34,
1990), Rec. 28 at ¶ 166 (Austl.).
189 See, e.g., Connel, supra note 180, at 162–64 (recommending that jurisdictions in R
the United States adopt infanticide provisions); Fisher, supra note 157, at 615–16 (dis- R
cussing international trends in infanticide legislation).
190 H.B. 3318, 81st Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2009); see infra text accompanying notes
197–200. R
191 MCKEE, supra note 149, at 5 (distinguishing neonaticide, infanticide, and filicide). R
192 See, e.g., Colleen Kelly, The Legacy of Too Little, Too Late: The Inconsistent
Treatment of Postpartum Psychosis as a Defense to Infanticide, 19 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH
L. & POL’Y 247, 248–49 (2002) (“In the United States, infanticide falls under general
homicide statutes, which vary from state to state.”).
193 See, e.g., id. at 249 (summarizing state approaches to infanticide).
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case approach has been criticized for its lack of uniformity, consistency, and
justice.194  Indeed, law professor Daniel Maier Katkin studied twenty-four
American infanticide cases in which the mother asserted postpartum psycho-
sis as a legal defense.195  Of those cases, eight women were judged not guilty
by reason of insanity, four were given probation, three were incarcerated for
less than five years, seven were incarcerated between five and twenty years,
and two were sentenced to life imprisonment.196
Some U.S. lawmakers have responded to the lack of infanticide-specific
offense or defense provisions by introducing international-like infanticide
bills.  On March 11, 2009, Representative Jessica Farrar (D-Houston) intro-
duced Texas House Bill 3318 (“H.B. 3318”) to amend the Texas Penal Code
to create the offense of infanticide, punishable as a state jail felony.197  H.B.
3318 generally tracks the language of the English Infanticide Act of 1938
(including its dual medical bases of childbirth and lactation), and establishes
the offense of infanticide defendants whose “judgment was impaired as a
result of the effects of giving birth or the effects of lactation following the
birth.”198  Texas Representative Farrar included the now-refuted medical jus-
tification of lactational insanity notwithstanding readily available scientific
evidence—including scientific review articles authored by local Texas scien-
tists—to the contrary.199  Like its international predecessors, H.B. 3318 sug-
gests to the public and the Texas legal community that a woman’s mind can
be “disturbed” during the twelve-month-period following birth due to the
effects of lactation.  The bill remains pending in the Texas House Criminal
Jurisprudence Committee as of this writing.200
International and U.S. infanticide legislation thus provides one measure
of the legal understanding of postpartum illness.  When prominent physi-
cians report associations between and among childbirth, lactation, and
mental illness century after century, these reports become part of the public
and legal understanding of postpartum behavior.  Even when scientists later
refute a purported scientific relationship, such as the alleged causal relation-
ship between lactation and mental illness, the now incorrect relationship may
remain in the law, as in the case of international infanticide laws that con-
194 See, e.g., Connel, supra note 180, at 146–53, 161–62 (summarizing state ap- R
proaches to infanticide and the criticisms thereof).
195 Daniel Maier Katkin, Postpartum Psychosis, Infanticide, and Criminal Justice, in
POSTPARTUM PSYCHIATRIC ILLNESS: A PICTURE PUZZLE 275, 279 (James A. Hamilton &
Patricia N. Harberger eds., 1992).
196 Id.
197 Tex. H.B. 3318, supra note 190; Texas Legislature Online, 81(R) Actions for HB R
3318, http://www.legis.state.tx.us/BillLookup/Actions.aspx?LegSess=81R&Bill=HB33
18 (last visited Nov. 15, 2009) (providing information about bill filing date and
sponsorship).
198 Tex. H.B. 3318, supra note 190, at § 1. R
199 See Dunnewold, supra note 44, at 25–26. R
200 Texas Legislature Online, 81(R) Actions for HB 3318, http://www.legis.state.tx.
us/BillLookup/Actions.aspx?LegSess=81R&Bill=HB3318 (last visited Nov. 15, 2009)
(showing that the Committee Report was sent to Calendars on April 28, 2009).
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tinue to allow impaired judgment concurrent with lactation to serve as a
ground for a lesser charge of infanticide.  Even after scientists have conclu-
sively refuted a purported scientific relationship, unwitting lawmakers bor-
row language from old laws referring to the outdated science to create new
laws, as in the case of the 2009 Texas infanticide bill that refers to impaired
judgment caused by lactation, thus perpetuating the law’s incorrect under-
standing of postpartum illness.201
B. Judicial Interpretation of Health Insurance Policies
Criminal infanticide laws provide one measure of the legal understand-
ing of postpartum illness.202  Judicial opinions interpreting health insurance
policies that distinguish physical illness from mental illness and provide
fewer benefits for the treatment of mental illness provide a second measure.
At least two federal courts, the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Florida and, on appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit, appear open to recognizing postpartum illness as a physical
illness, but would understandably require physiological proof, such as a test
result showing an imbalance in serotonin or norepinephrine, before requiring
an insurance company to provide comprehensive coverage of postpartum
treatments in accordance with the company’s physical illness policy provi-
sions.203  Because the plaintiff in the case failed to introduce physical evi-
dence of her illness, the courts classified her illness as mental for purposes
of applying the insurance policy’s coverage limits.204
At issue in this case, Blake v. UnionMutual Stock Life Insurance Com-
pany, was the proper interpretation of a provision within Pam Blake’s health
insurance policy that limited insurance coverage of mental illnesses (defined
as “any mental, nervous or emotional diseases or disorders”) to 30 days of
inpatient care and $1,000 worth of outpatient treatments.205  Familiar with
the hormone- and neurotransmitter-based theories of postpartum illness de-
scribed in Parts I(C) and I(D) of this Article, Blake believed that her postpar-
tum depression should be classified as a physical illness, defined in the
policy as an “illness or disease . . . [including] pregnancy unless excluded
elsewhere.”206  When Blake’s insurance company classified her postpartum
201 See supra text accompanying notes 197–200. R
202 See supra Part II(A).
203 See infra text accompanying notes 205–212. R
204 Blake v. UnionMutual Stock Life Ins. Co., 906 F.2d 1525, 1527 (11th Cir. 1990)
(affirming district court’s findings of fact and reasoning with regards to the insurance
policy); Blake v. UnionMutual Stock Life Ins. Co., No. 87-0543-CIV, 1989 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 16331, at *4–*5 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 10, 1989) (“Because of Plaintiffs’ failure to
prove an organic causation for this illness, we find that . . . she suffered a mental illness
within the terms of the policy.”).
205 Blake, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16331 at *4.
206 Id.
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depression as a mental illness and refused to cover the entirety of its treat-
ment, Blake sued to recover $33,279.55 in unpaid medical bills.207
At trial, the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Florida reviewed the evidence provided about Blake’s postpartum depression
and was asked to decide whether Blake had a physical or a mental illness.208
Although several expert and treating psychiatrists and psychologists testified
that imbalances in serotonin and norepinephrine, as well as other hormonal
imbalances, caused Blake’s postpartum depression, the court focused on
Blake’s failure to introduce into evidence any hormonal or other tests or
measurements that could prove that she had a physical illness: “[W]hile
hormonal changes may be an important cause of postpartum depression, no
proof has been offered in this case to show that the levels in Mrs. Blake were
abnormal following childbirth.”209  The court thus held that Blake had a
mental illness that was subject to the less comprehensive insurance cover-
age.210  The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision.211
It is tempting to classify the Blake opinions, now 19 and 20 years old,
as examples of the courts’ then-inability to understand postpartum depres-
sion as anything other than a mental illness, despite the emerging scientific
literature documenting the role or roles likely played by sex hormones,
neurotransmitters, brain structure, brain function, and genetics in the illness’s
etiology.  The carefully worded holdings, however, show that the courts fo-
cused more on Blake’s failure to provide evidence proving an organic cause
of her postpartum depression than their desire to pigeonhole postpartum de-
pression as a non-physical nervous disorder.212  The opinions do not fore-
close the possibility that future insureds can prove that their postpartum
depressions are physical illnesses if they can provide test results showing
chemical or hormonal imbalances or other physical pathology.213
207 Id.
208 Id. (“Plaintiffs argue that the Defendant applied the wrong section [of the insur-
ance policy].”).
209 Id. at *9–*10.  The court also stated that:
Neither Pam Blake’s serotonin and neopinephrine levels nor her hormonal levels
were ever measured so far as this Court is aware.  While Dr. Moreno did state that
testing the serotonin and neopinephrine levels is difficult, she did not state why
Mrs. Blake’s hormonal levels were never measured. Dr. Moreno’s testimony sim-
ply failed to prove a physical illness caused Mrs. Blake’s psychiatric
hospitalization.
Id. at *8.
210 Id. at *12 (“Because of Plaintiffs’ failure to prove an organic causation for this
illness, we find that the treatment Mrs. Blake received is only more convincing proof that
she suffered a mental illness within the terms of the policy.”).
211 Blake, 906 F.2d at 1527.
212 Blake, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16331, at *13 (“[T]he Court concludes that the
Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that Pam Blake suffered an organic mental illness
under our de novo review.”).
213 See, e.g., Phillips v. Lincoln Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 302, 309 (7th Cir. 1992)
(“[O]ur reading of Blake leads us to conclude that had the plaintiff demonstrated an
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Notwithstanding the carefully-worded Blake opinions, some subsequent
courts have referenced the opinions as support for a second proposition: that
postpartum depression is a mental illness, not a physical illness, because
postpartum depression is treated by a psychiatrist using well-recognized psy-
chiatric treatments such as psychoactive drug therapy and electroconvulsive
therapy.214  Elsewhere I explored the different tests used by courts to deter-
mine whether an illness is physical or mental for purposes of interpreting a
health or disability insurance policy, including tests that inquire as to the
nature of the (1) treatment provided to the patient (tube feedings provided to
eating-disordered patients leading to the classification of eating disorders as
a physical illness, but psychotherapy, psychotropic medications, and elec-
troconvulsive therapies leading to a finding of mental illness); (2) symptoms
of the illness (symptoms of dehydration and malnourishment leading to the
classification of eating disorders as a physical illness, with symptoms of
high moods followed by low moods leading to the classification of bipolar
disorder as mental illness); and (3) origin of the disease (expert testimony
regarding the neurobiological origin of bipolar disorder leading to the classi-
fication of bipolar disorder as a physical illness).215  Subsequent courts’ un-
derstanding of Pam Blake’s postpartum depression as a mental illness based
on the types of treatments she received constitutes a judicial application of
the first common law test, the “treatment provided to the patient” test.
Advances in the scientific understanding of a range of illnesses tradi-
tionally classified as “mental” beg for a reconsideration of this test.  For
example, does the test comport with the current scientific understanding of
illness if the test results in the classification of an illness as “mental” just
because the illness is treated by a psychiatrist?  For the moment, refrain from
the common law urge to view any treatment provided by a psychiatrist as a
treatment for mental illness.  Further, consider that psychiatrist-prescribed
psychoactive drugs (that is, chemical substances that act primarily upon the
central nervous system by altering brain function) and psychiatrist-ordered
electroconvulsive therapy (that is, a procedure that delivers a brief electrical
current to the brain through the placement of electrodes on one or both sides
of the head for the purpose of inducing seizures) are treatments that rely on
chemicals and electricity to produce physiological changes in the brain.
organic basis for her illness, the Eleventh Circuit may well have held that the policy’s
mental illness limitation did not apply.”).
214 See, e.g., Fitts v. Fed. Nat’l Mortgage Ass’n, 191 F.Supp. 2d 67, 74 (D.D.C. 2002)
(citing Blake v. UnionMutual Stock Life Ins. Co., 906 F.2d 1525, 1530 (11th Cir. 1990))
(noting parenthetically that Blake “not[ed] that the plaintiff’s postpartum depression was
properly considered a mental illness because ‘she was treated primarily by psychiatrists
receiving well recognized psychiatric treatment, including individual psychotherapy,
psychoactive drug therapy, electroconvulsive therapy and participation in group
sessions.’”).
215 See Stacey A. Tovino, Neuroscience and Health Law: An Integrative Approach,
42 AKRON L. REV. 469, 478–83 (2009).
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Now compare psychiatrist-prescribed psychoactive drugs and psychia-
trist-ordered electroconvulsive therapy to the types of drugs and devices pre-
scribed and ordered by non-psychiatrist physicians for a range of illnesses
traditionally classified as “physical.”  For example, consider a neurologist
who prescribes the drug Levodopa to help a patient control the symptoms of
her Parkinson’s disease, characterized by trembling of the arms and legs,
stiffness and rigidity of the muscles, and slowness of movement.216
Levodopa works by encouraging dopamine receptors in the brain to bypass
degenerating brain cells.217  Patients who have Parkinson’s disease and are
treated with Levodopa are considered by their health insurance companies to
be individuals with physical illnesses, not mental illnesses, even though
Levodopa has its primary physiological effect on the brain.218
Additionally, consider a neurologist who implants a device called a va-
gus nerve stimulator in a patient who has a treatment-resistant seizure disor-
der.219  Vagus nerve stimulators work by sending small electrical pulses to
the vagus nerve, which delivers the pulses to the brain and helps prevent the
electrical irregularities in the brain that cause seizures.220  Patients who have
seizure disorders and are implanted with vagus nerve stimulators are consid-
ered by their health insurance companies to be individuals with physical
illnesses, not mental illnesses, even though the implanted devices have their
primary physiological effect on the brain.221
Psychoactive drugs used to treat psychiatric patients and dopamine-en-
hancing drugs used to treat patients with neurological disorders both produce
a physiological effect in the brain.  Electroconvulsive therapy used to treat
psychiatric patients and vagus nerve stimulation used to treat patients with
neurological (seizure) disorders both use electricity to produce a physiologi-
cal effect in the brain.  Yet application of the common law “treatment pro-
vided to the patient” test would result in the classification of patients treated
216 See, e.g., Miho Murata, Levodopa in the Early Treatment of Parkinson’s Disease,
15 PARKINSONISM & RELATED DISORDERS S17 (2009) (discussing the use of Levodopa for
the treatment of Parkinson’s disease).
217 Id.
218 See, e.g., Michael J. Carroll, The Mental Health Parity Act of 1996: Let It Sunset
if Real Changes Are Not Made, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 553, 579 & n.203 (2004) (noting that
most health insurance plans cover Parkinson’s disease under their physical illness
provisions).
219 See, e.g., Cyberonics, VNS Therapy Basics, http://www.vnstherapy.com/epilep
sy/patient/About_Basics.asp (last visited Nov. 15, 2009) (describing the cause of some
seizure disorders and their treatment by vagus nerve stimulation).
220 Id.
221 See, e.g., Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Pub. 100-04, Medicare
Claims Processing Transmittal 1271, § I(A) (June 22, 2007), available at http://www.
cms.hhs.gov/Transmittals/Downloads/R1271CP.pdf (noting that the Medicare Program
covers vagus nerve stimulation for medically refractory partial onset seizures when sur-
gery is not recommended or has failed); see also Jones v. ING N. Am. Ins. Group, No. 8-
087 / 07-1099, 2008 Iowa App. LEXIS 135, at *6 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2008) (noting
that an insurance company determined that an insured’s illness was physical due in part to
her history of epilepsy).
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with Levodopa and vagus nerve stimulation as patients with physical ill-
nesses and the classification of patients treated with psychoactive drugs and
electroconvulsive therapy as patients with mental illnesses simply because
the latter set of patients are treated by psychiatrists.  Stated another way, the
“treatment provided to the patient” test can lead to illogical results when
similar treatments that produce similar physiological effects are prescribed
or ordered by both psychiatrist and non-psychiatrist physicians.
Judicial opinions interpreting health insurance policy provisions thus
provide a second measure of the legal understanding of postpartum illness.
When a claimant sues a health insurance company in an attempt to seek
more comprehensive insurance coverage under a health insurance policy’s
physical illness provision, the claimant is essentially asking the court to
make a medical—and thus contractual—determination that the claimant’s
condition is physical rather than mental in nature.  A health insurance claim-
ant is encouraged to request this determination by the health insurance pol-
icy itself, which distinguishes physical and mental illness even though the
distinction may be characterized as reductionist and perpetuative of a mind-
body dualism that is not necessarily supported by the current scientific litera-
ture.222  Even in cases in which forward-thinking courts give substantial
weight to expert testimony regarding the likely biological etiology of an in-
surance claimant’s particular illness, procedural technicalities (such as the
failure of the claimant to properly introduce evidence supporting such
neurobiology), combined with subsequent courts’ reinterpretation of these
cases based on arguably outdated common law tests, can reinforce the tradi-
tional legal understanding of postpartum illness as a mental illness.  As dis-
cussed in more detail in Part III, I anticipate that these legal understandings
may change as new federal and state mental health parity laws are litigated
and to the extent a physiological diagnostic test for postpartum illness, such
as a placental corticotropin-releasing hormone test for postpartum depres-
sion223 or a structural or functional neuroimaging test for postpartum ill-
ness224 becomes publicly available.
C. Postpartum Awareness Legislation
Criminal infanticide legislation and judicial opinions interpreting health
insurance policy provisions provide two measures of the legal understanding
of postpartum illness.  Laws that seek to improve postpartum illness aware-
222 See, e.g., DSM IV-TR, supra note 25, at xxx (“Although this volume is titled the R
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, the term mental disorder unfor-
tunately implies a distinction between ‘mental’ disorders and ‘physical’ disorders that is a
reductionistic anachronism of mind/body dualism.  A compelling literature documents
that there is much ‘physical’ in ‘mental’ disorders and much ‘mental’ in ‘physical’
disorders.”).
223 See supra text accompanying notes 66–70. R
224 See supra text accompanying notes 95–98. R
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ness, education, treatment, research funding, and health and disability insur-
ance coverage (“postpartum awareness laws”) provide a third measure.
During the last decade, federal and state lawmakers have introduced a num-
ber of postpartum awareness laws that would, among other things (i) require
the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services to make
available grants that would provide education to new mothers and their fami-
lies about postpartum illness, provide screening for postpartum illness dur-
ing the first year of postnatal check-up visits, and provide treatment for
mothers with postpartum conditions;225 (ii) direct the heads of federal agen-
cies to develop a research plan relating to postpartum illness;226 (iii) require
the compilation and synthesis of data relating to postpartum illness;227 (iv)
proclaim certain days and months in certain states as Postpartum Depression
Awareness Day228 or Month,229 as appropriate; (v) prohibit the denial of disa-
bility insurance for a history of postpartum depression;230 and (vi) require
public and private health plans to provide insurance coverage for treatments
for postpartum illness.231
A careful reading of the legislative findings and preambles in these stat-
utes suggests that part of the impetus for these laws is the improved, al-
though not necessarily correct, legal understanding of the etiology of
postpartum illness.  In a 1999 West Virginia resolution requesting the study
of postpartum depression and encouraging the United States Surgeon Gen-
eral to place postpartum depression on the agenda of a forthcoming study of
suicide, the West Virginia House found that, “[p]ostpartum depression is
the result of a chemical imbalance triggered by a sudden, dramatic drop in
hormonal production after the birth of a baby . . . .”232  One year later, when
225 Mom’s Opportunity to Access Health, Education, Research, and Support for Post-
partum Depression (MOTHERS) Act, S. 1375, 110th Cong. (2007).
226 Id.
227 See, e.g., H.B. 6567, 2001 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (R.I. 2001) (proposed Rhode
Island House resolution directing the Rhode Island Department of Health to establish a
panel to compile and synthesize data relating to postpartum depression and psychosis).
228 See, e.g., S. Res. 164, 210th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2003) (New Jersey Senate
Resolution declaring June 25, 2003, as Postpartum Depression Awareness Day).
229 See, e.g., Assem. Con. Res. 51, 2003-2004, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2003) (California
Assembly Concurrent Resolution proclaiming May 2003 as Postpartum Mood and Anxi-
ety Disorder Awareness Month).
230 See, e.g., An Act Prohibiting Denial of Disability Insurance for Treatment for
Depression Due to Menopause, Postpartum Depression, and Pregnancy, H. File 634, 79th
Gen. Assem., 1st Sess. (Iowa 2001) (Iowa House Bill that would “prohibit[ ] an insurer
from completely denying disability insurance coverage on the basis of treatment within
the previous five years for depression due to pregnancy, postpartum depression, or meno-
pause.  The insurer may, however, in such circumstances, require a waiver of coverage
for disability due to depression for a period of time not to exceed five years from the date
of coverage.”).
231 H.B. 2964, 80th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2007); S.B. 1388, 80th Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Tex. 2007). See generally Susan S. Night, A Missed Opportunity to Bring Change for
Women Suffering from Postpartum Depression, HEALTH L. PERSP. (2007), http://www.
law.uh.edu/healthlaw/perspectives/2007/post-partumdepressionlegislation.pdf (discussing
the value of legislation mandating benefits for treatment of postpartum illness).
232 H. Con. Res. 47, 74th Leg. (W. Va. 1999).
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the West Virginia Senate adopted a concurrent resolution requesting action
to increase public awareness of postpartum depression and improve recogni-
tion and treatment of postpartum illness, the Senate also found that postpar-
tum depression is a “serious medical condition resulting from the chemical
imbalance which is triggered by the abrupt and dramatic drop in a woman’s
hormonal production following the birth of a baby.”233
West Virginia is not the only state to suggest that postpartum depres-
sion has only one cause; that is, the sharp drop in hormones that occurs
within a few days of childbirth.  In a 2001 Pennsylvania bill seeking to es-
tablish a public awareness, education, screening, and treatment program for
postpartum depression, the Pennsylvania General Assembly found that post-
partum depression “is the result of a chemical imbalance triggered by a sud-
den dramatic drop in hormonal production after the birth of a baby . . . .”234
The same findings are set forth in a pair of 2000 New Jersey bills that would
require a New Jersey state agency to establish a public awareness campaign
and develop policies and procedures for health care professionals and facili-
ties concerning postpartum depression, and appropriating $50,000 there-
for,235 as well as a 2003 New Jersey Senate Resolution that would declare
June 25, 2003 to be Postpartum Depression Awareness Day in New Jersey.236
Although the postpartum awareness laws introduced between 1999 and
2003 suggest a unicausal, hormone-based theory of postpartum illness, some
federal and state bills and resolutions introduced during and after 2003 rec-
ognize the complexity of postpartum illness and suggest a broader range of
contributing factors.  In a 2003 California Assembly Concurrent Resolution
proclaiming May 2003 as Postpartum Mood and Anxiety Disorder Aware-
ness Month, California lawmakers found that,
The medical community does not fully understand or recognize all
factors contributing to postpartum mood and anxiety disorders, but
it is believed that these disorders are caused by physiological fac-
tors, such as hormone levels, and can be exacerbated by such ex-
ternal risk factors as marital problems, sleep deprivation, and
preexisting mental illnesses . . . .237
In the federal Mom’s Opportunity to Access Health, Education, Research,
and Support for Postpartum Depression Act, which Congress designed to
ensure that new mothers and their families are educated about postpartum
depression, screened for symptoms, and provided with essential services,
Congress also recognized the complexity of postpartum illness and sug-
gested a broader range of contributing factors:
233 S. Con. Res. 18, 75th Leg. (W. Va. 2000).
234 S.B. 1172, 185th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2001).
235 Assem. B. 2775, 209th Leg. (N.J. 2000); S.B. 1111, 209th Leg. (N.J. 2000).
236 S. Res. 164, 210th Leg. (N.J. 2003).
237 Assem. Con. Res. 51, supra note 229. R
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The causes of postpartum depression are complex and unknown at
this time; however, contributing factors include: a steep and rapid
drop in hormone levels after childbirth; difficulty during labor or
pregnancy; a premature birth; a miscarriage; feeling overwhelmed,
uncertain, frustrated or anxious about one’s new role as a mother; a
lack of support from one’s spouse, friends, or family; marital strife;
stressful events in life such as death of a loved one, financial
problems, or physical or mental abuse; a family history of depres-
sion or mood disorders; a previous history of major depression or
anxiety; or a prior postpartum depression.238
Perhaps the most accurate legal understanding of postpartum illness is that
of Arizona lawmakers in a 2008 Arizona House Concurrent Resolution that
simply stated “The causes of perinatal mood disorders are complex and not
fully understood at this time.”239
Postpartum awareness laws thus provide a third measure of the legal
understanding of postpartum illness.  Some recent postpartum awareness
laws do recognize the complexity of postpartum illness and accurately iden-
tify a broad range of possible contributing factors.  A second set of postpar-
tum awareness laws remain premised on unicausal, hormone-based theories
of postpartum illness that were outdated even at the time of the laws’ intro-
duction and enactment.  Several possible explanations exist for this second
set of laws.  First, a lag may exist between the time of an advance in the
scientific understanding of an illness and the public and legal understanding
of that illness.  Even with today’s electronic (in advance of print) release of
peer-reviewed scientific studies through PubMed and other digital collec-
tions of biomedical and life sciences journals, lawmakers may not have the
time, desire, or ability to stay abreast of the current scientific literature.  In
addition, non-scientifically trained lawmakers may have difficulty under-
standing and accurately describing complex disease etiology in the few
sentences that comprise the legislative findings portion of a statute.  Finally,
simple scientific explanations, including unicausal hormone-based explana-
tions of postpartum illness, may appeal to lawmakers who wish to support
their proposed legislation with ostensibly clean, objective, and persuasive
authority.
D. A Contemporary Legal Understanding of Postpartum Illness
In this Part, I demonstrated that the legal understanding of the science
used to support postpartum law and policy is not always accurate, that these
inaccuracies are difficult to remove from the law once established, and that
these inaccuracies tend to appear in new law notwithstanding readily acces-
238 MOTHERS Act, supra note 225, at § 2(7). R
239 S. Con. Res. 1029, 49th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2009).
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sible scientific evidence to the contrary.  Stated slightly differently, the sci-
ence used to formulate legislation, contractual provisions, and common law
tests in the context of postpartum illness does not always meet the more
rigorous standards for scientific evidence required by the common law or
federal or state rules of evidence for use in litigation.240
Lawmakers who rely on inaccurate science to formulate health law and
policy can inadvertently create several potential problems.  The first poten-
tial problem relates to the abbreviated future of the legislative provision con-
taining the inaccurate scientific reference.  More specifically, the discovery
of inaccurate scientific references within a law may lead to the repeal of the
entire law even if the general policy underlying the law might be right but
the science in one portion of the law is wrong.  Assume for the sake of
argument only that all criminal law scholars agree that female-specific crim-
inal infanticide offense provisions that lower the maximum charge a mother
can face for killing her child from murder to a manslaughter-like infanticide
are jurisprudentially desirable.  As discussed in Part II(A), many infanticide
provisions contain two medical bases, that is, infanticide that results from
the disturbance of the balance of the mother’s mind due to the mother’s fail-
ure to recover from the effects of giving birth as well as infanticide that
results from a mother’s impaired judgment due to lactation.  In today’s par-
lance, these two medical bases may be referred to as postpartum psychosis
and lactational insanity.  As discussed in Part I, the scientific literature cur-
rently supports the diagnosis of postpartum psychosis but not lactational in-
sanity.  When international law reform commissioners learned in the late
twentieth century that the concept of lactational insanity was no longer sup-
ported by the scientific literature, they began recommending the repeal of
their jurisdictions’ entire infanticide offenses, not just the second medical
basis of lactational insanity.241  Thus, one risk of relying on inaccurate sci-
ence to formulate a law is the eventual repeal of the entire law even though
all but one of the law’s medical bases is accurate.  This problem is easily
remedied by the repeal of only the inaccurate medical basis.
A second, more significant, concern relates to the development of the
wrong health law and policy.  The oft-cited controversy surrounding legisla-
tion mandating insurance coverage of high-dose chemotherapy with autolo-
gous bone marrow transplant (“HDC-ABMT”) for treatment of breast
cancer nicely illustrates this potential problem.242  In the HDC portion of the
240 See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589–90 (1993);
FED. R. EVID. 702.
241 See, e.g., LRC, supra note 186, at Recommendation 3 (recommending the repeal R
of the New South Wales infanticide offense provision) and § 3.28 (arguing that the New
South Wales infanticide offense provision should be repealed because, “it seems now to
be generally doubted that there is any medical basis for the notion of ‘lactational
insanity.’”).
242 See, e.g., Michelle M. Mello & Troyen A. Brennan, The Controversy Over High-
Dose Chemotherapy With Autologous Bone Marrow Transplant For Breast Cancer, 20
HEALTH AFFAIRS 101, 106–10 (Sept.–Oct. 2001) (discussing the enthusiastic adoption of
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HDC-ABMT procedure, a breast cancer patient is administered a high dose
of chemotherapy that is intended to kill the patient’s cancer but has the side
effect of disabling the patient’s immune system.243  In the ABMT portion of
the procedure, the patient is reinfused with bone marrow or stem cells that
were extracted prior to the administration of the high dose of chemotherapy
in an attempt to restore the patient’s immune system.244  The theory behind
HDC-ABMT is that the patient can be given a higher dose of chemotherapy,
thus killing more cancer cells, than would otherwise be possible because the
patient’s immune system will be fortified following the chemotherapy
through the transplant process.245
Initially, many health insurers refused to cover the approximately
$80,000 cost of the HDC-ABMT procedure, relying on early clinical trials
finding that HDC-ABMT was not more efficacious than less costly and less
toxic standard doses of chemotherapy.246  Insurers’ initial refusals to cover
the costs of HDC-ABMT led to intensive political lobbying by patient advo-
cacy and other groups, which led to legislation in several states mandating
health insurers to cover or offer coverage for the procedure.247  The Missouri
General Assembly, for example, passed a law in 1995 requiring certain
health insurance policies created or renewed after January 1, 1996, to offer
coverage for the treatment of breast cancer by HDC-ABMT.248  The Mis-
souri mandated benefit law remains on the books today notwithstanding the
publication since 1998 of several carefully-designed clinical studies con-
cluding that HDC-ABMT does not confer a survival advantage for women
with breast cancer relative to standard-dose chemotherapy.249
the unproven HDC-ABMT procedure in the clinical, legal, and insurance contexts); U.S.
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HEHS No. 96-83, HEALTH INSURANCE: COVERAGE OF
AUTOLOGOUS BONE MARROW TRANSPLANTATION FOR BREAST CANCER 5–6 (1996) [herein-
after GAO REPORT] (discussing the enthusiastic adoption of the unproven HDC-ABMT
procedure in the insurance context). See generally RICHARD A. RETTIG, PETER D. JACOB-
SON, CYNTHIA FARQUHAR & WADE M. AUBRY, FALSE HOPE: BONE MARROW TRANSPLANTA-
TION FOR BREAST CANCER (2007) (discussing the enthusiastic adoption of the unproven
HDC-ABMT procedure in the clinical, legal, and insurance contexts).
243 Mello & Brennan, supra note 242, at 101. R
244 Id.
245 Id.
246 Id. at 102.
247 See GAO REPORT, supra note 242, at 11 & n.14 (listing states that, by 1996, had R
passed or had pending legislation requiring health insurance coverage of HDC-ABMT).
248 MO. REV. STAT. § 376.1200 (2000).
249 See, e.g., Gabriel N. Hortobagyi et al., Randomized Trial of High-Dose Chemo-
therapy and Blood Cell Autografts for High-Risk Primary Breast Carcinoma, 92 J. NAT’L
CANCER INST. 225, 231 (2000) (concluding that, “[n]o relapse-free or overall survival
advantage was associated with the use of high-dose chemotherapy, and morbidity was
increased with its use.”); W.P. Peters et al., A Prospective, Randomized Comparison of
Two Doses of Combination Alkyating Agents (AA) as Consolidation After CAF in High-
Risk Primary Breast Cancer Involving Ten or More Axillary Lympth Nodes (LN): Prelim-
inary Results of CALGB 9082/SWOG 9114/NCIC MA-13, 18(1a) PROCEEDINGS AM. SOC’Y
CLINICAL ONCOLOGY (1999); Sjoerd Rodenhuis et al., Randomised Trial of High-Dose
Chemotherapy and Haemopoietic Progenitor-Cell Support in Operable Breast Cancer
with Extensive Axillary Lymph-Node Involvement, 352 LANCET 515, 520 (1998); Edward
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The enactment and persistence of state legislation mandating health in-
surance coverage of the HDC-ABMT procedure notwithstanding the initial
and continued lack of scientific support for the efficacy and safety of the
procedure is referenced in several cautionary law-medicine tales that empha-
size (i) the dangers of allowing political pressures to overwhelm science in
evaluating new therapies and rationing scarce resources;250 (ii) the inappro-
priateness or incompetence of the legal system in resolving health insurance
coverage disputes involving complex medical procedures and scientific re-
search studies;251 and, more generally (iii) the inability of mandated benefit
and other health-related legislation to keep pace with evolving clinical stan-
dards of care.252
These lessons also apply in the context of postpartum law and policy.
A legislative desire to provide a lower criminal charge for postpartum wo-
men who commit infanticide should not overwhelm or otherwise extend be-
yond the scientific literature, which no longer supports the concept of
lactational insanity.  The spring 2009 introduction of Texas H.B. 3318, one
portion of which provides a lower criminal charge for women who commit
infanticide if their judgment is impaired due to lactation, demonstrates the
bill authors’ inability to stay abreast of the current scientific literature.253  If
passed, the portion of Texas H.B. 3318 that refers to impaired judgment due
to lactation would not only be scientifically incorrect, but would also en-
courage the introduction of expert testimony regarding future defendants’
purported lactational insanity even though the proffered evidence should not
survive standards for scientific evidence used in litigation.254
A third potential problem associated with the legal misunderstanding of
science is the development of conflicts between different laws and policies.
If passed, Texas H.B. 3318 would send a message to the Texas public and
legal community that lactation can cause impaired judgment that can result
in infanticide.  This message may contradict the message sent by other Texas
laws relating to the maternal, child, and societal benefits associated with
lactation.  For example, in Texas’s Breastfeeding Rights and Policies Act,
enacted in 1995, the Texas Legislature stated that breastfeeding “must be
encouraged in the interests of maternal and child health and family val-
ues,”255 and that “a woman’s choice to breast-feed benefits the family, the
A. Stadtmauer et al., Conventional-Dose Chemotherapy Compared with High-Dose
Chemotherapy Plus Autologous Hematopoietic Stem-Cell Transplantation for Metastatic
Breast Cancer, 342 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1069, 1074 (2000).
250 See, e.g., Mello & Brennan, supra note 242, at 102, 110–12. R
251 Id. at 112–14.
252 See, e.g., MASSACHUSETTS DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE FINANCE AND POLICY, COM-
PREHENSIVE REVIEW OF MANDATED BENEFITS IN MASSACHUSETTS: REPORT TO THE LEGISLA-
TURE 1 (2008) (“It can, however, be a challenge for mandated benefits laws to keep apace
with evolving clinical standards of care.”).
253 Tex. H.B. 3318, supra note 190. R
254 See id.
255 TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 165.001 (Vernon 2001).
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employer, and society.”256  Because of the maternal and other benefits asso-
ciated with breastfeeding, the Texas Legislature officially recognized
breastfeeding as the best method of infant nutrition257 and established the
legal right of a mother to breastfeed in any place where she is authorized to
be.258  To the extent the 2009 infanticide bill suggests that lactation causes
mental illness and can result in infanticide and the 1995 pro-breastfeeding
law states that breastfeeding benefits mothers, babies, and society, the two
pieces of legislation may be read as sending conflicting messages regarding
the safety and desirability of breastfeeding.
A fourth potential problem associated with the legal misunderstanding
of science relates to the perpetuation of outdated sexual stereotypes.  When a
postpartum awareness law incorrectly attributes postpartum illness solely to
hormonal imbalances,259 the law perpetuates the outdated stereotypes of wo-
men as hysterical, unstable, and unable to control their raging hormones.260
These stereotypes may be used to justify discriminatory treatment against
women in a range of employment, education, and other contexts.261  Less
dangerous are postpartum awareness laws that correctly attribute postpartum
illness to a range of possible factors, including the biochemical,
neuroanatomical, genetic, evolutionary, psychosocial, and sociocultural fac-
tors that also play a role in the development of illnesses such as major de-
pressive disorder, bipolar disorder, and schizophrenia that occur in both
male and female populations.262
256 Id. § 165.031.
257 Id. § 165.001.
258 Id. § 165.002.
259 See, e.g., H. Con. Res. 47, supra note 232. R
260 See, e.g., ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, The PMS Defense Feminist Setback, in THE
ABUSE EXCUSE: AND OTHER COP-OUTS, SOB STORIES AND EVASIONS OF RESPONSIBILITY
53, 54–55 (1994) (criticizing legal decisions premised on women’s hormonal imbalances
on the grounds that they confirm the sexist stereotype of women unable to control their
raging hormones); Huang, supra note 158, at 364, 363–65 (stating in the context of con- R
versations regarding a premenstrual syndrome (PMS) criminal defense that, “[t]he de-
velopment of a PMS defense could have retrograde ideological effects by reinforcing a
conception of women as inherently irresponsible and unstable . . . which justif[ies] dis-
criminatory treatment of women in employment, education, and political life as well as
place[s] women under the insidiously patriarchal control of the medical establishment.”)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
261 See Huang, supra note 158, at 365 (discussing whether recognition of female- R
specific conditions could lead to discrimination against women). But see Michelle Ober-
man, “Lady Madonna, Children at Your Feet”: Tragedies at the Intersection of Mother-
hood, Mental Illness, and the Law, 10 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 33, 67 (2003).
To the extent that the legal system considers the circumstances that shape the
fabric of the daily life of its litigants who raise postpartum mental illness-related
claims, it likely will bring into focus the very factors that led to her legal troubles.
In so doing, the law might be able to nudge society in the direction of change, by
forcing us to focus on what we can do to alter the circumstances that give rise to
the tragedies associated with postpartum mental illness.
Id.
262 See, e.g., Peter F. Buckley, Schizophrenia and Bipolar Disorder, Part I: Etiology
and Diagnosis, PSYCHIATRY WEEKLY (Nov. 26, 2007) available at http://www.psychiatry
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In light of these and other potential problems, lawmakers, judges, and
other stakeholders need to recognize the complexity of disease etiology, in-
cluding the etiology of postpartum illness.  To assist in these efforts, I now
propose a contemporary legal understanding of postpartum illness that em-
phasizes the illness’s incomplete understanding and likely multifactorial eti-
ology, as well as the elimination or reformulation of common law tests
designed to distinguish physical and mental illness.
I begin by proposing the elimination of lactation as a ground for a lesser
criminal charge in infanticide legislation.  The Infanticide Act of 1938, as
amended and effective today in the United Kingdom, continues to allow a
mother who kills her child to be charged with a lesser crime if “the balance
of her mind was disturbed . . . by reason of the effect of lactation consequent
upon the birth of the child.”263  If passed, Texas H.B. 3318 would also allow
a Texas mother who kills a child to be charged with a lesser crime if, at the
time of the killing, “her judgment was impaired as a result of . . . the effects
of lactation following the birth.”264  The current scientific literature does not
support a causal relationship between lactation and impaired judgment.  I
therefore recommend the elimination of the “by reason of the lactation con-
sequent upon the birth of the child” language in the Infanticide Act of 1938,
the “effects of lactation following the birth” language in Texas H.B. 3318,
and similar language in other jurisdictions’ infanticide laws.
I further propose the reformulation of some infanticide laws’ remaining
medical bases.  The Infanticide Act of 1938, as amended and effective today
in the United Kingdom, continues to allow a mother who kills her child to be
charged with a lesser crime if at the time of the killing “the balance of her
mind was disturbed by reason of her not having fully recovered from the
effect of giving birth to the child.”265  The Act, perhaps unconsciously,
blames the symptoms associated with postpartum depression and psychosis
on some women’s failure to recover from giving birth.  Technically, it is the
physiological changes associated with giving birth combined with the influ-
ence of other psychosocial, sociocultural, and environmental factors that
scientists currently believe contributes to postpartum illness, not a woman’s
failure to recover from childbirth.  Texas H.B. 3318 is less accusatory and
allows a mother who kills her child to be charged with a lesser crime if at the
time of the killing, her “judgment was impaired as a result of the effects of
giving birth.”266  I would therefore amend the Infanticide Act to more
weekly.com/aspx/article/articledetail.aspx?articleid=640 (stating that both schizophrenia
and bipolar disorder have incompletely understood, multifactorial etiologies that likely
include genetic, environmental, and other components); Donald M. Hilty, Kathleen T.
Brady & Robert E. Hales, A Review of Bipolar Disorder Among Adults, 50 PSYCHIATRIC
SERVS. 201, 202–03 (1999) (discussing studies investigating the genetic, biochemical,
neuroanatomical, and neurofunctional bases of bipolar disorder).
263 Infanticide Act, 1938, 1 & 2 Geo. 6, c. 36, § 1(1) (Eng.).
264 Tex. H.B. 3318, supra note 190, at § 1. R
265 Infanticide Act of 1938, at § 1(1).
266 Tex. H.B. 3318, supra note 190, at § 1. R
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closely resemble the Texas bill to permit the application of the lower crimi-
nal charge “if the balance of her mind was disturbed as a result of the effects
of giving birth” (or, if criminal law and evidence law scholars desire greater
clinical specificity, “if the balance of her mind was disturbed due to the
hormonal, biochemical, neuroanatomical, genetic, psychosocial, sociocul-
tural, and/or other physiological or environmental factors scientists believe
contribute to postpartum psychosis”).  In the context of common law tests
designed to distinguish physical and mental illness for purposes of applying
health and disability insurance coverage provisions, I further propose the
elimination of the “treatment provided to the patient test,” which results in
an almost automatic finding of mental illness if the patient is treated by a
psychiatrist even if the psychiatrist uses a drug or device that is designed to
produce a physiological response in the brain.  In Part III, I suggest that the
field of health law should consider a limited, legal merger of physical and
mental illness, which would eliminate the need for a replacement common
law test.
Finally, in the context of postpartum awareness laws that are designed
to improve postpartum illness awareness, education, treatment, research
funding, and health and disability insurance coverage, I propose the deletion
of outdated references to unicausal theories of postpartum illness.  For exam-
ple, legislators should not include in the legislative findings portion of a
postpartum awareness law language stating that, “[p]ostpartum depression
is the result of a chemical imbalance triggered by a sudden, dramatic drop in
hormonal production after the birth of a baby.”267  Instead, I would include a
more accurate report of the current scientific understanding of postpartum
illness, such as:
The causes of postpartum illness are complex and not completely
understood at this time.  The current scientific literature supports
the involvement of a number of different factors in the develop-
ment of postpartum illness, including hormonal, neurochemical,
neuroanatomical, genetic, evolutionary, psychosocial, sociocul-
tural, physiological, and environmental factors.  The scientific un-
derstanding of postpartum illness is rapidly changing.  These
legislative findings, as well as the substantive law below, should
be reviewed and updated by the Legislature on a regular basis.
III. LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF ADVANCES IN THE SCIENTIFIC UNDERSTANDING
OF POSTPARTUM ILLNESS
In the previous Part, I examined the current legal understanding of post-
partum illness and found that a range of existing legal authorities, including
267 See, e.g., H.R. Con. Res. 47, supra note 232 (establishing a unicausal, hormone- R
based theory of postpartum depression).
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criminal infanticide laws, judicial opinions interpreting health insurance pol-
icy provisions, and postpartum awareness laws, contain inaccurate under-
standings of postpartum illness.  In this final Part, I turn to the future and
explore how advances in the scientific understanding of postpartum illness
combined with recent changes to mental health parity law and disability dis-
crimination law may impact the result of future litigation in favor of some
women with postpartum illness.  More broadly, I use mental health parity
law and disability discrimination law as a platform from which to question
the appropriateness of health law frameworks that continue to distinguish
physical and mental illness, and I conclude by proposing a limited, legal
merger of physical and mental illness.
A. Implications for Mental Health Parity Law
Although health insurance plans initially offered physical and mental
health benefits under the same terms and conditions,268 many health insur-
ance plans, including employer-based plans, began reducing their mental
health benefits in the 1970s.269  Insurers and employers justified these benefit
reductions on the grounds that mental health treatments were more expen-
sive and less efficacious than treatments for physical illnesses.270  Patients
268 Dana L. Kaplan, Can Legislation Alone Solve America’s Mental Health Dilemma?
Current State Legislative Schemes Cannot Achieve Mental Health Parity, 8 QUINNIPIAC
L. REV. 325, 328 (2005).  The background information provided in the next two and one-
half paragraphs is updated and taken with copyright permission from Tovino, Remarks,
supra note 87, at 949–50.  Copyright permission granted October 29, 2008, 20:19:00 R
CST, by Jason M. Fuller, Symposium Editor, Akron Law Review.
269 Kaplan, supra note 268, at 328. R
270 See, e.g., RACHEL SETHI, JOANNE JEE, LISA CHIMENTO & D. RICHARD MAUERY,
DESIGNING EMPLOYER-SPONSORED MENTAL HEALTH BENEFITS, DHHS Pub. No. SMA-06-
4177, at 14 (2006).
A key concern among employers is that providing better mental health care bene-
fits will result in higher costs and increased utilization of those services.  Accord-
ing to a trade journal published by International Society of Certified Employee
Benefit Specialists, mental health care costs increased significantly throughout the
1980s and early 1990s; in one year (from 1987 to 1988), these costs grew by 27
percent.  Spending for mental health disorders increased three and a half times
between 1987 and 2000.
Id. (internal citations omitted); Allan Beigel & Steven S. Sharfstein, Mental Health Care
Providers: Not the Only Cause or Only Cure for Rising Costs, 141 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY
668, 668 (1984).
In 1955 mental health expenditures were estimated to be $1.2 billion, or 6% of all
expenditures.  By 1977 the total amount of expenditures for mental health care
had risen to $19.6 billion, 12% of all expenditures.  Even with a correction for
population growth and price increases, this amounts to a fourfold increase in
mental health expenditures.
Id.; Kaplan, supra note 268, at 328 (stating that mental health benefits are two to three R
times as expensive as physical illness benefits); Cheryl A.C. Brown, Interpreting Exclu-
sions or Limitations on Coverage for Mental Illness under Health and Disability Policies,
35 THE BRIEF 52, 53 (Fall 2005).
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with mental health conditions, on the other hand, worried that the stigma
associated with mental illness, as well as their inability to literally prove the
existence of their mental health conditions through routine blood, urine, X-
ray, or other diagnostic tests, prompted the less comprehensive coverage.271
Whatever the cause, the result was referred to as a mental health benefit
disparity.  Some health insurance plans that covered 365 days of inpatient
care for physical illnesses, for example, began covering only 45 days of
inpatient care for mental illnesses.272  Plans that provide unlimited outpatient
visits for treatment of physical illnesses might allow only 20 outpatient visits
per year for treatment of mental disorders.273  And plans that covered all or
maybe 80% of the cost of treatment for physical illnesses began covering
only 50% or less of the cost of treatment for a mental illness.274
In the late 1980s, some patients who sought and were denied additional
mental health benefits due to these contractual disparities responded by su-
ing their insurers, arguing that their conditions were physical rather than
mental in nature and thus covered under the better set of insurance bene-
fits.275  The Blake v. UnionMutual Stock Life Insurance Company case, ex-
amined in Part II(B), is one example.276  In these contract-based lawsuits, the
expert witnesses (usually psychiatrists and psychologists) routinely refer-
enced advances in the behavioral and brain sciences to support the argu-
ments of the insured parties.277  Sometimes the insureds won these lawsuits
Until as recently as 1990, the diagnosis and treatment of mental illnesses were
relatively unsuccessful.  Thus, to avoid the long-term expenses associated with
mental illnesses, many policies have addressed the nature of the coverage pro-
vided for mental illness.  Typically, they exclude or limit coverage, including the
period for which benefits are payable.
Id.
271 See, e.g., The Carter Center, The Carter Center Mental Health Program: Combat-
ing the Stigma of Mental Illness, http://www.cartercenter.org/health/mental_health/index.
html (last visited Nov. 15, 2009) (explaining that much has changed since the time mental
illnesses were shrouded in shame and stigma, but that individuals with mental illness
continue to face stigma and discrimination, including as a result of mental health insur-
ance disparities).
272 See Brian D. Shannon, Paving the Path to Parity in Health Insurance Coverage
for Mental Illness: New Law or Merely Good Intentions? 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 63, 68
(1997).
273 See id.
274 See e.g., id. at 68 n.17; Eric Beal, Note, It’s Better to Have Twelve Monkeys Chas-
ing You Than One Gorilla: Humana Inc. v. Forsyth, the McCarran-Ferguson Act, RICO,
and Deterrence, 5 Conn. Ins. L.J. 751, 752 (1998) (“[H]ealthcare insurance contracts
often stipulate that the insurer will pay a certain percentage of costs, e.g., 80%, leaving
the policyholder with a co-payment of the remaining 20%.”).
275 See, e.g., Blake v. UnionMutual Stock Life Ins. Co., No. 87-0543-CIV, 1989 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 16331 (S.D. Fla. March 10, 1989); Blake v. UnionMutual Stock Life Ins.
Co., 906 F.2d 1525, 1525 (11th Cir. 1990); see also Tovino, Neuroscience and Health
Law, supra note 215, at 478–83 (discussing a number of cases in which insured parties R
who were denied comprehensive insurance coverage responded by suing their insurers,
arguing that their conditions were physical rather than mental in nature and thus covered
under the more comprehensive set of insurance benefits).
276 See, e.g., Blake, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at 16331 at *12; Blake, 906 F.2d at 1525.
277 See Tovino, Neuroscience and Health Law, supra note 215, at 478–83. R
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and sometimes they did not, but the result usually depended on whether the
insured could prove that she had a physical illness through physical
evidence.278
Frustrated with these piecemeal lawsuits, many mental health patient
advocacy organizations began in the early 1990s to lobby Congress and state
legislatures for health insurance parity, reasoning that there was no biologi-
cal justification for the unequal insurance coverage of mental and physical
conditions by health insurance plans.279  By the mid-1990s, proponents of
mental health parity had achieved some success at the federal level through
the Mental Health Parity Act of 1996 (“MHPA’96”), which required covered
group health plans to provide parity with respect to annual and lifetime ag-
gregate spending caps imposed on medical and surgical benefits and mental
health benefits within the plan.280  Because MHPA’96 did not require parity
with respect to financial requirements, cost-sharing requirements, and treat-
ment limitations, mental health parity proponents continued to lobby Con-
gress for more complete parity measures over the next twelve years.281  On
October 3, 2008, President George W. Bush responded by signing into law
the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, one subtitle of which
contained the Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and
Addiction Equity Act of 2008 (“MHPA’08”).282  Very generally, MHPA’08
requires covered group health plans that provide both medical and surgical
benefits and mental health or substance use disorder benefits to ensure that
(1) the financial requirements, such as deductibles and copayments, applica-
ble to mental health and substance use disorder benefits are no more restric-
tive than the predominant financial requirements applicable to substantially
all medical and surgical benefits covered by the plan; (2) no separate cost
sharing requirements that are applicable only with respect to mental health
or substance use disorder benefits exist; (3) the treatment limitations applica-
ble to such mental health and substance use disorder benefits are no more
restrictive than the predominant treatment limitations applicable to substan-
tially all medical and surgical benefits covered by the plan; and (4) no sepa-
rate treatment limitations that are applicable only with respect to mental
health or substance use disorder benefits exist.283  MHPA’08 applies to cov-
ered plans beginning in the first plan coverage year that is one year after the
278 Id.
279 Mary Crosby, Political Lobbying for Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, 11 CHILD
AND ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRIC CLINICS OF NORTH AMERICA 145, 153–54 (2002) (discuss-
ing the push for parity in the 1990s).
280 Mental Health Parity Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-204, 110 Stat. 2944 (codified
as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1185a (2006)).
281 See, e.g., Alaska Psychological Association, 2007–2008 Legislative Agenda and
Report, at 2, available at http://www.ak-pa.org/legislation/2007-2008_legislative_report.
pdf (noting that the Alaska Psychological Association’s goals for the 2007–2008 Con-
gressional Session include “continu[ing] to lobby for mental health parity . . . .”).
282 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, Subtitle B,
§§ 511–12, 122 Stat 3765, 3881 (2008).
283 Id. § 512(a) (amending 29 U.S.C. § 1185a(a) (2006)).
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date of enactment.  For most covered plans, the effective date of MHPA’08
will be January 1, 2010.284  As of this writing, at least one health care reform
bill, H.R. 3962, would extend the application of certain federal mental health
parity provisions beyond the group health plan market to insurance sold on
the individual market.285  The House passed H.R. 3962 on November 7,
2009, although the bill has not yet been considered by the Senate.
Given current mental health parity law, the question becomes how fu-
ture judicial opinions interpreting federal mental health parity law as well as
analogous state parity laws may provide new legal understandings of post-
partum illness.  The answer lies in the fact that neither MHPA’96 nor
MHPA’08 defines the phrase “mental health benefits” other than to refer to
“benefits with respect to services for mental health conditions, as defined
under the terms of the plan and in accordance with applicable Federal and
State law.”286  Because other federal laws do not direct a definition of the
phrase “mental health benefits” as used in MHPA’96 and MHPA’08, the ap-
plication of federal mental health parity law to individuals with particular
mental health conditions will depend on the terms of the plan as regulated by
state law.  Insureds who reside in states that narrowly define these terms
may not receive as much, or the same, protection as insureds who reside in
states that broadly define these terms.
For example, some state laws define “mental health benefits” in terms
of conditions listed in the latest editions of the American Psychiatric Associ-
ation’s (“APA’s”) Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (“DSM”)287 and/or the
World Health Organization’s International Classification of Diseases
(“ICD”),288 both of which identify and classify mental disorders.  Some
states do this even though the current edition of the DSM, the DSM-IV-TR,
states in its Introduction that a mental condition’s inclusion in the manual
should not imply that the condition meets legal criteria for what constitutes a
mental disease, disorder, or disability, and that there is an imperfect fit be-
tween the law on the one hand and disease classification for clinical diagnos-
tic purposes on the other.289  Arkansas is an example of such a jurisdiction.
284 Id. § 512(e)(1) (providing that the law will take effect one year after enactment).
As most health insurance plans follow the calendar year, this means the law will take
actual effect on January 1, 2010.
285 Affordable Health Care for Americans Act, H.R. 3962, §214(b), 111th Cong., 1st
Sess. (2009).
286 See id. §§ 511–12; Mental Health Parity Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-204, 110
Stat. 2944.
287 DSM-IV-TR, supra note 25. R
288 INTERNATIONAL STATISTICAL CLASSIFICATION OF DISEASES AND RELATED HEALTH
PROBLEMS (World Health Organization 2d ed., 10th Rev., 2007).
289 DSM-IV-TR, supra note 25, at xxxii-xxxiii. R
When the DSM-IV categories, criteria, and textual descriptions are employed for
forensic purposes, there are significant risks that diagnostic information will be
misused or misunderstood.  These dangers arise because of the imperfect fit be-
tween the questions of ultimate concern to the law and the information contained
in a clinical diagnosis.  In most situations, the clinical diagnosis of a DSM-IV
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The Arkansas Mental Health Parity Act (“ArkMHPA”),290 the intent of
which is to make insurance coverage for mental illnesses as available as, and
at parity with, insurance coverage for other medical illnesses,291 defines the
phrase “mental illness” as an illness or disorder listed in the DSM or the
ICD.292  ArkMHPA then requires health benefit plans to provide benefits for
the diagnosis and treatment of mental illnesses under the same terms and
conditions as provided for covered benefits offered for the treatment of other
medical illnesses or conditions.293  In Arkansas, then, a woman who requests
treatment for a postpartum illness can benefit from federal and Arkansas
insurance parity requirements if her condition meets the criteria for a mental
disorder listed in the current version of the DSM or the ICD.
The DSM-IV-TR contains a category of mental disorders called “Mood
Disorders,” which includes the “Depressive Disorders” (including Major
Depressive Disorder, Dysthymic Disorder, and Depressive Disorder Not
Otherwise Specified (“NOS”)), the “Bipolar Disorders” (including Bipolar
I Disorder, Bipolar II Disorder, Cyclothymic Disorder, Bipolar Disorder
NOS, and Mood Disorder NOS),294 as well as a category of mental disorders
called “Schizophrenia and Other Psychotic Disorders,” which includes
Schizophrenia, Schizophreniform Disorder, Schizoaffective Disorder, Delu-
sional Disorder, Brief Psychotic Disorder, Shared Psychotic Disorder, and
Psychotic Disorder NOS.295  Although the DSM-IV-TR does not contain a
separate category or classification for postpartum illness, the DSM-IV-TR
does allow a clinician to add a “Postpartum Onset” specifier to a Major
Depressive Disorder, Bipolar II Disorder, or Brief Psychotic Disorder if on-
set is within four weeks after childbirth.296  The DSM-IV-TR expressly
states, however, that the symptoms of a postpartum-onset episode of a de-
pressive, bipolar, or psychotic disorder do not differ from the symptoms of a
non-postpartum-onset episode.297  An Arkansas woman who requests treat-
mental disorder is not sufficient to establish the existence for legal purposes
of a “mental disorder,” “mental disability,” “mental disease,” or “mental
defect” . . . .
Id.
290 ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 23-99-501–23-99-511 (2004).
291 Id. § 23-99-502 (“It is the intent of this state that insurance coverage for mental
illnesses and the mental health treatment of those with developmental disorders shall be
as available and at parity with that for other medical illnesses.”).
292 Id. § 23-99-503(6) (“‘Mental illnesses’ and ‘developmental disorders’ mean those
illnesses and disorders listed in the International Classification of Diseases Manual and
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders . . . .”).
293 ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 23-99-506(a) (LexisNexis Supp. 2009) (“A health benefit
plan that provides benefits for the diagnosis and treatment of mental illnesses shall pro-
vide the benefits under the same terms and conditions as provided for covered benefits:
(1) The duration or frequency of coverage; (2) The dollar amount of coverage; or (3)
Financial requirements.”).
294 DSM-IV-TR, supra note 25, at 20–21. R
295 Id. at 19.
296 Id. at 422–23.
297 Id. at 422.
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ment for a postpartum illness thus can benefit from federal and Arkansas
parity requirements as long as her condition meets the criteria for a mental
disorder, which usually will be one of the Mood Disorders or a Brief
Psychotic Disorder, even if its onset occurred after the four-week postpartum
period allowed by the DSM-IV-TR.  As a result, I do not anticipate that
future judicial opinions interpreting state mental health parity law in juris-
dictions such as Arkansas will provide further legal discussion or under-
standing of postpartum illness beyond characterizing it as a depressive,
bipolar, or psychotic illness because a finding of postpartum onset is not
necessary to the application of mental health parity requirements.
In other jurisdictions, however, the result might be different.  Some
states do not reference the DSM or the ICD in their definitions of mental
health benefits.298  Instead, some states mandate parity between the benefits
offered for physical and mental illnesses and define the mental illnesses that
benefit from the parity requirement in terms of whether they are “biologi-
cally-based.”  New Jersey, for example, requires certain health benefit plans
to provide benefits for biologically-based mental illnesses under the same
terms and conditions as provided for other sicknesses.299  New Jersey defines
a “biologically-based mental illness” as a “mental or nervous condition that
is caused by a biological disorder of the brain and results in a clinically
significant or psychological syndrome or pattern that substantially limits the
functioning of the person with the illness . . . .”300  A New Jersey woman
who is insured by a regulated health benefit plan and requests treatment for a
postpartum illness thus can benefit from New Jersey’s mental health parity
provisions if she can prove that her postpartum condition is caused by a
biological disorder of the brain and substantially limits her functioning.301  I
anticipate that in future litigation in which a health insurance company ref-
uses to provide equal insurance coverage for a woman’s postpartum illness
treatments due to the illness not being biologically-based (along the same
The symptoms of the postpartum-onset Major Depressive, Manic, or Mixed Epi-
sode do not differ from the symptoms in nonpostpartum mood episodes.  Symp-
toms that are common in postpartum-onset episodes, though not specific to
postpartum onset, include fluctuations in mood, mood lability, and preoccupation
with infant well-being, the intensity of which may range from overconcern to
frank delusions.
Id.
298 See, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE § 10144.5(d)(1)–(9) (West 2005) (defining “severe
mental illness” in terms of certain listed disorders).
299 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17B:27A-19.7 (2006) (“Every small employer health benefits
plan that provides hospital or medical expense benefits . . . shall provide benefits for
biologically-based mental illness under the same terms and conditions as provided for
any other sickness under the health benefits plan.”).
300 Id.  Section 17B:27A-19.7 also provides an illustrative, but not exhaustive, list of
conditions that the New Jersey Legislature believes are biologically-based, including
schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder, major depressive disorder, bipolar disorder, para-
noia, and other psychotic disorders, obsessive-compulsive disorder, panic disorder, and
pervasive developmental disorder or autism. Id.
301 Id.
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lines as the previously examined Blake v. UnionMutual Stock Life Insurance
Company, in which the defendant insurer argued that Pam Blake’s postpar-
tum depression was not a physical illness),302 the plaintiff would rely on one
or more of the studies presented in Part I of this Article or comparable testi-
mony in an attempt to prove that her postpartum illness has identifiable hor-
monal, biochemical, neuroanatomical, genetic, or other physical markers
and, therefore, is biologically-based.  To the extent a court agrees (or dis-
agrees) with the plaintiff’s characterization of her postpartum illness as bio-
logically-based, a new legal understanding of postpartum illness exists.
The Arkansas and New Jersey parity provisions discussed above pro-
vide two approaches to mental health parity.  A third approach, similar to the
second approach, is taken by states that expressly tie their definition of pro-
tected mental health conditions to those conditions that “current medical
science affirms” is caused by an organic or physiological disorder.  Ne-
braska, for example, defines a “serious mental illness” as “any mental
health condition that current medical science affirms is caused by a biologi-
cal disorder of the brain and that substantially limits the life activities of the
person with the serious mental illness.”303  If a state-regulated health insur-
ance plan provides coverage for “serious mental illnesses,” Nebraska law
requires the insurance plan to provide coverage for health care rendered by
certain listed individuals as well as health care provided in certain listed
facilities.304  I anticipate that in future Nebraska litigation in which a defen-
dant insurance company refuses to cover health care rendered by a listed
individual or within a listed facility for a plaintiff’s postpartum illness, the
plaintiff may point to one or more of the studies discussed in Part I of this
Article or comparable expert testimony in an attempt to prove that current
medical science has affirmed that her postpartum illness is caused by a
brain-based biological disorder.  To the extent a court agrees (or disagrees)
that current medical science has affirmed that the plaintiff’s postpartum ill-
ness is caused by brain-based biological disorder, a new legal understanding
of postpartum illness exists.
Assuming for the moment that a particular plaintiff’s postpartum illness
does substantially limit her functioning, the question becomes whether a
court interpreting the New Jersey and Nebraska mental health parity provi-
302 Blake v. UnionMutual Stock Life Ins. Co., No. 87-0543-CIV, 1989 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 16331 (S.D. Fla. March 10, 1989); Blake v. UnionMutual Stock Life Ins. Co., 906
F.2d 1525, 1525 (11th Cir. 1990).
303 NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-792(5)(b) (2004).  Section 44-792(5)(b) also provides an
illustrative, but not exhaustive, list of conditions that the Nebraska Legislature believes
that current medical science affirms are caused by biological disorders of the brain in-
cluding schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder, delusional disorder, bipolar affective dis-
order, major depression, and obsessive compulsive disorder.
304 Id. § 44-793(2).  Notably, this section of the statute also contains a caveat provid-
ing that “[t]he issuer of a health insurance plan may require a health care provider under
this subsection to enter into a contract as a condition of providing benefits.” Id.  The law
is silent as to any limits on what the provisions of such a contract may contain.
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sions should find that postpartum illness is a “biological disorder of the
brain” or that “current medical science affirms [postpartum illness] is
caused by a biological disorder of the brain,” respectively.305  Stedman’s
Medical Dictionary, a standard medical dictionary, defines “biological” as
“derived or obtained from living organisms” and “biology” as “the science
concerned with the phenomena of life and living organisms.”306  Attempts to
define the word “disorder” in the context of mental illness have resulted in
vigorous debates and significant controversy due in part to disagreement re-
garding the corresponding concepts of order and normality, the implications
of a definition of “disorder” for health conditions that may be sociocul-
turally bound, as well as the use of a fixed set of criteria for diagnosing
mental disorders.307  Notwithstanding, most standard medical dictionaries de-
fine “disorder” as “a disturbance of bodily function, structure, or both.”308
I believe that applying these definitions to the current scientific under-
standing of postpartum illness could reasonably support the classification of
postpartum illness as a biological disorder of the brain (i.e., a disturbance of
brain function, structure, or both).  In the context of neurotransmitters,309 it is
helpful to reconsider the 2008 study published by scientists at The Univer-
sity of Pittsburgh and Emory University using positron-emission tomogra-
phy (“PET”) to investigate brain serotonin-1A (“5HT1A”) receptor binding
and finding that postsynaptic 5HT1A receptor binding in the subjects with
postpartum depression was reduced 20% to 28% relative to controls.310  The
scientists concluded that their findings demonstrated a “neurobiological def-
icit” in women with postpartum depression.311  In terms of the medical dic-
tionary definition of “disorder” defined above, these findings certainly
could be classified as a disturbance in brain function.
Also reconsider the 1998 study published by the group of German
scientists who used computed tomography to quantify the CSF spaces in 14
women, 12 of whom had cycloid psychoses with postpartum onset, and find-
ing that certain CSF spaces were significantly larger in patients with postpar-
tum psychosis when compared to age-matched female patients with non-
305 See supra text accompanying notes 300–303. R
306 STEDMAN’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 220 (28th ed. 2006).
307 See, e.g., ALLAN V. HORWITZ & JEROME C. WAKEFIELD, THE LOSS OF SADNESS:
HOW PSYCHIATRY TRANSFORMED NORMAL SORROW INTO DEPRESSIVE DISORDER 110–11
(2007) (discussing the controversy surrounding the meaning of the term “disorder” in the
context of mental health and mental illness); DSM-IV-TR, supra note 25, at xxx R
(“[A]lthough this manual provides a classification of mental disorders, it must be admit-
ted that no definition adequately specifies precise boundaries for the concept of ‘mental
disorder.’  The concept of mental disorder, like many other concepts in medicine and
science, lacks a consistent operational definition that covers all situations.”).
308 STEDMAN’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY at 567, supra note 306. R
309 I defined “neurotransmitters” in Part I as endogenous chemicals in the brain that
are responsible for relaying, amplifying, and modulating signals between neurons and
other cells. See supra text accompanying note 76. R
310 See Moses-Kolko, supra note 80, at 685. R
311 Id.
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postpartum cycloid psychoses or bipolar affective disorders outside the puer-
perium.312  The scientists concluded that their findings “could reflect an un-
specific neurostructural vulnerability marker in some patients with
postpartum psychosis,”313 which could reasonably be classified as a distur-
bance of bodily structure.
In summary, many of the scientific studies presented in Part I of this
Article could reasonably be classified as suggesting or finding disturbances
in brain structure or function of women with postpartum illness and, thus,
suggesting or finding a biological disorder of the brain for purposes of ap-
plying mental health parity law in states such as New Jersey and Nebraska.314
As such, advances in the scientific understanding of postpartum illness may
impact the result of future insurance litigation in favor of some women with
postpartum illness.
B. Implications for Disability Discrimination Law
In addition to judicial interpretations of mental health parity laws, fu-
ture legal understandings of postpartum illness may also be found in judicial
interpretation of disability discrimination laws, including the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”)315 as amended by the ADA Amend-
ments Act of 2008 (“ADAAA”).316  A brief summary of the ADA as
amended by the ADAAA is necessary before proceeding.
On July 26, 1990, President George H.W. Bush signed the ADA into
law to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimina-
tion of discrimination against individuals with disabilities.317  The original
ADA provided a three-prong definition of disability (i) a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of such
individual; (ii) a record of such an impairment; or (iii) being regarded as
having such an impairment.318  Implementing regulations defined “physical
or mental impairment” as:
(1) Any physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfigure-
ment, or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following
body systems: neurological, musculoskeletal, special sense organs,
respiratory (including speech organs), cardiovascular, reproduc-
tive, digestive, genito-urinary, hemic and lymphatic, skin, and en-
docrine; or (2) Any mental or psychological disorder, such as
312 See Lanczik, supra note 88, at 45. R
313 Id.
314 See supra text accompanying notes 299–303. R
315 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12206 (2006)).
316 ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3533 (2008).
317 Americans with Disabilities Act, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990).
318 Id. § 3(2)(A)–(C) (pre-ADAAA definition of disability).
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mental retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental
illness, and specific learning disabilities.319
Traditionally, ADA plaintiffs who claim disability status based on depres-
sive, anxiety, or psychotic disorders have relied on the second clause in the
definition of impairment (the “mental or psychological disorder” clause),
and not the first clause (the “physiological disorder” clause).320  The scien-
tific studies presented in Part I of this Article, especially those studies sug-
gesting or finding neuroanatomical vulnerabilities321 and neurofunctional
deficits322 in women with postpartum depression and psychosis, may provide
some support for a future ADA plaintiff with postpartum illness to argue that
she has a physiological condition that affects her neurological and endocrine
systems and, therefore, that she has a “physiological disorder” within the
meaning of the first clause of the definition.  However, I do not anticipate
that future litigants or courts will spend significant time arguing or resolving
the issue whether postpartum illness is a physical versus mental impairment
under the ADA because no distinction in legal result exists.  Stated another
way, an ADA plaintiff who has either a “physiological disorder” or a
“mental or psychological disorder” may attempt to qualify as a protected
individual with a disability under the ADA.
The original ADA made clear, however, that even if an ADA plaintiff
has a physical or mental impairment, the impairment also must substantially
limit one or more major life activities of the individual in order for the indi-
vidual to be a protected individual with a disability for purposes of the
ADA.323  Although regulations implementing the original ADA defined the
“major life activities” that must be substantially limited as “functions such
as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing,
speaking, breathing, learning, and working,”324 the interpretation of the
phrase “substantially limit” was left to the courts.
Nine years after the original ADA’s enactment, the United States Su-
preme Court in Sutton v. United Air Lines held that the phrase “substantially
limits” requires that an individual be presently—not potentially or hypothet-
ically—substantially limited in a major life activity.325  According to Sutton,
319 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1)–(2) (2009).
320 See, e.g., Schneiker v. Fortis Ins. Co., 200 F.3d. 1055, 1061 (7th Cir. 2000) (ana-
lyzing the ADA plaintiff’s major depression under the “mental or psychological disorder”
language); Snead v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 237 F.3d 1080, 1088 & n.8 (9th Cir.
2001) (analyzing the plaintiff’s depression under the “mental or psychological disorder”
language and noting that, “[a]t least four other circuits agree that depression can consti-
tute a mental impairment under the ADA”).
321 See, e.g., Lanczik, supra note 88, at 45. R
322 See, e.g., Moses-Kolko, supra note 80, at 685; Maurer-Spurej, supra note 78, at R
23–25, 27.
323 Americans with Disabilities Act, Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 3(2)(A), 104 Stat. 327
(1990).
324 See 29 C.F.R. §1630.2(i) (2009).
325 Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 482 (1999).
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an individual whose physical or mental impairment is corrected by medica-
tion or other mitigating measures does not have an impairment that presently
substantially limits a major life activity and, therefore, is not a protected
individual with a disability.326  Twelve years after the original ADA’s enact-
ment, the Supreme Court in Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v.
Williams further narrowed the broad scope of protection intended to be af-
forded by the ADA and held that an individual’s impairment must be perma-
nent or long-term and must prevent or severely restrict the individual from
doing activities that are of central importance to most people’s daily lives.327
Following the publication of Sutton and Toyota but before the enact-
ment of the new ADAAA, the Supreme Court and lower courts across the
country found that a number of individuals with a wide range of physical
and mental impairments, including depressive and anxiety disorders, were
not protected individuals with disabilities328 in part because their medica-
tions, psychotherapy, and other treatments constituted mitigating mea-
sures.329  In cases specifically involving individuals with postpartum
depression, the courts tended to deny disability status on the ground that the
plaintiff’s postpartum depression imposed only a short-term or temporary
restriction on a woman’s major life activities.330
326 Id. at 482.
Looking at the Act as a whole, it is apparent that if a person is taking measures to
correct for, or mitigate, a physical or mental impairment, the effects of those mea-
sures—both positive and negative—must be taken into account when judging
whether that person is “substantially limited” in a major life activity and thus
“disabled” under the Act.
Id.
327 Toyota Motor Mfr. Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 185 (2002).
328 ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2(a), 122 Stat. 3533
(2008) (explaining that following the publication of the Sutton and Toyota cases, “lower
courts have incorrectly found in individual cases that people with a range of substantially
limiting impairments are not people with disabilities . . . .”).
329 See e.g., Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 565–66 (1999) (declaring
that mitigating measures encompass not only artificial aids, such as medications and de-
vices, but also measures undertaken, whether consciously or not, with the body’s own
systems, including subconscious mechanisms for compensating and coping with visual
impairments); Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 527 U.S. 516, 521 (1999) (noting
that the determination of whether petitioner’s impairment substantially limited one or
more major life activities was properly made with reference to the mitigating factor of
blood pressure medication); Orr v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 297 F.3d 720, 724 (8th Cir.
2002) (dismissing the claims of a pharmacist with diabetes who controlled his condition
with insulin injections and a controlled diet); Chenoweth v. Hillsborough Co., 250 F.3d
1328, 1330 (11th Cir. 2001), cert denied, 534 U.S. 1131 (2002) (dismissing the claims of
a nurse with focal onset epilepsy controlled by medication); Boerst v. Gen. Mills Opera-
tions, No. 01-1483, 2002 WL 59637 at *408 (6th Cir. Jan. 15, 2002) (“[The plaintiff’s]
own testimony shows that he suffered no substantial limitation on his ability to work
when Zoloft’s mitigating effects are taken into account.”); Nordwall v. Sears Roebuck &
Co., No. 01-1691, 2002 WL 31027956 (7th Cir. Sept. 6, 2002) (dismissing the claims of
an administrative assistant with diabetes who controlled her condition to some degree by
daily blood sugar tests and daily injections of insulin).
330 See infra text accompanying notes 331–340. R
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In the Sixth Circuit case of Novak v. MetroHealth Medical Center, for
example, an employee sought leave under the federal Family and Medical
Leave Act (“FMLA”) to care for her 18-year-old daughter who allegedly
had postpartum depression.331  The FMLA authorizes leave for employees to
care for a child 18 years of age or older if the child is suffering from a
serious health condition and is incapable of self-care because of a “physical
or mental disability.”332  According to regulations adopted by the Depart-
ment of Labor interpreting the FMLA, the phrase “physical or mental disa-
bility” as used in the FMLA means a “physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of an individual,”
as defined in the ADA.333  Stated another way, an employee may take FMLA
leave to care for an adult child only if that child has a disability under the
ADA.334  The Sixth Circuit thus had to determine whether the daughter’s
claimed postpartum depression constituted a disability under the ADA in
order to resolve the underlying FMLA claim.
The Sixth Circuit provided three overlapping reasons in support of its
holding that the daughter’s postpartum depression did not constitute a disa-
bility under the ADA.335  First, the mother did not provide sufficient evidence
(other than her daughter’s nonspecific, nonexpert testimony that she could
not “follow the doctor’s orders without some help” and that she was afraid
she might “freak out and not know how to deal with a newborn”) that her
daughter’s postpartum depression was severe.336  Second, evidence from a
physician’s brief certification form and the daughter’s own testimony showed
that the daughter’s postpartum depression only lasted a week or two, and
under Toyota, short-term restrictions on major life activities do not constitute
disabilities.337  Third, the mother failed to provide any evidence showing that
the daughter’s postpartum depression “inflicted any permanent or long-term
impact on her health” or caused the daughter to “endure[ ] any long-term
adverse effects.”338
In a similar case, Shalbert v. Marcincin, the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania also was asked to determine whether the plaintiff’s postpartum de-
pression constituted a disability under the ADA.339  Like the Novak court, the
Shalbert court found that the plaintiff (who began feeling better two months
after she was prescribed the drug Paxil) failed to produce evidence show-
331 503 F.3d 572, 575–76 (6th Cir. 2007).
332 Id. at 581 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C) (2006) and 29 U.S.C. § 2611(12)(B)
(2006)).
333 Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 825.113(c)(2)).
334 Id.




339 Shalbert v. Marcincin, No. 04-5116, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16564, at *17 (E.D.
Pa. Aug. 9, 2005) (finding that the plaintiff failed to produce evidence showing that her
postpartum depression was long-lasting or permanent).
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ing that her postpartum depression was long-lasting or permanent.  The
Shalbert court concluded that, “temporary, non-chronic impairment of short
duration is not a disability covered by the ADA . . . .”340
To remedy the narrow application of the ADA in these and other cases,
President George W. Bush signed the ADAAA into law on September 25,
2008, with the stated goals of (1) restoring the original intent and scope of
the ADA by reinstating a broad scope of protection; (2) overturning the Su-
preme Court’s ruling in Sutton and related cases that disabilities should be
determined with reference to the ameliorative effects of mitigating measures;
(3) rejecting the Supreme Court’s holding in Toyota that the ADA requires
that an impairment severely restrict major life activities; and (4) expressing
Congress’ intent that the focus of ADA compliance and litigation should be
on whether covered entities have complied with their ADA obligations.341
To achieve these ends, the new ADAAA retains the ADA’s basic three-
prong definition of disability (that is, with respect to an individual (i) a phys-
ical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life
activities; (ii) a record of such impairment; or (iii) being regarded as having
such an impairment),342 but clarifies the interpretation of several phrases and
several clauses within this definition.  First, the ADAAA expressly rejects
the Sutton and Toyota courts’ interpretation of the phrase “substantially lim-
its”343 and clarifies that the phrase is intended to be interpreted broadly and
that an impairment that substantially limits one major life activity need not
limit other major life activities in order to be considered a disability.344  Sec-
ond, the ADAAA clarifies that an impairment that is episodic or in remission
remains a disability so long as it substantially limits a major life activity
when active.345  Third, the ADAAA clarifies that the determination of
whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity should be
made without regard to the ameliorative effects of mitigating measures such
as medication or learned behavioral or adaptive neurological
modifications.346
Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, the ADAAA provides a new stat-
utory definition of “major life activity,” which is broader than the regulatory
definition established by the EEOC in its regulations implementing the origi-
nal ADA.347  Under the EEOC regulations implementing the original ADA,
340 Id. at *17.
341 ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2(b), 122 Stat. 3533
(2008).
342 Id. § 4(a) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2006)).
343 Id. § 2(b)(3)–(4).
344 Id. § 4 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2006)).
345 Id.
346 Id.
347 Id.  Although the original ADA did not define the phrase “major life activity,”
regulations promulgated by the EEOC did.  See also Ray v. Glidden Co., 85 F.3d 227,
229 (5th Cir. 1996) (“The ADA does not define ‘substantially limits’ and ‘major life
activities.’  But, regulations promulgated by the EEOC under the ADA define both.”).
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“major life activities” were defined as “functions such as caring for oneself,
performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing,
learning, and working.”348  The ADAAA not only contains an expanded list
of “major life activities,” including “caring for oneself, performing manual
tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending,
speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicat-
ing, and working,” but also identifies certain “major bodily functions” that
are to be included within the definition of “major life activities,” including
“the operation of a major bodily function, including but not limited to, func-
tions of the immune system, normal cell growth, digestive, bowel, bladder,
neurological, brain, respiratory, circulatory, endocrine, and reproductive
functions.”349  On September 23, 2009, the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission issued proposed regulations implementing the ADAAA in the
context of employment.350  If adopted in final form, these regulations would
clarify that certain impairments, including major depression, bipolar disor-
der, and schizophrenia, will consistently meet the definition of disability due
to their substantial limitation of the major life activities of brain function,
thinking, concentrating, interacting with others, sleeping, or caring for
oneself.351
Although ADA plaintiffs generally were not successful in arguing that
postpartum depression constituted a protected disability under the original
ADA,352 I anticipate that future plaintiffs with postpartum illness who are
operating under the authority of the ADAAA may attempt to present hormo-
nal, neurochemical, neuroanatomical, or genetic research or evidence to ar-
gue that they have substantially impaired neurological and/or endocrine
functions and, therefore, that their postpartum illnesses substantially limit a
major bodily function.  And, if the EEOC’s proposed regulations are adopted
in final form, the regulations would almost automatically qualify individuals
with major postpartum depression or postpartum psychosis as individuals
with disabilities.  What should not matter, according to the ADAAA and the
proposed regulations, is evidence showing that a drug has reduced the wo-
man’s symptoms of postpartum depression or psychosis, or evidence show-
ing that the mother was not permanently depressed or psychotic.
348 See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (2009).
349 ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 4, 122 Stat. 3533
(amending 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2006)).
350 Regulations To Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the Americans
With Disabilities Act, as Amended, 74 Fed. Reg. 48431 (Sept. 22, 2009), available at
http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2009/pdf/E9-22840.pdf.
351 Id. at 48441 (proposing new 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(j)(5)(H) (providing examples of
impairments that will consistently meet the definition of disability)).
352 See, e.g., Novak v. Metrohealth, 503 F.3d 572, 582 (6th Cir. 2007); Shalbert v.
Marcincin, No. 04-5116, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16564, at *17 (E.D. Pa., Aug. 9, 2005).
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C. A Limited, Legal Merger of Physical and Mental Illness
Advances in the scientific understanding of postpartum illness com-
bined with recent developments in mental health parity law and disability
discrimination law thus may impact future insurance and disability discrimi-
nation litigation in favor of some women with postpartum illness.  Mental
health parity and disability discrimination law also can serve as platform
from which I can question the appropriateness of health law frameworks that
continue to distinguish physical and mental illness.
Some legal distinctions between physical and mental illness have no
legal consequences.  Consider the ADA’s definition of “physical or mental
impairment,” which contains one clause describing the types of “physiologi-
cal disorders” that may qualify as impairments and a second, separate clause
that describes the types of “mental or psychological disorders” that also may
qualify as impairments.353  I suggested in Part III(B) that the current scien-
tific literature could support the classification of postpartum illness as either
a “mental or psychological disorder” or a “physiological disorder” of the
neurological or endocrine systems.354  Regardless of how a court decides to
categorize postpartum illness, however, a woman with postpartum illness
still may attempt to qualify as a protected individual with a disability.  Stated
another way, even if a court finds that a woman’s postpartum illness is a
“mental or psychological disorder,” the woman still may be a proper ADA
plaintiff if she can show that her postpartum illness substantially limits a
major life activity.
Although some commentators have suggested that the existence of
mental health parity law is evidence that lingering legal distinctions between
physical and mental illness have no legal consequences, a careful review of
mental health parity law reveals several important legal consequences.  At
the federal level, neither MHPA’96 nor MHPA’08 regulates the health benefit
packages of small employers (those with 50 or fewer employees) or insur-
ance offered in the individual market.355  Individuals who have employer-
sponsored group health plan coverage but work at small employers as well
as individuals who purchase health insurance in the individual market may
continue to be subject to inferior mental health benefits.  Second, federal
mental health parity law only requires group health plans that provide both
medical and surgical benefits and mental health or substance use disorder
benefits to adhere to parity requirements.356  Because federal law does not
353 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1)–(2) (2009).
354 See supra text accompanying notes 321–322. R
355 See 29 U.S.C. § 1185a(c)(1) (2006) (small employer exemption); id.
§ 1185a(a)(1)–(2) (regulating only group health plans); Emergency Economic Stabiliza-
tion Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, Subtitle B, § 512(a)(3), 122 Stat 3765, 3881
(2008) (slightly revising but retaining the small employer exemption); id. § 512(a)(1)–(2)
(regulating only group health plans).
356 See 29 U.S.C. § 1185a(a)(1)–(2) (2006) (regulating only a “group health plan . . .
that provides both medical and surgical benefits and mental health benefits”); Emergency
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require covered group health plans to actually offer mental health or sub-
stance use disorder benefits, individuals with mental illness who belong to a
group health plan that does not offer mental health or substance use disorder
benefits will not have access to such benefits unless they purchase them
separately on the individual market, which federal parity law does not regu-
late.  Although some states have responded to these loopholes by enacting
state parity laws that apply to a broader range of insurance plans and/or that
require the offering of mental health benefits,357 other states do no more than
federal law; that is, other states only require large group health plans to
implement parity if they offer mental health benefits.358  Even in those states
that have parity laws that apply to a broader range of insurance plans or that
require the offering of mental health benefits, the parity provisions may only
apply to certain classes of mental illness, such as “biologically-based mental
illness”359 or “serious mental illness.”360  In summary, legal distinctions be-
tween physical and mental illness and among the different types of mental
illness continue to have significant legal consequences in the context of
health insurance.
The two-part question becomes whether (1) continuing legal distinc-
tions between and among physical and mental illness are valid given our
current scientific literature; and (2) whether varying legal consequences
based on such distinctions, such as equal or comprehensive insurance cover-
age versus no insurance coverage, are normatively appropriate.  I believe
that as the scientific understanding of illness (as well as the efficacy of a
range of treatments) continues to progress, legal distinctions between and
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, at § 512(a)(1) (regulating only a “group health plan
. . . that provides both medical and surgical benefits and mental health or substance use
disorder benefits”).
357 See, e.g., National Conference of State Legislators, State Laws Mandating or Reg-
ulating Mental Health Benefits, http://www.ncsl.org/IssuesResearch/Health/StateLaws
MandatingorRegulatingMentalHealthB/tabid/14352/Default.aspx (last visited Nov. 15,
2009) (online resource categorizing state mental health parity laws by whether they re-
quire (1) the offering of health benefits for all mental illnesses; (2) the offering of health
benefits for some mental illnesses, such as biologically-based mental illnesses; or (3)
parity between physical health benefits and mental health benefits if the regulated plan
offers mental health benefits).
358 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-2322(A) (2002) (requiring “any health ben-
efits plan . . . that provides services or health benefits that include mental health services
or mental health benefits . . .” to comply with the State’s parity requirements).
359 See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 514C.22.3 (2007) (defining “biologically-based mental
illness” as “the following psychiatric illnesses: Schizophrenia, Bipolar disorders, Major
depressive disorders, Schizo-affective disorders, Obsessive-compulsive disorders, Perva-
sive developmental disorders, [and] Autistic disorders . . .”); and id. § 514C.22.1 (requir-
ing certain health plans to provide coverage benefits for treatment of biologically based
mental illness if certain criteria are satisfied).
360 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18 § 3343(a)(3) (1999 & LexisNexis Supp. 2008)
(defining “serious mental illness” as “any of the following biologically based mental
illnesses: schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, obsessive-compulsive disorder, major depres-
sive disorder, panic disorder, anorexia nervosa, bulimia nervosa, schizo affective disorder
and delusional disorder . . .”); and id. § 3343(b) (requiring regulated health insurance
carriers to provide coverage for such serious mental illnesses).
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among physical and mental illness are becoming less valid and, as a result,
varying legal consequences less appropriate.
Stated another way, regardless of whether the comparative focus is ill-
ness etiology, effect of illness, treatment modality, or treatment provider,
few distinctions remain between illnesses traditionally classified as
“mental” and “physical.”  Let us test these four methods of comparing a
range of health conditions, some of which have been traditionally classified
as “physical” (including epilepsy, Parkinson’s disease, and brain cancer),
and some of which have been traditionally classified as “mental” (including
major depression, schizophrenia, obsessive-compulsive disorder, and eating
disorders).  The first method of comparison is illness etiology, which is the
primary focus of state mental health parity law and federal disability law and
one area of focus of courts that have interpreted health insurance policy pro-
visions.361  The causes of many health conditions, like postpartum illness, are
incompletely understood at this time, although scientists currently believe
that most illnesses, including both those traditionally classified as “physi-
cal” and “mental,” have multifactorial etiologies that may include genetic,
biological, and environmental factors.  For example, the etiology of epilepsy
is complex and not completely understood in all cases.  Depending on the
person, epilepsy may be caused by a head injury, cerebrovascular disease, a
prenatal injury, heredity, an imbalance in neurotransmitters, or a combina-
tion of these and other unidentified physiological or environmental causes.362
Likewise, the etiology of major depression also is complex and incompletely
understood at this time.  Scientists currently believe that major depression
has genetic, biological, and psychosocial factors.363  Notwithstanding consid-
erable scientific investigation, the etiology of Parkinson’s disease remains
unclear, and scientists continue to debate the role and contribution of ge-
netic, biological, and environmental factors.364  The etiology of schizophre-
nia also remains under investigation, although both biology and
environmental stress are considered probable factors.365  Genetics and the
environment also are likely factors in the etiology of brain cancer, which
361 See supra Part II(B) (judicial interpretation of health insurance policy provisions)
and Parts III(A) and (B) (mental health parity law and federal disability law).
362 See, e.g., World Health Organization, Epilepsy: Key Facts, available at http://
www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs999/en/index.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2009).
363 See, e.g., Department of Health & Human Services, Mental Health: A Report of
the Surgeon General 251 (Dec. 13, 1999) available at http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/
library/mentalhealth/home.html [hereinafter Surgeon General Report].
364 See Kathy Steece-Collier, Eleonora Maries & Jeffrey H. Kordower, Commentary,
Etiology of Parkinson’s Disease: Genetics and Environment Revisited, 99 PROCEEDINGS
NAT’L ACADEMY SCIENCES 13972, 13972 (2002) (“Despite many years of focused re-
search, the causes of [Parkinson’s disease] remain to be elucidated . . . . The relative
contributions of genetic versus environmental factors regarding the cause of [Parkinson’s
disease] have been hotly debated.”).
365 See, e.g., Herbert Y. Meltzer & Ariel Y. Deutch, Neurochemistry of Schizophre-
nia, in BASIC NEUROCHEMISTRY, MOLECULAR, CELLULAR, AND MEDICAL ASPECTS 1053,
1065 (6th ed., George J. Siegel et al. eds., 1999).
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likewise remains incompletely understood.366  Obsessive-compulsive disor-
der also has likely, although not certain, biological and psychosocial fac-
tors.367  In summary, many health conditions have complex, multifactorial
etiologies that would preclude illness etiology from serving as a singular,
distinguishing feature.  More broadly, the “illness etiology” test fails to take
into account current approaches to and models of science including the
“unity of science,” which deemphasizes traditional distinctions between and
among the social sciences (including sociology and psychology) and the nat-
ural sciences (including biology, chemistry, and physics), and emphasizes
the ability of scientists and others to understand phenomena in physics in
terms of chemistry, chemistry in terms of biology, psychology in terms of
biology, and so on.368
A second possible method of comparison requires an analysis of the
effects, symptoms, or consequences of the illness.  The application of this
test, however, does not always lead to the most consistent or rational results.
For example, an individual with an eating disorder who displays symptoms
of dehydration and malnourishment may be classified as an individual with a
physical illness whereas an individual who displays the high and low moods
[T]he etiology of schizophrenia may involve pathological processes which begin
in utero or perinatally and continue to unfold until the brain approaches its adult
anatomical state as a result of extensive neuronal loss and synaptic pruning during
early and late adolescence.  These neurodevelopmental abnormalities are pro-
posed to lead to the activation of pathological neural circuits during adolescence
or young adulthood, perhaps due to severe stress, leading to the emergence of
positive or negative symptoms or both.
Id.
366 See, e.g., ClinicalTrials.gov, A Case Referent Study of Brain Tumors in Adults,
Oct. 6, 2008, http://clinicaltrials.gov/ct2/show/NCT00339300 (“The etiology of brain
cancer is largely unknown, although several chemicals and occupations have been associ-
ated with the disease.”); Paul Kleihues, Adriano Aguzzi & Hiroko Ohgaki, Genetic and
Environmental Factors in the Etiology of Human Brain Tumors, 82–83 TOXICOLOGY LET-
TERS 601, 601–05 (1995) (discussing the genetic and environmental factors in the etiol-
ogy of human brain tumors).
367 See, e.g., Mark F. Eddy & Gordon S. Walbroehl, Recognition and Treatment of
Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder, 57 AM. FAMILY PHYSICIAN 1623, 1624 (1998).
The etiology of obsessive-compulsive disorder is uncertain, but it appears to in-
clude a combination of neurologic and psychologic factors.  The dominant
neurochemical theory of obsessive-compulsive disorder suggests that the neuro-
transmitter serotonin plays a central role in the development of the condition.
Drugs that increase the availability of serotonin in the body are effective in ame-
liorating the symptoms of obsessive-compulsive disorder, while nonserotonergic
medications have been found to have little or no effect.
Id.
368 See generally EDWARD O. WILSON, CONSILIENCE: THE UNITY OF KNOWLEDGE
(1998) (deemphasizing gaps between and among the natural and social sciences, as well
as the arts, and encouraging scholars to bridge those gaps in future research); Martha
Farah, Ph.D., Director, University of Pennsylvania Center for Neuroscience & Society,
Opening Lecture and PowerPoint, Neuroscience Boot Camp, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
(Summer 2009) (providing an overview of the relationship between neuroscience and
society as well as various approaches to understanding relationships between different
scientific disciplines, including the “unity of science” concept).
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associated with bipolar disorder may be classified as an individual with a
mental illness.369  By further example, an individual with severe depression
who engages in self-cutting or who presents to an emergency department
following a failed suicide attempt may be classified as an individual with a
physical illness whereas an individual with severe depression who presents
to an emergency department with suicidal ideations may be classified as an
individual with a mental illness.370
A third possible method of comparison relates to method of treatment.
According to some common law tests, patients who receive individual or
group counseling or other forms of psychotherapy, or who are prescribed
psychoactive drugs or electroconvulsive therapy, are considered individuals
with mental illnesses,371 whereas patients who have received other types of
treatments are considered individuals with physical illnesses.  The applica-
tion of the “method of treatment” test also can lead to somewhat illogical
results, especially in the context of drugs, therapies that rely on electricity,
and surgery, all of which are designed to and do produce physiological
changes in the brain.  For example, an individual who has Parkinson’s dis-
ease and is treated with dopamine-enhancing drugs372 may be classified as an
individual with a physical illness whereas an individual who has schizophre-
nia and is treated with psychoactive drugs373 may be classified as an individ-
ual with a mental illness.  By further example, a woman who has epilepsy
and is treated with an implanted vagus nerve stimulator that delivers an elec-
trical pulse to her brain374 may be classified as an individual with a physical
illness whereas an individual who has medication-resistant depression and is
treated with electroconvulsive therapy that delivers electricity to his brain375
369 See Tovino, supra note 215, at 478–83 (referencing courts that have applied the R
“symptom” test to a range of illnesses).
370 Id.
371 See, e.g., Blake v. UnionMutual Stock Life Ins. Co., No. 87-0543-CIV, 1989 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 16331, at *12 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 10, 1989) (noting that the plaintiff’s postpar-
tum depression was properly considered a mental illness because “[s]he was treated
primarily by psychiatrists receiving well recognized psychiatric treatment, including indi-
vidual psychotherapy, psychoactive drug therapy, electroconvulsive therapy and partici-
pation in group sessions.”).
372 See, e.g., Murata, supra note 216, at S17–20 (discussing the use of Levodopa, a R
dopamine-enhancing drug, for the treatment of Parkinson’s disease).
373 See, e.g., Rune A. Kroken, Erik Johnsen, Torleif Ruud, Tore Wentzel-Larsen &
Hugo A. Jorgensen, Treatment of Schizophrenia with Antipsychotics in Norwegian Emer-
gency Wards, a Cross-Sectional National Study, 9 BMC PSYCHIATRY 24, 24 (2009) (study
evaluating the treatment of patients with schizophrenia with antipsychotics in the Scandi-
navian public health system).
374 See, e.g., S.M. Kabir, C. Rajaraman, C. Rittey, H.S. Zaki, A.A. Kemeny & J.
McMullan, Vagus Nerve Stimulation in Children with Intractable Epilepsy: Indications,
Complications and Outcome, 25 CHILD’S NERVOUS SYSTEM 1097, 1097–1100 (2009) (ret-
rospectively analyzing the indication, complications and outcome of vagus nerve stimula-
tion in intractable childhood epilepsy and concluding that vagus nerve stimulation is a
relatively safe and potentially effective treatment for children with medically intractable
epilepsy).
375 See, e.g., Paula Barros Antunes, Moacyr Alexandro Rosa, Paulo Silva Belmonte-
de Abreu, Maria Ineˆs Rodrigues Lobato & Marcelo P. Fleck, Electroconvulsive Therapy
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may be classified as an individual with a mental illness.  Finally, a woman
who has brain cancer that is surgically removed376 may be classified as an
individual with a physical illness whereas a man who has obsessive-compul-
sive disorder and is surgically implanted with a deep brain stimulator that
stimulates his ventral caudeate nucleus377 may be classified as an individual
with a mental illness.  In summary, the “method of treatment” test fails to
recognize that drugs, electricity-based therapies, and surgeries produce simi-
lar physiological changes in the brain when applied to individuals with ill-
nesses traditionally classified as both “physical” and “mental.”  Even in the
context of psychotherapy, which traditionally has been considered a treat-
ment for mental illness, scientists are uncovering neurobiological findings
that support prior, first-person, subjective reports of efficacy.378
A fourth possible method of comparison relates to treatment provider.
According to some judicial opinions, individuals who are treated by psychia-
trists or psychologists should be classified as individuals with mental ill-
nesses, whereas individuals who are treated by other non-psychiatrist
physicians should be classified as individuals with physical illnesses.379  This
test ignores the fact that many individuals with illnesses traditionally classi-
fied as “mental” receive treatment solely from a non-psychiatrist primary
care physician or general practitioner and that the majority of psychoactive
drugs are prescribed by non-psychiatrist physicians, including primary care
physicians and general practitioners who do not have extensive training in
psychiatry.380  Application of the “treatment provider” test to two different
in Major Depression: Current Aspects, 31 (Supp.1) REVISTA BRASILEIRA DE PSIQUIATRIA
S26, S26–33 (May 2009) (study published in the Brazilian Review of Psychiatry designed
to demonstrate the role of electroconvulsive therapy (“ECT”) in the treatment of depres-
sion, finding that ECT remains a highly efficacious treatment in treatment-resistant de-
pression and with improvements in technique has become safer and more useful for the
both the acute phase and for the prevention of new depressive episodes).
376 See, e.g., A. Romano, G. D’Andrea, G. Minniti, L. Mastronardi, L. Ferrante, L. M.
Fantozzi & A. Bozzao, Pre-Surgical Planning and MR-Tractography Utility in Brain Tu-
mour Resection, 19 EUROPEAN RADIOLOGY 2798, 2798 (2009) (study finding that MR-
tractography can provide neurosurgeons with new anatomical views that may impact sur-
gical resection planning for brain neoplasms).
377 See, e.g., Bruno Aouizerate, Corinne Martin-Guehl, Emmanuel Cuny, Dominique
Guehl, Helene Amieva, Abdelhamid Benazzouz, Colette Fabrigoule, Bernard Bioulac,
Jean Tignol & Pierre Burbaud, Deep Brain Stimulation for OCD and Major Depression,
162 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 2192, 2192 (2005) (stating that deep brain stimulation of the
ventral caudate nucleus continues to be a promising strategy for the treatment of refrac-
tory cases of both OCD and major depression).
378 See, e.g., LOUIS J. COZOLINO, THE NEUROSCIENCE OF PSYCHOTHERAPY: BUILDING
AND REBUILDING THE HUMAN BRAIN (2002) (arguing that many forms of psychotherapy
are supported by neuroscientific findings).
379 See, e.g., Blake v. UnionMutual Stock Life Ins. Co., No. 87-0543-CIV, 1989 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 16331, at *12 (S.D. Fla. March 10, 1989) (noting that the plaintiff’s postpar-
tum depression was properly considered a mental illness because “she was treated prima-
rily by psychiatrists receiving well recognized psychiatric treatment . . .”).
380 See, e.g., RALPH REISNER, CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN & ARTI RAI, LAW AND THE
MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL ASPECTS 110 (4th ed. West 2004) (“[T]he
‘bulk of psychotropic medications are in fact’ not being prescribed by psychiatrists, but
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individuals with the same condition thus could lead to different or illogical
results if one individual receives treatment from a psychiatrist and the sec-
ond individual receives treatment from a non-psychiatrist physician for the
same condition.  In addition, the “treatment provider” test assumes that an
individual with a primary diagnosis will only see one type of health care
provider when, in reality, many ill individuals see multiple physicians with
different areas of expertise.  An estimated 25% of cancer patients meet
clinical criteria for major depression, for example, and are encouraged to and
do obtain treatment by psychiatrists and other mental health care providers
affiliated with their institutional cancer care providers.381  By further exam-
ple, scientists continue to investigate rather strong associations between de-
pression and osteoporosis, which suggests that individuals with depression
also may need treatment from an endocrinologist, orthopedist, family practi-
tioner, an expert in physical medicine and rehabilitation, or other physician
who specializes in osteoporosis care.382  In summary, application of the
“treatment provider” test may not lead to the most consistent, rational re-
sults.  The “treatment provider” test also fails to recognize the push within
some medical and scientific circles to merge the disciplines of neurology and
psychiatry.383
As the empirical study of the cost and efficacy of mental health care
advances, legal consequences to individuals with illnesses traditionally clas-
sified as “mental” also become less appropriate.  Old data cited by insurance
companies and employers finding that treatments for mental versus physical
instead ‘are being prescribed by primary care physicians who have no extensive training
in the treatment of mental disorders.’”).
381 See, e.g., Karen Stuyck, Psychotherapy Extends Cancer Care Beyond the Physi-
cal, 53 ONCOLOG 1–2 (2008) available at http://www2.mdanderson.org/depts/oncolog/
pdfs-issues/08/oncolog6-08.pdf (reporting that “[a]nywhere from 20% to 70% of cancer
survivors experience some level of depression and/or anxiety, depending on other stres-
sors in their life; and the U.S. National Cancer Institute estimates that 25% of cancer
patients experience major depression” and referencing the psychiatric services available
through The University of Texas M. D. Anderson Cancer Center).
382 See, e.g., Williams, supra note 142, at 16–25 (reviewing the relationship between R
depression and bone metabolism); National Osteoporosis Foundation, How to Find a
Doctor, http://www.nof.org/patientinfo/finding_doctor.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2009).
There is no single type of healthcare provider or medical specialty that focuses on
osteoporosis. Also, there is no certification program for health professionals who
treat the disease.  Over time, some healthcare providers in different medical spe-
cialties have gained the knowledge and expertise to diagnose and treat people
with osteoporosis.  These specialties include endocrinology, family practice, geri-
atrics, gynecology, internal medicine, orthopedics, physical medicine and rehabil-
itation, and rheumatology.
Id.
383 See, e.g., Mark Moran, Psychiatry, Neurology Urged to Become One Discipline,
43 PSYCHIATRIC NEWS, Nov. 21, 2008, at 1, 4 (quoting Dr. Stuart Yudofsky as stating that,
“I believe psychiatry and neurology should be combined into one profession . . . .”). But
see Thomas Szasz, Letter to the Editor: Merger of Psychiatry, Neurology, 44 PSYCHIAT-
RIC NEWS, March 6, 2009, at 25, 25 (explaining that psychiatry and neurology formerly
comprised a single discipline referred to as “mad-doctoring” or “neuropsychiatry,” and
arguing that the reestablishment of psychiatry as a medical specialty is redundant).
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illnesses compared unfavorably in terms of cost384 are being replaced with
new data showing that mental health treatments are not more expensive and
that the implementation of managed mental health care and mental health
parity can result in lower total health care costs.385  Old data suggesting that
treatments for mental versus physical illness compared unfavorably in terms
of efficacy386 are being replaced with new data, including a recent report by
the Surgeon General finding that mental illness is very treatable.387  Old con-
cerns regarding the ability of some individuals to malinger, or fake, mental
illness,388 are being replaced with new data showing that psychological tests
can successfully detect malingering389 and that urine, blood, and radiological
diagnostic tests soon may provide a method of diagnosing the existence of,
or a predisposition or vulnerability to, mental illness.390
Given advances in the scientific understanding of illness and treatment
efficacy as well as the empirical study of the cost and efficacy of mental
health care, I thus propose a limited, legal merger of physical and mental
illness.  I will first address the limitations on such merger.  I do not currently
propose the elimination of distinctions between types of individual or insti-
tutional health care providers or illnesses to the extent that these distinctions
attempt to identify patient populations with particular needs, encourage the
development of diagnostic and treatment services for such patients, or at-
tempt to route patients with particular health conditions to the most appropri-
ate care provider.  For example, many states have enacted mental health
384 See SETHI, supra note 270, at 14; Beigel, supra note 270, at 668; Brown, supra R
note 270, at 53; Kaplan, supra note 268, at 328. R
385 See, e.g., William Dodge, Health Coverage Should Include Mental Illness, S. F.
CHRON., Apr. 22, 1999, at A27 (referencing several studies finding that the implementa-
tion of managed mental health care and mental health parity, as well as the emphasis on
primary mental health care, can lower total health care costs).
386 See, e.g., Brown, supra note 270, at 53 (“Until as recently as 1990, the diagnosis R
and treatment of mental illnesses were relatively unsuccessful.  Thus, to avoid the long-
term expenses associated with mental illnesses, many [health insurance] policies have
addressed the nature of the coverage provided for mental illness.  Typically, they exclude
or limit coverage, including the period for which benefits are payable.”).
387 See, e.g., SURGEON GENERAL REPORT, supra note 363, at 64 (“Mental disorders are R
treatable, contrary to what many think.”).
388 See, e.g., Pamela Kulbarsh, Why Would Anyone Want to Fake Mental Illness?,
LAWYER.COM, June 16, 2009, http://www.lawofficer.com/news-and-articles/columns/
Kulbarsh/malingering.html# (defining “malingering” as the “intentional production of
false or exaggerated physical or psychological complaints with the goal of receiving a
reward,” noting that malingering has been estimated to occur in 7.5% to 33% of all
disability claims, and stating that malingering depletes Social Security, disability, work-
ers compensation, and insurance funds).
389 See, e.g., David J. Schretlen, The Use of Psychological Tests to Identify Malin-
gered Symptoms of Mental Disorder, 8 CLINICAL PSYCHOL. REV. 451, 451 (1988) (noting
the importance of detecting malingering in both the medical and legal contexts and find-
ing that the majority of studies show that psychological tests can accurately detect
malingering).
390 See supra text accompanying notes 66–70 (discussing the potential of a hormone R
test to predict the onset of postpartum illness) and 90–95 (discussing the potential of R
neuroimaging to identify vulnerability to postpartum illness).
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code provisions that permit counties, hospital districts, local agencies, and
other entities to establish community mental health centers that provide di-
agnosis and treatment services for individuals with mental illness and sub-
stance use disorders and that encourage the referral of patients with certain
diagnoses to these centers.391  These code provisions are premised on find-
ings showing that patients with illnesses traditionally classified as “mental”
are underserved and have fewer treatment and placement options than pa-
tients with illnesses traditionally classified as “physical.”392  To the extent all
patient populations become equally served and patients with particular needs
are always routed to the most appropriate care providers, this proposal
should be revisited.
I also do not currently propose the elimination of distinctions between
types of individual or institutional health care providers or illnesses in health
care regulation to the extent the purpose of the regulation is to protect pa-
tients with illnesses traditionally classified as “mental” due to findings of
heightened abuse, neglect, and exploitation in this patient population, as well
as the inability of such patients to have and exercise basic human and pa-
tients’ rights.  For example, many state legislatures have passed laws that
give patients with illnesses traditionally classified as “mental” the same
rights as non-patients, such as the right to vote, the right to sue and be sued,
and the right to religious freedom.393  Congress and many state legislatures
also have passed laws that give patients with illnesses traditionally classified
as “mental” the same rights as other patients, including the right to medical
privacy and the right to be free from unnecessary restraint and seclusion.394
To the extent patients with illnesses traditionally classified as “mental” be-
come no more vulnerable than other patients and have and are able to exer-
cise their basic human and patients’ rights, this proposal should be revisited.
I also will not identify as a “first target” for revision legal distinctions
between physical and mental illness, such as the ADA’s distinction between
“physiological disorders” and “mental or psychological disorders” in its
definition of “physical or mental impairment,” when such distinctions do
not have legal consequences; however, these distinctions should be removed
as time and resources permit to enable the language of the law to more
closely resemble the current scientific understanding of illness.
I do, however, propose the immediate elimination of distinctions be-
tween types of individual or institutional health care providers or illnesses in
health law to the extent the purpose of the distinction is to provide less legal
391 See, e.g., TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 534.001(a)–(b)(1) (Vernon 2003 & West
Supp. 2009).
392 See, e.g., TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 534.0015(b) (West Supp. 2009).
393 See, e.g., TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 576.001(a) (Vernon 2003 & West Supp.
2009); id. at § 576.001(b) (“A person with mental illness in this state [of Texas] has the
rights, benefits, responsibilities, and privileges guaranteed by the constitution and laws of
the United States and this state.”).
394 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 10841 (2006) (establishing the “Restatement of Bill of
Rights for Mental Health Patients”).
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protection or fewer benefits to individuals with illnesses traditionally classi-
fied as “mental.”  One method of implementing this proposal would be to
repeal current federal mental health parity law and enact in its place a new
provision that would prohibit all health insurers, public and private, from
distinguishing physical and mental illness in their individual and group
health insurance policies and plans.  This proposal would eliminate the need
for the concept of mental health parity and would remedy the contractual
problem presented in the Blake v. UnionMutual Stock Life Insurance Com-
pany litigation discussed at length in Part II(B), in which the health insur-
ance policy issued to plaintiff Pam Blake distinguished physical illness
(defined as an “illness or disease . . . [including pregnancy] unless excluded
elsewhere”) from mental illness (“any mental, nervous or emotional dis-
eases or disorders”) and limited Blake’s coverage of mental illness to only
30 days of inpatient care and $1,000 worth of outpatient treatments.  This
proposal also would eliminate the need for common law tests designed to
distinguish physical and mental illness, including the “treatment provided to
the patient test,” the “symptoms of illness test,” and the “origin of disease
test.”
To achieve the same result without repealing current mental health par-
ity law, a second method would be to amend existing parity laws to require
all insurers, public and private, that offer individual and group medical and
surgical insurance benefits to also offer mental health and substance use dis-
order benefits and to make those benefits equal to offered medical and surgi-
cal benefits.  To implement this proposal, Congress could (1) delete the
introductory clause (“In the case of a group health plan (or health insurance
coverage offered in connection with such a plan) that provides both medical
and surgical benefits and mental health and substance use disorder bene-
fits—”) from 42 U.S.C. § 1185a(a)(1) (2006) (regulating aggregate lifetime
limits), 42 U.S.C. § 1185a(a)(2) (2006) (regulating annual limits), 42 U.S.C.
§ 1185a(a)(3) (2006) (regulating financial requirements and treatment limi-
tations), and 42 U.S.C. § 1185a(a)(5) (2006) (addressing care provided in
the out-of-network context) and replace it with the following language: “In
the case of a public or private individual or group health plan (or health
insurance coverage offered in connection with such a plan) . . . ”; (2) delete
the construction language currently set forth at 42 U.S.C. § 1185a(b) (2006)
that provides, “Nothing in this section shall be construed—(1) as requiring a
group health plan (or health insurance coverage offered in connection with
such a plan) to provide any mental health or substance use disorder bene-
fits”; (3) delete the small employer exception at 42 U.S.C. § 1185a(c)(1)
(2006); (4) create a new paragraph at 42 U.S.C. § 1185a(a)(6) (2006) that
provides, “In the case of a public or private individual or group health plan
(or health insurance coverage offered in connection with such a plan) that
provides medical and surgical benefits, the plan shall also provide mental
health and substance use disorder benefits.”; and (5) make conforming
changes to 42 U.S.C. § 1185a(b)(2) (2006) as well as other Medicare and
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Medicaid provisions, as necessary.  I emphasize that my proposals would
apply to both private and public health plans in light of current federal law,
which provides fewer Medicare and Medicaid benefits for inpatient psychi-
atric hospital services and care received at institutions for mental disease,
respectively,395 compared to inpatient non-psychiatric hospital services.
D. Conclusion
In this Article, I used postpartum illness as an example of a health con-
dition that has an evolving scientific understanding to demonstrate that the
science lawmakers use to support and interpret health law and policy is not
always accurate.  Further, I suggest that lawmakers who rely on outdated
scientific findings risk developing inappropriate health laws and policies,
encouraging the introduction of expert testimony that will not meet eviden-
tiary standards, establishing conflicts between different health laws and poli-
cies, and supporting the public misunderstanding of health conditions.  I
hope that readers will project the concerns I have expressed in the context of
postpartum law and policy to other areas of health law including, but cer-
tainly not limited to, compulsory immunization law and policy, which is
currently based on scientific findings regarding the safety and efficacy of
early childhood vaccines but is being challenged by some parents who be-
lieve that their children are developing autism and other disorders as a result
of vaccines;396 disease reporting law and policy, which is based on epidemio-
logical findings relating to communicable diseases such as the swine flu and
395 See 42 C.F.R. § 409.62 (2009) (federal Medicare regulation limiting inpatient psy-
chiatric hospital services to 190 lifetime days); 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(i) (2006) (federal
Medicaid provision defining the term “institution for mental diseases” as “a hospital,
nursing facility, or other institution of more than 16 beds, that is primarily engaged in
providing diagnosis, treatment, or care of persons with mental diseases, including medi-
cal attention, nursing care, and related services”); 42 C.F.R. § 435.1009(a)(2) (2009)
(federal Medicaid regulation providing that federal financial participation is not available
for services provided to “individuals under age 65 who are patients in an institution for
mental diseases unless they are under age 22 and are receiving inpatient psychiatric ser-
vices”). See generally Sara Rosenbaum & Joel Teitelbaum, George Washington Univer-
sity School of Public Health and Health Services Issue Briefs, Issue Brief #2: An Analysis
of the Medicaid IMD Exclusion 2 (Dec. 19, 2002) available at http://www.gwumc.edu/
sphhs/departments/healthpolicy/CHPR/downloads/behavioral_health/reports/IMD%20Re
port%201202.pdf) (noting that the Medicaid limitation on coverage of care provided at
institutions for mental diseases raises several policy questions and poses several impor-
tant questions: “As researchers gain an increasing understanding of the biological basis
of many forms of mental illness, does the exclusion continue to have meaning other than
as a financial penalty?  If conditions classified as ‘mental diseases’ in fact increasingly
are treated through medical therapies and treatments that require limited to no traditional
psychiatric intervention, is there still a justification for the exclusion?”).
396 See, e.g., U.S. Court of Federal Claims, Omnibus Autism Proceeding, available at
http://www.uscfc.uscourts.gov/omnibus-autism-proceeding (last visited Nov. 15, 2009)
(providing information about lawsuits filed by parents against the federal government
seeking compensation for the injuries allegedly sustained by their vaccinated children).
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sexually-transmitted diseases;397 complementary and alternative medicine
and the law and policy, conservative forms of which are loyal to traditional
allopathic medicine and are being challenged by individuals who seek a
more holistic approach to care, including individuals who seek access to
non-physician acupuncturists, chiropractors, homeopaths, naturopaths, mas-
sage therapists, and midwives;398 mental health law and policy, which is
based on scientific findings regarding the safety and efficacy (or lack
thereof) of controversial therapies such as physical restraint, chemical re-
straint, deep brain stimulation, electroconvulsive therapy, and psychosur-
gery;399 and abortion law and policy, which is based in part on scientific
findings relating to fetal viability, maternal health risks associated with abor-
tion, and maternal health risks associated with carrying a child to term.400  In
all of these contexts, lawmakers need to be able to understand the medical
and scientific bases of the health conditions, theories of health care, and
medical or surgical interventions under consideration, use those understand-
ings to inform and shape (but not dictate) the development of appropriate
law and policy, and, perhaps most importantly, revisit existing law when its
medical and scientific foundations have changed.
More broadly, I have attempted to demonstrate that differences between
scientific and legal understandings in health law may relate less to the com-
plexity of the substantive topic under review than to differences between the
process of fact finding in science compared to law.  As illustrated in Part I,
the scientific investigation of postpartum illness has been characterized by
an open-ended search for knowledge with the recognition that scientific
findings published one day are subject to revision the next.  In almost all of
the published scientific studies and review articles referenced in Part I, the
scientist authors emphasized the limitations of their findings, the fact that the
etiology of postpartum illness remains poorly understood, and the fact that
additional research is needed, and identified possible directions for future
397 See, e.g., TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 81.041 (Vernon 2001 & West Supp.
2009) (requiring the reporting of certain communicable diseases in the name of health
promotion and disease prevention).
398 See, e.g., Suzanne Hope Suarez, Midwifery Is Not the Practice of Medicine, 5
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 315, 315 (1993) (arguing that states should legalize traditional
midwifery).
399 Compare TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 578.003(b) (Vernon 2003) (requiring
patients considering electroconvulsive therapy to be informed by their physicians that a
division of medical opinion as to the efficacy of electroconvulsive therapy exists) with
Branning v. Branning, 285 Ill.App.3d 405, 411 (Ill. App. 1996) (finding a “significant”
“liberty interest in refusing unwanted ECT, psychosurgery and services of an ‘unusual,
hazardous, or experimental’ nature.”).
400 See, e.g., TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 170.001(3) (Vernon 2001 & West Supp.
2009) (statutory definition of viability); id. § 171.012(a)(1)(B), (D) (statutory informed
consent provisions addressing maternal health risks).
\\server05\productn\H\HLG\33-1\HLG108.txt unknown Seq: 75 27-JAN-10 12:46
2010] Scientific Understandings of Postpartum Illness 173
research.401  The understanding and expectation of these authors is that future
studies may yield different findings and disprove the authors’ hypotheses.402
As demonstrated in Parts II and III, legislators and judges also have
sought to understand postpartum illness as necessary to make laws that af-
fect and adjudicate disputes involving new mothers, although legal under-
standings of postpartum illness tend to be characterized by factual findings
that are fixed in time.  In very few of the statutes and judicial opinions refer-
enced in this Article did the legislators and judges recognize that postpartum
illness is a complex health condition that remains incompletely understood.
In none of the statutes and judicial opinions referenced in this Article did the
legislators and judges state that their findings should be revisited as the sci-
entific understanding of postpartum illness evolves.  This result is to be ex-
pected in a common law system that is based on the concept of precedent, in
which judges through opinions establish principles and rules that other judi-
cial bodies rely on when deciding subsequent cases involving similar issues.
The result, however, is the eventual discrepancy between scientific and legal
findings in the context of postpartum illness.  For these reasons I do not
conclude, as do so many other health law scholars, that lawmakers simply
need to improve their understanding of the particular scientific relationship,
technology, or health condition (in this case, postpartum illness) under re-
view.  Instead, I also recommend improving the awareness of health law and
policymakers of the existence of differences between scientific and legal
methods and the need to revisit legislative and judicial findings as their med-
ical and scientific foundations evolve.
401 See, e.g., Charles B. Nemeroff, Understanding the Pathophysiology of Postpartum
Depression: Implications for the Development of Novel Treatments, 59 NEURON 185, 185
(2009) (“Depression during pregnancy and in the postpartum period is . . . poorly under-
stood in terms of pathophysiology.”); Lorberbaum, supra note 96, at 99 (“Future work in R
this area may help: (1) unravel the functional neuroanatomy of the parent-infant bond;
and (2) examine whether markers of this bond, such as maternal brain response to infant
crying, can predict maternal style (i.e., child neglect), offspring temperament, or off-
spring depression or anxiety.”).
402 See, e.g., ROBIN DUNBAR, THE TROUBLE WITH SCIENCE 19 (1995) (referencing Aus-
tralian philosopher Karl Popper’s observation that scientists proceed by attempting to dis-
prove, not prove, previously generated hypotheses).
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